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ABSTRACT
THE CATHOLIC LOBBY: THE PERIPHERY DOMINATED CENTER,
PUBLIC OPINION AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 1932-1962
MAY 1996
THOMAS M. MORIARTY, B.A., AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL COLLEGE
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Milton Cantor
This work examines the origins of the Cold War from
the perspective of domestic American politics. Specifically,
the role of the so-called "Catholic vote" in the New Deal
coalition built by President Franklin D. Roosevelt in the
1930s. Catholics comprised roughly one-quarter of the
population and were concentrated in the major urban and
industrial areas of the country. These were the same areas
that dominated the electoral college and thus were of
primary importance to anyone seeking national office or
proposing national policy.
FDR frequently modified his position on national
issues if it appeared this "Catholic vote" might be
jeopardized. Throughout the 1930s, as charges of Communist
influence on FDR and the New Deal increased in intensity,
the official position of the Catholic Church was hardening
iv
into a strict ant i
-Communism. The potential, then, existed
for widespread defections of Catholic voters from the New
Deal coalition over the issue of Communism.
Using a variety of primary sources but especially the
presidential papers located at the Roosevelt Library at Hyde
Park, New York, and the archives of the Archdiocese of
Boston in Brighton, Massachusetts, this work will
demonstrate the impact of Catholic opinion on national
policy, especially foreign policy, as it was reflected in
the attempt to keep the Catholic vote in the Democratic
Party. The response of first FDR and then Presidents Truman
and Eisenhower to Soviet domination of largely Catholic
Eastern Europe following the war suggests that religion,
especially Catholicism, is the overlooked paradigm of the
Cold War.
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CHAPTER 1
"SATAN AND LUCIFER"
When Franklin Roosevelt met with Winston Churchill
at Quebec in August of 1943, the conference was publicly
billed as dealing with military matters affecting both the
Pacific and European theaters of war. By this time the
military situation had turned decidedly in favor of the
Allies. The Soviets were delivering smashing blows to the
Germans on the eastern front, the North African campaign
against Rommel had been successful and Anglo-American forces
were completing operations in Sicily. However, the presence
of American Secretary of State Cordell Hull and British
Foreign Minister Anthony Eden led to press speculation that
postwar political issues were also on the agenda. As the
military situation became more favorable the wartime
political alliance seemed to deteriorate.
Postwar political issues began taking on greater
significance in early 1943, and would occupy more and more
of FDR's thinking as the year progressed. In January,
William C. Bullitt, former U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet
Union wrote a lengthy memorandum to Roosevelt in which he
outlined his fears that Stalin would attempt to dominate
Europe at the end of the war. Bullitt, in a speech at New
York in July 1941, shortly after the Nazi invasion of
Russia, likened the struggle between the two totalitarian
1
powers as "a war between Satan and Lucifer." He concluded
the best course of action for the U.S. would be to let the
Germans and Russians fight it out among themselves in the
belief that the winner would be so weakened as to no longer
threaten Europe. [1]
The very military successes which prompted the
decision to meet at Quebec were at the heart of Bullitt's
memorandum to FDR. It was now apparent that the Soviets not
only stopped Hitler's Wehrmacht in 1942, but, with the
encirclement and destruction of Paulus' Sixth Army at
Stalingrad, were poised to begin throwing the Germans back
in 1943. Bullitt's current concern seems to have been that
Satan [or Lucifer, he did not designate which country
represented whom] was about to emerge from the struggle, but
not in the weakened condition originally forecast.
FDR seems to have been impressed with Bullitt's
argument, which was that the closer the Allies came to
defeating Germany the less influence they would have on
getting Stalin to agree on any postwar settlements . Now was
the time to apply pressure while "Your club would have lead
in it, not cotton." He suggested that FDR threaten a Pacific
first strategy, reduction in aid to the Soviets, possible
di f f iculty in providing postwar aid to rebuild the Soviet
Union, and expressing full opposition to '^predatory Soviet
policy in Europe and Asia." He also advocated striking
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against Germany through the Balkans rather than France, but
only if that decision were based on sound military
considerations. FDR met with Bullitt to discuss the memo and
asked him to continue to keep him informed on his thinking
regarding the political situation as he saw it. [2]
The President also raised the issues contained in
Bullitt's memo with British Foreign Minister Eden in March.
He asked if Eden believed that Stalin's ultimate aim was to
dominate and communize Europe. Eden responded there was no
way to know for sure, but that even if that were his
intention the Allies should continue to work with him and
assume he intended to honor his treaty obligations. Eden
added he was surprised by Roosevelt's belief that Poland
would not prove to be a difficult question to resolve at the
end of the war . FDR felt territorial cone ess ions of East
Pr uss ia and parts of Silesia would make Poland a net gainer
if the Cur z on Line were accepted as its eastern border
.
According to Eden, FDR was also prepared to accept Russian
demands on Finland and the Baltic States, but hoped the
Russians would conduct plebiscites to ratify their
actions
.
[ 3
]
Further complicating the political situation was the
German announcement in April of the discovery of a mass
grave in the Katyn Forest of eastern Poland. The grave
contained the remains of some 10,000 Polish army officers.
3
The Germans claimed the Russians massacred the Polish
officers after occupying eastern Poland in 1939. Stalin
immediately denied the charge, claiming instead that the
Germans themselves had killed the Poles. FDR and Churchill
supported Stalin's position, arguing the Germans were
attempting to sow dissension among the Allies and to
distract worldwide attention from their own massacre then
underway of Jews in the Warsaw ghetto. However, in London,
the Polish government-in-exile requested an investigation of
the charge by the International Red Cross. Stalin
immediately severed relations with the London Poles, further
complicating the situation.
While the Allies were struggling to maintain a
semblance of unity in the face of the Katyn accusations, FDR
began making plans to meet with Stalin one-on-one. While
Churchill had already held face-to-face meetings with the
Soviet Premier, the President had yet to meet his Russian
counterpart. In early May, as FDR and Churchill were
preparing for the Trident Conference, to be held in
Washington, the President sent former Ambassador to the
Soviet Union Joseph Davies to Moscow. Davies was to relay to
Stalin the President's desire to meet sometime in July,
without the presence of the British. Stalin initially agreed
to the meeting but expressed doubts to Davies that such a
4
meeting could take place in the absence of the opening of a
second front in Europe.
Davies reported to FDR that failure to open the
promised second front would have far-reaching consequences
on Soviet attitudes on the prosecution of the war and their
participation in the peace. Stalin's trust in his allies was
obviously diminishing. Whether he believed the Allies were
deliberately holding back and letting the Germans and
Russians slug it out, as Bullitt had publicly suggested, is
uncertain. He did believe that the Soviets were carrying the
brunt of the fighting and expected another major German
offensive in the summer. He also believed the successful
North African campaign and the Allied air offensive against
Germany were insufficient substitutes for the promised
cross-Channel attack
.
[ 4
]
The results of the Trident Conference were exactly
what Stalin feared. Churchill persuaded FDR to postpone the
cross-Channel attack in favor of securing the Mediterranean
and possibly driving Italy out of the war. Stalin sent an
angry reply to Roosevelt's cable informing him of the
Trident decisions. The Soviets could not consent to these
agreements, again reached without Soviet participation, "and
without any attempt at a joint discussion of this highly
important matter and which may gravely affect the subsequent
course of the war." Churchill, now aware that FDR was
5
planning to meet with Stalin without him, began pressing for
a Big Three meeting. Stalin refused, citing pressing needs
on the eastern front which required his presence, although
the Germans had not mounted a major summer offensive as
expected
. t 5
]
So as FDR and Churchill came together at Quebec for
their sixth meeting of the war the political alliance seemed
to be coming apart. Stalin's reaction to this meeting was as
acrimonious as his earlier cable to FDR: "To date it has
been like this: the U.S.A. and Britain reach agreement
between themselves while the U.S.S.R, is informed of the
agreement between the two powers as a third party looking
pass i vely on . " [ 6 ]
The Soviet Premier cont inued to express growing
distrust of his allies. Quebec demonstrated his allies
'
growing distrust of him. The conference produced a secret
agreement regarding the Tube Alloys Project - the atomic
bomb. The agreement stipulated that the weapon would never
be used by either partner against the other or against a
third party without the consent of the other. It also
stipulated that information about the project could not be
passed to a third party except by mutual consent. This in
effect gave both FDR and Churchill a veto over informing
Stalin about the development of the bomb or sharing
information about it . [ 7
]
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FDR did press the British about committing to the
cross-Channel attack in the Spring of 1944 at Quebec. They
also agreed to pursue a meeting of the Big Three later that
fall. When the meeting broke up, both men took short
vacations before returning to Washington for further
discussions. Historians have repeatedly attempted to
determine just what Roosevelt's thinking was at this
cr itical juncture, as preparations began for the first
meeting of the Big Three later that year at Teheran. The
controversy seems to revolve around just how much FDR's
conversations with Bullitt and Eden earlier in the year
reflected his real thinking and how much may have been pure
speculation
.
Herbert Feis contends these early discussions
were an "exercise in imagination" and that "the record of
these discuss ions leaves the impress ion that they were
conducted in a vacuum." Gaddis Smith, on the other hand,
argues that policy was being based on a combination of
naivete and stereotypes held by FDR and his advisors. This
resulted in a formulation of policy "on the basis of hopes
and i 1 lus ion rather than ascertainable f act . " Robert Dallek
presents yet another position, contend ing that Roosevelt was
indeed influenced by Bullitt's arguments and that "he was
uncertain about postwar relations with Russia, he wished to
assure against the possibility that Stalin aimed at
extens i ve European control . " [ 8
]
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By the time Churchill arrived in Washington on
September 1, Italy had accepted the surrender terms of the
Allies. The President invited Archbishop Francis J. Spellman
of New York to dine at the White House along with the Prime
Minister. The following morning FDR met privately with
Spellman for more than an hour. The Archbishop recorded his
impressions of what the President said in a two-page memo
that he sent to the Vatican to his longtime friend and
mentor Pope Pius XII. This document presents a very
different picture regarding the firmness of FDR's views on
the postwar world. According to Spellman, FDR forecast a
postwar world dominated by "spheres of influence" among the
"big four." China would have the dominant interest in the
Far East; the U.S. in the Pacific; Britain and Russia in
Europe and Africa. However, Spellman said FDR believed
Russia would dominate Europe because of Britain's
"predominately colonial interests." While Chiang Kai-shek
would be consulted on "the great decisions concerning
Europe," he would have no influence on them. Moreover, the
U.S. would be in much the same position as Chiang on
European matters, "although to a lesser degree." FDR hoped
the Russian domination of Europe "would not be too harsh,"
according to Spellman, "[ajlthough that might be wishful
thinking. "[9 ]
8
It is interesting to note from this portion of
Spellman's memo that FDR did not foresee a major role for
the U.S. in Europe after the war. Much of what the President
did in the remaining months of the war takes on new meaning
when seen from this perspective.
Spellman restated the President's desire to establish
a personal relationship with Stalin. He would seek a meeting
with Stalin as soon as possible in the belief that he was
better able to reach an accommodation with the Soviet leader
than Churchill. Stalin's postwar territorial aims were
outlined: "He would certainly receive; Finland, the Baltic
States, the Eastern half of Poland, Bessarabia." The
President had decided, according to Spellman, that there was
no sense in opposing these territorial desires of Stalin's
because he had the power to get them anyway. In essence FDR
acknowledged that he would accept the Soviet front iers in
existence on June 21, 1941, the date of the German invasion
of Russia. Stalin had been pressing for the recognition of
these borders si nee December of 19 41. He had proposed a
secret protocol to Foreign Minister Eden to the treaty of
alliance between Russia and Britain. Both the British and
the U.S. had opposed the recognition of these borders. FDR
outlined for Spellman the same position he took in his
discussions with Eden in March; the Baltics would be
absorbed by Russia, eastern Poland would be taken as well.
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FDR then went on to outline for Spellman more far-
reaching consequences of the changing military and political
situation, far more than he revealed to Eden. According to
Spellman, FDR confirmed to him the probability that Stalin
would attempt to set up communist governments in the areas
not incorporated directly into the Soviet Union. The
President conceded that Austria, Hungary and Croatia would
"fall under some sort of Russian protectorate . " When the
archbishop asked if the Allies intended to support
noncommunist elements in those countries to help prevent
communist takeovers, FDR replied, "no such move was
contemplated." The President seemed to be agreeing with the
most pessimistic evaluation of Soviet aims outlined by
Bullitt in January. [10]
The picture presented here contrasts sharply with
those of an undecided, naive President about to embark on an
attempt to prevent Soviet power from expanding in Europe.
Rather , he has a firm grasp of the postwar realities created
by the increasing military strength of the Soviet Union. He
believes the Soviets will be the dominant power in Europe
.
He believes the Soviets will attempt to install communist
governments in several eastern European countries and is
making no plans to counter such a development. FDR told the
archbishop, and through him the Vatican, that all of Eastern
Europe from the Baltic States to the Balkans would be either
10
incorporated into the Soviet Union or fall under Soviet
domination. Furthermore, he will do nothing to assist or
support elements within those countries which might resist
such a development, and the United States and Britain cannot
fight the Russians to prevent their takeover of Eastern
Europe. The arguments put forth by Bullitt to prevent the
expansion of Soviet power have been rejected.
The fact that Spellman swiftly notified the Vatican of
the President's postwar outlook is clear evidence of his
concern over what FDR had confided to him. The prospect of
Poland, the Baltic States, Hungary, Austria and
Czechoslovakia -- all predominantly Catholic countries --
coming under communist influence was not something the
Vatican would take lightly. The question remains why FDR
would be telling the archbishop of New York all this in the
first place? Surely he knew Spellman would inform the
Vatican of this discussion. He also risked the possibility
the information would leak to the press and create a storm
of protest. The answer seems to lie in the fact that this
was not a new initiative on FDR's part but rather a
confirmation to the Vatican of an already established trend
of thinking on postwar problems. The evidence seems to
suggest that FDR had reached decisions on the need to
accommodate the extension of Soviet power in Europe as early
11
as mid-1942 and conveyed this to the Vatican through his
personal representative Myron C. Taylor.
In August of 1942, while Italy was still an active
member of the Axis alliance, Taylor was spirited into Rome
for meetings with the Pope and his top advisors. Sumner
Welles, Assistant Secretary of State and FDR's man in the
State Department, initiated the idea to send Taylor back to
Rome in the midst of hostilities. FDR agreed "that it would
be useful for Myron Taylor to go back to the Vatican But
how can we get him there." Arrangements were apparently made
through the Italian government in the belief that Taylor
would transmit to the Pope conditions under which the
Italians could withdraw from the war. The records of
Taylor's meetings with the Pope, however, reveal that much
more was being discussed, and the Italian situation was
rarely ment ioned
.
[ 11
]
Taylor seemed intent on conveying to Pius XII, and his
Secretary of State Cardinal Luigi Maglione, the nature of
postwar Europe, and in particular the role of Russia. Taylor
stressed the Russian signature to the Atlantic Charter,
"which, among other things, asserts adherence to the
principle of religious freedom, and by its expressed
attitude toward Poland, the Baltic and Balkan States, in the
discussion of postwar settlements," had led the
administration to believe "the field is open for
12
collaboration
- and generous compromise." Taylor impressed
upon the Pope and his advisors the need for Russian
cooperation at the end of the war without which "the future
stability of Europe" would be endangered. Russia would gain
security through an effective international organization
dedicated to the prevention of German rearmament and in
return would be asked only to "cease her ideological
propaganda in other countries, and to make religion really
free within her borders." According to Taylor, the Pope and
his advisors were very impressed with the fact that
consideration of postwar matters was already well under way.
[121
Taylor met privately the following day with Cardinal
Secretary of State Maglione and again brought up the
question of Russia and her postwar attitude "which is very
much in the minds of everyone here." He raised the
possibility of establishing a "buffer organization of states
...between Germany and Russia" to ensure Russian security
and reducing her need "to gain territory in the less rich
areas surrounding her on the west." Taylor did not spell out
just how this "buffer organization of states" was to be
created, only that the matter was under consideration .[ 13
]
The evidence seems to suggest that FDR developed a
postwar strategy very early in the war, much earlier than
historians have commonly thought. He communicated important
13
elements of that plan to the Vatican as early as September
1942, while the Allies were still on the defensive (the
battle of Stalingrad was just beginning). Historians have
largely overlooked FDR's wartime communications with the
Vatican as a source for providing a clear indication of what
he planned to accomplish. For example, British Foreign
Minister Eden was taken by surprise in March of 1943 when
FDR suggested that Poland would not present a difficult
problem to resolve at the end of the war. FDR suggested to
him that East Prussia and parts of Silesia would more than
compensate Poland for possible loss of territory to Russia
in the east. Prior to Taylor's departure for discussions
with the Pope the State Department prepared "a special map
of Germany" for Taylor based on "[t]he instruct ion ... to show
the Germanized Slav sandy plain of Brandenburg." The
commentary accompanying the map states: "Practically all of
Pomerania, Brandenburg, Silesia and the Kingdom of Saxony
are still inhabited by a stock whose anthropological
characteristics are basically Slav." The document goes on to
state that "Polish sovereignty at no time extended over so
wide an area, but stopped at the western frontier of
Silesia, some miles west of the Oder River" and concluded
with the comment that "[f]or purposes of the present map,
the Oder has been selected as the western limit of the
Germanized Slav area" and that it approximated the
14
westernmost extension of Polish rule. As Taylor left for
Rome in September of 1942 he carried with him the outline of
possible future borders of Poland which Roosevelt would
allude to six months later to Foreign Minister Eden. [14]
Yet another element of Roosevelt's postwar thinking is
revealed in the Taylor documents. Upon leaving Rome, Taylor
went to London where he held conversations with Averell
Harriman and Soviet Ambassador Ivan Maisky on the subject of
developing "a brief formula that would be the basis for a
declaration by Stalin that would encourage the thought that
religion in Russia would actually be free." While in London
he sought the opinion of one of the leading authorities on
the Soviet Union concerning the question of religion in
Russia and what effect that might have within territories
occupied by the Soviets after the war. George Kennan, then
temporarily assigned to the embassy in Lisbon, outlined in a
three-page memorandum dated October 2, 1942, the Soviets'
hostility to the Russian Orthodox Church and religion in
general. Kennan related a number of instances of a "great
resurgence" of religious life in German occupied areas of
Russia. While acknowledging the accounts may have been
exaggerated by the Germans for their own propaganda
purposes, he concluded they "are naturally not without their
effects on the religious populations of the other eastern
European countries," and "[t]hey doubtless tend to increase
15
the horror with which these people view the prospect of
Russian occupation after the war." [15]
As a result of these wartime experiences, Kennan said
it should "be evident to anyone that a greater real
tolerance of religious life in Soviet controlled territories
would be in the interests of the Soviet Government itself
both now and in the future." Kennan acknowledged the
difficulty of "achieving such cooperation and
understanding." The problem, as he saw it, lay not so much
with the concept of religious freedom itself, but with the
potential of foreign influence. He compared the Communist
rulers of Russia with the Czars of the 15th and 16th
centuries who "fought Roman religious influence, not so much
out of convict ions of dogma as out of fear of foreign
influence on a backward and credulous people, so the present
rulers tend to feel that any foreign influence, religious or
otherwise, challenges the security of their rule." Kennan's
memorandum concluded, "If these preoccupations could be
overcome and i f the Kr eml in could be induced to tolerate
religion at home and to receive the proffered cooperation of
western religious movements in the spirit of friendliness
and confidence, I believe one of the greatest barriers to a
sound future peace would have been removed . " [ 16
]
Upon returning to the U.S. Taylor resumed
correspondence with Archbishop Edward Mooney of Detroit,
16
taking up with him the question of what type of statement
would be necessary from Stalin. Mooney told Taylor, "I am
profoundly convinced that a reliable, authoritative
statement on religious freedom in Russia is a 'sine qua non
•
of sincere cooperation between America and Russia in post
war problems." Mooney, like Roosevelt, felt that Stalin was
an "utter realist" and that such a statement could be
obtained "if we insist." However, the bishop also believed
that "an ambiguous or evidently insincere declaration would
be fatal to the prestige of the President and to the
confidence which people must have in him if his high ideals
for the post war settlement are to be realized
substantially." The President's reputation, and acceptance
of his postwar settlements, ultimately hinged on their
acceptance by the American public.
Writing in 1969, Norman Graebner asked the fundamental
question historians had been trying to answer: "After more
than twenty years of Cold War, the quest for understanding
raises one fundamental and still unanswered question: Why
did the Untied States after 1939 permit the conquest of
eastern Europe by Nazi forces, presumably forever, with
scarcely a stir, but refused after 1944 to acknowledge any
primary Russian interest or right of hegemony in the same
region on the heels of a closely-won Russian victory against
the German invader?" Graebner concluded that "when scholars
17
have answered that question fully the historical debate over
the Cold War origins will be largely resolved." Graebner was
writing at the conclusion of the second round of work on the
origins of the Cold War conducted by the so-called
"revisionist" historians such as William Appleman Williams,
Gabriel Kolko, David Horowitz and Gar Alperovitz. They put
forth their theories based on economic interpretations of
global American interests. But after another quarter century
and the end of the Cold War that question Graebner asked
remained elusive. [17]
This work will attempt to resolve the question posited
by Graebner in terms of a new Cold War paradigm - religion.
More specifically, it will focus on the reaction of American
Catholicism, and the domestic political repercussions
inherent in the postwar settlement FDR envisioned and
outlined to Pius XII as early as 1942 and Archbishop
Spellman a year later. FDR was about to embark on an
ambitious plan to make the postwar political realities he
outlined to Archbishop Spellman more palatable to the
Vatican and thereby to American Catholics. In doing so he
was acknowledging the importance of the religious periphery,
American Catholics, in terms of their ability to dominate
the discussion of anti-Communism in America. Ronald
Formisano formulated a political "core" and "periphery" in
relationship to the development of political parties in
18
antebellum Massachusetts. According to Formisano, "core"
groups should be "considered as culturally or religiously
dominant groups seeking to maintain or extend their values
over out-groups or minorities which the paternalist core
usually regard as subordinate or inferior." In like manner
the "out-groups resisting the political, economic, cultural
hegemony of the Center/Core" groups were considered the
periphery. [ 18 ]
Formisano was detailing the struggle of separatist
religious groups such as Baptists and Methodists competing
with the Center/Core orthodox Congregationalists in
antebellum Massachusetts. By the 1930s the periphery was
made up of Catholics and Jews, especially the huge influx of
so-called "new immigrants" from southern and eastern Europe,
the very area FDR was conf irming would come under Russ ian
hegemony following the war. That is why FDR seemed so
concerned about keeping the Vatican well informed about
potential postwar territorial settlements . In fact, FDR was
so concerned that he appears to have informed the Pope and
his advisors of his thinking some six months before mak ing
s imi lar thoughts known to his pr incipal wartime ally. What
could the Vatican do? If, as Roosevelt told Spellman, the
combined strength of Britain and the United States could not
prevent Stalin from doing what he wanted; the Vatican would
surely be helpless.
19
The answer was that the Vatican was not entirely
helpless. It could sway worldwide Catholic public opinion,
and Roosevelt, the consununate politician, knew this. Public
opinion, particularly Catholic opinion, might not have
counted for much in the Soviet Union under Stalin, but it
counted for a great deal in the United States under FDR,
Obviously, Roosevelt was well aware of the importance of the
Catholic vote to his national coalition. He had risen to
political prominence in New York State, where the large,
well-organized Catholic minority was important. On the
national level the same was true in several key industrial
states of the Northeast and Midwest, such as Massachusetts,
Michigan and Illinois with their large bloc of electoral
votes. FDR always had at least one Catholic in his cabinet;
James Farley through the first two administrations in the
traditionally political position of postmaster general. When
Farley broke with Roosevelt over the third term issue, he
was replaced with another Catholic, Frank Walker.
American Catholic opinion on the wartime alliance with
the Soviet Union was ambivalent at best. The German attack
on Russia in June of 1941 suddenly turned one of the
European aggressor nations into an ally. Even the staunch
ant i -Communist Winston Churchill was willing to put the past
"with its crimes, its follies, and its tragedies" behind in
the hope that Russia could hold out long enough to let
20
England catch its breath. When the U.S. entered the war in
December, American Catholics found themselves allied with an
ideological enemy of longer standing than Nazism.
Although Catholics were willing to fight Nazis
alongside Russians, they, along with other Americans,
remained skeptical of any long-range alliance with the
Soviets. Catholic newspapers and periodicals continued to
remind readers of the nature of the Soviet dictatorship.
Commonweal, a liberal Catholic journal, reminded readers in
September of 1942, while Myron Taylor was discussing postwar
issues with the Pope, that the record on Soviet occupation
of Poland was much the same as that of Nazi Germany. "What's
the difference between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia?"
asked Polish refugee Marta Wankowicz: "In Russia it's
colder," she answered. [19]
Now, a year later, FDR had confirmed to the most
powerful American Catholic prelate, and through him the
Vatican, a vision of postwar Europe that confirmed Catholics
worst fears. What was he willing to do? The answer to this
question would unfold over the course of the remainder of
the war. The story has never been fully told, but beginning
with Taylor's mission to Rome in 1942 and continuing through
the Yalta conference, FDR attempted to mediate a
rapprochement between the Vatican and the Soviet Union. He
knew the domestic political risk of failure was great and
21
might result in the loss of the large Catholic vote to the
Democratic Party.
Events moved rapidly in late 1943, and the
long-awaited meeting of the Big Three took place in
November. Teheran, more so than any of the other conferences
of the war, illustrated the basic interrelationship of
domestic political realities with the President's
formulation of foreign policy. Shortly after the first
official meeting adjourned, Stalin visited Roosevelt
privately. The President outlined for Stalin his concerns
about the 1944 presidential election. In March FDR had told
Eden that reaching a settlement on Poland would not present
a problem. But in November FDR told Stalin there were six to
seven million voters in the United States of Polish
extraction (virtually all of them Catholic), and as a
practical man he did not want to lose their votes. He told
Stalin he agreed with him on the need to restore the Polish
state, but he could not participate in any decision on the
subject. When Stalin replied that he understood the
President's position now that matters had been explained to
him, Roosevelt brought up the similar problem he faced with
American voters of Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian heritage
(also mostly Catholic). FDR told Stalin the United States
would not go to war over the issue when the Soviets
reoccupied the Baltic Republics, but the issue for Americans
22
would be the right of self-determination. FDR raised the
possibility of holding a plebiscite, as he had with Eden and
Spellman, and told Stalin he believed the people of the
Baltics would vote to join the Soviet Union. Stalin replied
that the Baltic States had no autonomy under the czars, and
he saw no reason why the issue was being raised now. When
the President said the public "neither knows nor
understands," Stalin told him, "They should be informed and
some propaganda work done." [20]
The "realism" the President spoke of to Spellman in
September was manifesting itself in terms of American
presidential politics in November. The reality was that FDR
did not want to risk losing the Polish Catholic vote, and
possibly the entire Catholic vote, over the Polish border
issue. FDR was well aware of the impact a president's
foreign policy decisions could have on domestic political
alignments. As a vice presidential candidate in 1920 he had
seen the mass desertion of Irish Catholics from the
Democratic party in the Northeast that resulted from
Wilson's pro-British foreign policy and the crushing of the
Easter Rebellion. Roosevelt wrote to a British Friend
Colonel Arthur Murray, M.P.: "I wish to goodness you could
find some way of taking it (the Irish Question) out of our
campaign over here." The impact of the Irish question on
American domestic politics, the involvement of the Catholic
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hierarchy, the reDection ot the Treaty of Versailles and the
ability of domestic politics to impinge on international
agreements and create a potential breakdown of wartime
alliances was not lost on FDR as he was facing a similar
situation 25 years later over Poland. The evidence presented
from the Taylor mission of 1942 clearly suggests that FDR
was thinking in much larger terms than simple ethnic
considerations. [211
This work will attempt to analyze FDR's postwar policy
within the context of his relationship with American
Catholics. Throughout his Presidency, he confronted many
issues, both domestic and international, which hinged on
finding a political solution acceptable to Catholic voters
and the Catholic hierarchy. Virtually all of these involved
accusations of Communist sympathies on his part or within
his administration. To fully appreciate the perspective from
which FDR was operating during these critical war years it
is necessary to review these incidents and the impact they
had on his decision to attempt the seemingly impossible: a
rapprochement between the Vatican and the Kremlin.
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CHAPTER 2
"HE HASN'T TALKED ABOUT ANYTHING BUT RELIGIOUS FREEDOM"
John Adams once remarked that "papists" were as rare
in his hometown of Braintree as comets and earthquakes. The
scarcity of Catholics in the new American Republic did not
prevent the founders from worrying about the provisions
contained in Article Six of the proposed new constitution.
This article prohibited a religious test to hold office in
the new federal government. Major Rusk of Massachusetts
"shuddered at the idea that Roman Catholics, Papists, and
Pagans might be introduced to office." A delegate to the
North Carolina ratifying convention took a more long-range
view, arguing that he "did not suppose that the Pope could
occupy the President's chair," but that in "four or five
hundred years," it was possible "that Papists may occupy"
the presidency, tl]
In fact, it would take only 140 years for a Catholic
to seek the highest office in the land. By 1928, when Alfred
E. Smith left Houston with the Democratic Party nomination,
the face of America had changed. The great waves of
immigration in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
century transformed the nation. As if the sheer size of the
new immigration were not enough to provide native Americans
with a sense of being overwhelmed, the origin of the new
immigrants was even more frightening. Prior to the 1880's,
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95 percent of new immigrants came from northwestern Europe.
The new wave was coming from southern and eastern Europe:
Poles, Italians, Russians, Lithuanians, Czechs, Rumanians,
Spanish and Portuguese. As one historian has noted, "most
spoke no English," and, perhaps more importantly,
"Protestantism was foreign to most." The bulk of the new
immigrants were Catholics, Jews and Eastern Orthodox. [2]
Such huge numbers of Catholics seemed to many to
present a clear and present danger to the American way of
life. A midwestern scholar expressed his fear of the new
immigrants' religion: "The church to which he [the southern
immigrant] gives allegiance is the Roman Catholic, and,
however much the Catholic Church may do for the ignorant
peasant in his European home, such instruction as the priest
gives is likely to tend toward acceptance of their
subservient position on the part of the working man." The
American ideal of the rugged individual as the basis for
American democracy was clearly challenged by the traditional
paternalism of the Catholic church. [3]
The great waves of immigration also transformed the
nation from predominantly rural to predominantly urban. The
census of 1920 marked the first time a majority of Americans
were found to be living in cities. By 1900 the population of
seven of America's largest cities: New York, Boston,
Buffalo, Chicago, Cleveland, Detroit and Milwaukee, was over
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seventy percent comprised of foreign-born stock. Along with
the demographic shift came a shift in political power.
Smith's nomination was a harbinger of that change. Political
power was shifting from rural to urban America, and urban
America was where Catholics were primarily concentrated.
This is dramatically demonstrated by figures released in
1936 which showed that of the fifty largest cities in the
U.S. forty-one listed Roman Catholics as the largest single
segment of the population, including Providence with 52
percent, Newark with 45, Boston 40, Pittsburgh 35, Cleveland
32, and Milwaukee and St. Paul with 29. [4]
Smith's nomination revived all the old fears of papal
conspiracies and ant i -Cathol ic sentiment previously
manifested in the nativist movement of the 1840's and the
Know Nothing Party of the 1850's. The political resurgence
of the Ku Klux Klan in the 1920's was associated with the
anti-urban, anti-foreign, ant i -Cathol ic and anti-Semitic
response to the great immigration in addition to the
anti-black orientation of the original Klan. The crushing
defeat suffered by Smith cannot be attributed solely to his
Catholicism. Rather, as historian Richard Hofstadter has
pointed out, no Democrat could have defeated Hoover in 1928.
The combination of prosperity, prohibition and
anti-Catholicism combined to make Hoover's victory
overwhelming. Smith's candidacy represented to most
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Americans all the evils associated with the immigrants:
Catholicism, corrupt big city political machines, saloons,
cr ime and vice
.
The importance of Smith's candidacy, however, lies not
so much in his defeat, but in his ability to obtain the
nomination in the first place. Smith's nomination secured
the urban ascendancy within the Democratic party, and that
ascendancy assured Catholics a major role in the selection
of any nominee of the party. A Catholic might not be able to
be elected president, but no Democrat could hope to be
elected without the support of the major urban political
machines , which were predominantly Catholic.
Franklin D. Roosevelt understood this political shift
in power perhaps better than anyone. His campaigns and
leadership reflected it. He rose to political prominence in
New York state where the large, well-organized Catholic
minor ity was important . He stayed on good terms with Tammany
while at the same t ime not becoming identified with its
practices. He nomi nated Smith for the presidency in 1928
with his famous "Happy Warr ior " speech . Campaigning
vigorously for Smith, he criticized both the Klan and the
religious bigotry of the campaign . This resulted in a large
residue of support for FDR among Catholics as the 1932
campaign opened .
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As the depression deepened and the response of the
Hoover administration continued to rely on the traditional
American value of individual responsibility and the ability
of business to eventually correct the situation, Americans
began questioning the very basis of American culture. The
cultural clash between the "rugged individualism" of native
Protestant America and the "paternalism" of the huge numbers
of Catholic immigrants seemed to collapse in the face of
millions of unemployed, hungry and hopeless workers. In May
of 1931, Pope Pius XI issued the encyclical Quadraoesimo
Anno marking the fortieth anniversary of Pope Leo XIII 's
encyclical Rerum Novarum ("On the Condition of Labor"). Pius
reaffirmed the teaching of his predecessor affirming the
right of private property and condemning the socialistic
concept of communal ownership. However, Leo also condemned
the concentration of wealth and the evils resulting from the
modern industrial process. He asserted the obligation of
owners and employers to provide their workers with
"reasonable and frugal comfort." [5]
More importantly, both pontiffs asserted that if
employers failed to recognize their obligations to provide
for their employees, "the public authority must step in to
meet them." In October of 1932, with unemployment
approaching 13 million, FDR made a speech at Detroit quoting
approvingly from Pius XI 's Ouadraaesimo Anno , calling it
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"one of the greatest documents of all time" and "just as
radical as I am." Was the candidate hinting at the need for
government intervention in the economy on a broader scale
than his previous campaign statements suggested? [6]
While FDR generally received support from American
Catholics on New Deal issues, which affected them directly,
he soon found himself embroiled in a host of foreign-policy
questions which would place him in conflict with one of his
most important constituencies. The new President had been
Assistant Secretary of the Navy in the Wilson administration
when the U.S. broke off relations with Russia following the
Bolshevik Revolution
. Three succeeding Republ ican
administrations continued the nonrecognition policy, in
spite of the fact that most major world powers had come
around to the reality of dealing with the Soviet government
.
During the campaign FDR sidestepped the question of
recognition, but early in the new administration it became
obvious he was seriously considering the possibility. The
Catholic press and members of the church hierarchy openly
questioned the wisdom of such a move.
Many Catholics were shocked when Al Smith testified in
favor of Russ ian r ecogni t ion before the Senate Finance
Committee. He favored more trade with the Soviets and
dismissed their repudiation of World War I debts to the U.S.
He noted that the U.S. sent troops to Russia to help put
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down the revolution, although both countries were
technically at peace. Reverend Edmund A. Walsh, vice
president of Georgetown University and a leading Catholic
authority on Communism, opposed recognition. Father Walsh
headed the Vatican Relief Mission to the Soviet Union from
1919 through 1924, during which there had been much
speculation that the mission signaled a willingness of the
Vatican to enter into a concordat with the Soviets. This
Vatican mission was affiliated with the American Relief
Administration headed by Herbert Hoover. The Russian
experience left Walsh a rabid anti-Communist. In 1950, at a
dinner in Washington, he would counsel the junior Senator
from Wisconsin, Joseph R. McCarthy, to make ant i -Communism
the focus of his reelection campaign, advice McCarthy would
follow wholeheartedly. [7]
FDR sent a letter to Russian President Kalinin in
October 1933 requesting a representative of the Soviet
government be sent to discuss outstanding issues between the
two countries in the hope of reaching a settlement. Foreign
Commissar Maxim Litvinov was given the assignment. On the
same day Roosevelt met with Father Walsh to review the
issues. The President asked Walsh to prepare a report on the
state of religion in Russia which he said would be used when
serious negotiations began. Walsh quoted the President as
saying "leave it to me Father; I am a good horse dealer." At
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the same time the Vatican was expressing its concern about
the possibility America would recognize the Soviet
government. Cardinal Hayes of New York was asked to express
to FDR the Vatican's hope that he would raise the issue of
religious persecution in Russia during his talks with
Litvinov. Hayes submitted a list of proposals for Roosevelt
to discuss. These included: freedom of conscience for
Russians and foreigners; freedom of worship, public and
private; liberation of persons imprisoned for their faith;
and cessation of propaganda against God. [8]
Catholics were not the only Americans opposed to the
recognition of Russia. This division was reflected within
the administration where Secretary of State Cordell Hull and
Secretary of Agriculture Henry Wallace, both Protestants,
joined with Postmaster General James Farley, a Catholic, in
opposition, although Hull's opposition was based largely on
the potential political consequences of alienating large
segments of Catholic Democrats. Hull proposed negotiating
with the Soviets to permit freedom of religion for American
nationals living in the Soviet Union. At this stage
Auxiliary Bishop of Boston Francis Spellman was brought into
the negotiations. While a student at the American College in
Rome, Spellman became the protege of Cardinal Secretary of
State Eugenio Pacelli. Spellman received a letter from Count
Enrico Galeazzi, a financial advisor to the Vatican, asking
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him to convey to Roosevelt the Pope's desire to insist upon
religious freedom in Russia as a prerequisite to U.S.
recognition. Spellman appears to have communicated the
Pope's wishes through FDR's son James. [9]
When Litvinov finally arrived in Washington for the
talks which would lead to U.S. recognition, he was surprised
by the President's insistence on including the issue of
religious freedom in the discussions. Years later, in 1938,
Spellman recounted in a letter to his brother the
astonishment Litvinov expressed to William Bullitt.
According to Bullitt, after three days of talks Litvinov
exclaimed, "I can't understand the President; he hasn't
talked about anything but religious freedom to me, and I
want to talk about important things like trade relations."
[10]
After nine days of discussions FDR and Litvinov
exchanged formal notes which extended recognition to the
Soviet Union. In the notes the Soviets agreed to cease
subversive activity in the United States, to permit American
citizens in the Soviet Union free exercise of religion and
to negotiate a final settlement on financial claims. The
agreement seems to bear the imprint of Secretary Hull's
position in that it recognized the right of Americans to
worship freely in Russia. At the same time the agreement
seems to have satisfied American Catholics. Monsignor Keegan
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of New York congratulated Roosevelt on the manner in which
he upheld "the vitally sacred principles which we Americans
hold so dear." Bishop Spellman recorded in his diary, "Jack
Kelly and Mr. Galeazzi, whose names will never appear in
history did much to get President Roosevelt to insist that
American citizens at least should worship God as they wished
in Russia." [11]
The resolution of the recognition of Russ ia question
established a precedent which would play an important part
in the future relationship between FDR and American
Catholics. First, Catholics did not get exactly what they
wanted. They had sought virtually total recognition of
freedom of religion in Russia. The recognition agreement
provided only for the right of Americans in Russia to
worship freely, which amounted to the right of the embassy
staff to worship, as there were virtually no other Amer icans
in Russia. At the same time the president did raise the
issue of religious freedom repeatedly and vigorously, as
testified to by the comments of Willi am Bullitt. The fact
that FDR even took into account Catholic sensitivities was a
major departure from previous American administrations . His
ability to reach a compromise they found acceptable would
become a feature of his administration. Finally, the issue
of religious freedom in the Soviet Union would continue to
be a central feature of Roosevelt's future dealings with the
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Soviet Union and an important element of his thinking on the
future postwar settlement.
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CHAPTER 3
"MARX AMONG THE AZTECS"
As the issue of Russian recognition was being
favorably resolved another, more perplexing, problem arose
which would haunt the administration throughout FDR's first
term. American Catholics had been concerned about the fate
of their co-religionists in Mexico since 1913. The church in
Mexico was closely aligned with the regime which was
overthrown in the revolution that year. The new
revolutionary government wrote a constitution in 1917
containing several anti-Catholic provisions. The hostility
of the Mexican government expressed itself in repeated
instances of ant icier ical ism. Several priests were murdered
and churches burned
.
The election of General Plutarco Elias Calles as
Pres ident intens i f ied the problem and injected the issue of
anti-Communism into the fray. Calles was arguably the most
radical in a series of revolutionary Mexican Presidents. A
true believer in the social and economic aspects of the
Mexican Revolution, in 1925 he called for enactment of new
laws to enforce the land reform provisions of the 1917
constitution. One such law allowed foreigners to purchase
land but only if they renounced all rights of protection by
their own government. The second law, called the petroleum
law, declared subsoil deposits, such as oil, the
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"inalienable and impr escr ibable" property of the nation.
Several American oil companies, used to having their own way
in Mexico, refused to comply with the new laws. Calls for
American military intervention in Mexico increased, and the
press picked up on the charges of the need to prevent the
spread of Bolshevism. The oil companies argued that Mexico
was going the way of the Soviet Union and would soon provide
a base for the spread of Communism throughout Latin America.
American Catholics were just as upset as the American
oil companies. Calles began enforcing the ant i -Cathol ic
provisions of the 1917 constitution which had been largely
ignored by his predecessors Carranza and Obregon:
nat ional izing church property, expel ling foreign priests and
nuns, prohibiting religious instruction in private primary
schools and limiting the number of priests allowed to
perform religious functions in the various Mexican states.
When Calles refused to compromise on these issues, the Pope
took the extraordinary measure of authorizing an interdict
against Mexico, prohibiting the performance of public
rel igious r i tes .
When FDR took office in March 1933, he appointed his
old friend and boss from his days in the Navy Department,
Josephus Daniels, ambassador to Mexico. The appointment was
initially well received by both the Catholic press and
spokesmen who viewed the appointment of such a close friend
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as an indication that FDR would use the ambassador to exert
his influence in Mexican affairs. In late July 1934, Daniels
gave a speech in Mexico City, before a seminar on education,
in which he quoted President Calles on the importance of
education in Mexico's future: "We must enter and take
possession of the mind of childhood, the mind of youth." To
this Daniels added his own thoughts: "To the carrying out of
that aim, which alone can give Mexico the high place
envisioned by its statesmen, the government is making the
rural school a social institution." [1]
What Daniels thought an innocent phrase comparing
Mexican efforts in education to the widely-respected
American public school system provoked a furor among
American Catholics. Many immediately called for his
resignation . Father Coughlin told his huge radio audience
that the U.S. government "from Wilson down to our President
Roosevelt, has aided and abetted the rape of Mexico." The
issue was quickly transformed from a question of the rights
of private schools to the question of whether Mexico was
following in the footsteps of Russian Communism. The issue
would not go away, and in November, Commonweal , in an
editorial entitled "Mexico follows Russia" stated that, "the
rul ing powers of Mexico are seemingly determined to f ol low
Russia's example to the last and most bitter degree." The
editors argued that Americans were witnessing just across
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the border "a full demonstration of the most
anti-democratic, ant i
- 1 i ber tar i an , ant i -r el ig i ous tyranny
known in the modern world outside Russia itself." [2]
Unlike the recognition of Russia question, which
centered almost exclusively around the official position of
the church hierarchy. Catholic lay organizations became
actively involved in the Mexican issue. In New York,
Catholic students picketed the Mexican consulate. The
Catholic Evidence Guild, Ancient Order of Hibernians,
Catholic Daughters of America, Holy Name Societies, the
National Council of Catholic Women and even the
Massachusetts League of Catholic Foresters sent letters to
the White House. The group which took the lead in
criticizing the President, however, and which refused to let
go of the issue, was the Knights of Columbus. [3]
Throughout 1934, 1935, and into the election year of
1936, the 500,000 member organization kept up a steady
stream of criticism of the Roosevelt administration. Michael
H. Carmody of New Haven, Connecticut, head of the
organization, requested a meeting with FDR in January of
1935 to discuss the Mexican situation. The President instead
arranged for Carmody, and the executive committee of the
Knights, to meet with Secretary of State Cordell Hull.
Following the meeting with Hull, the group termed the
discussion "very satisfactory" but continued to lobby
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influential Catholic members of congress. Through the
efforts of Senator David Walsh from Carmody's neighboring
state of Massachusetts, Senator William E. Borah of Idaho
introduced a resolution in the Senate calling for an
investigation "into the persecution of Christians... now
being practiced in Mexico" and for Senate resolutions
protesting the "anti-religious campaign" being conducted in
Mexico
.
[ 4 ]
Catholic newspapers editorialized in favor of passage
of the Borah resolution, and several prominent members of
the Catholic hierarchy spoke out in favor of it. In an
editorial of February 15, 1935, Commonweal acknowledged that
the Borah Resolution was not expected to pass. But the
editors took issue with the Protestant periodical The
Christian Century , which had criticized the role of the
Catholic Church in Mexico, claiming the church had
"underwritten a blanket denunciation of socialism and
socialistic education." Commonweal '
s
editors argued that a
"common-sense" distinction had to be made "between the
'socialism' of social reformers and the 'socialism of say,
Marx, Lenin, Bakunin and their modern exemplars in Russia
and Mex ico . " [ 5
]
Only a week earlier, on February 8, 1935, Commonweal
carried an article by William T. Walsh entitled "Is
Communism Dangerous" in which he compared General Calles to
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Stalin and criticized Daniels for his public praise "...in
favor of a Communistic plan to transfer all control of
children's education form the parent to the state." But,
perhaps even more ominously for FDR, Walsh quoted an article
Saturday Review to the effect that "collectivism in
some form is inevitable ... sovietism, fascism and President
Roosevelt's 'New Deal' will be found in the long run,
despite apparent divergencies, to have been fundamentally
the same thing." Not only were readers being asked to equate
Mexico's revolution with Soviet Russia, but also to equate
Roosevelt's New Deal with Soviet style collect ivism. t 6
]
The administration took the position that the Borah
Resolution represented "a premature indictment of a friendly
neighboring government" and would hinder the development of
the president's Good Neighbor policy. Nonetheless a petition
in the House garnered 242 signatures which was presented to
Roosevelt. The President needed to say something and put the
issue behind him. A second request for a meeting with the
President was sent by Carmody in April and again was
referred to the State Department. This time, however, FDR
requested a reply be prepared that could be sent over his
signature. Commonweal returned to the issue that same month
with an article entitled "Marx Among the Aztecs." The
author, Dixon Wecter, equated Mexican and Russian socialism
and collectivism and reminded readers that "In 1927
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Secretary Kellogg sought to convince the Foreign Relations
Committee of the Senate that Communism was receiving
official encouragement in Mexico." Official encouragement?
Was Wecter implying that FDR was encouraging Communism in
one of our closest neighboring states? The evidence seems to
suggest that this is precisely what was happening. The
association with New Deal social programs promoting
collectivism, reluctance to challenge the Mexican government
and the Russian recognition issue were leading many
Americans, both Catholic and non-Catholics alike, to the
conclusion FDR's sympathies lay with some foreign ideology.
In May Bishop John F. Noll of Fort Wayne, Indiana, expressed
this concern in a letter to Roosevelt asking him to take a
strong public stand on the religious freedom issue and "end
rumors of Roosevelt sympathy for communism. " [ 7
]
Finally, in early July, the President met with Carmody
and a delegation from the Knights of Columbus. The group
again asked the President to speak out publ icly against the
persecut i on of the church in Mexico . FDR, however , would
give the group no specific promise. After the meeting, the
Knights told the press he had been gracious but
noncommittal. Eight days later the President met with a
Congress ional delegat i on on the same subject and used the
opportunity to issue a statement on religious freedom which
said he wished to "make it clear that the American people
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and the Government believed in freedom of religious worship
not only in the United States, but also in other nations."
[8]
The Catholic press seemed relieved by the statement.
Most took the position that Roosevelt had spoken directly to
the Mexican situation, although he had not mentioned Mexico.
Commonweal praised the statement as the forerunner of an
international pact on religious freedom. The Catholic
journal Amer ica editorialized that "a major objective of our
campaign on Mexico was achieved." It seemed as though a
collective sigh of relief was taken by Catholic opinion
leaders. The President had said something, anything, and
they could now return to cementing relations with a
President they believed was taking a genuine interest in
Catholic issues.
It seemed the President had put the issue to rest.
However, the Knights of Columbus were not so easily
mollified. At their annual convention at New York in August
the Knights passed a unanimous resolution authorizing
Carmody to send yet another letter to the President
expressing their regret at the President's apparent lack of
concern over matters in Mexico. In October, the National
Board of Directors sent a vigorous letter of protest to FDR
arguing that the President's statement on religious freedom
fell far short of what was needed. The letter concluded.
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"You cannot escape responsibility for throttling the Borah
Resolution. for the endorsement given the Mexican
Government .by your ambassador ... for nonaction on behalf of
bleed ing
.
. . Mex ico . " [ 9 )
This time the Knights had gone too far. The political
activism generated by the Mexican situation was calling into
question who had the authority to speak for the church.
Archbishop John J. McNicholas of Cincinnati issued a
statement to be read in all churches of his archdiocese
stating that the Knights "in no sense speak for the priest-
hood or for the Catholic laity of Cincinnati." McNicholas
was correct in stating that the Knights did not speak for
the entire Catholic community. The ant i -Communist rhetoric
which dominated much of the issue surrounding education in
Mexico would now be overwhelmed by a symbolic gesture from
Amer ican Ca thoi ic educat ion . Chicago's liberal Cardinal,
George Mundelein, would play a key role in bringing the
clamor created by the Knight's latest letter to an end. [10]
In November of 1935, the University of Notre Dame, the
most prestigious Catholic university in the country, invited
Roosevelt to receive an honorary degree. Frank Walker, mayor
of Detroit and a close political advisor to FDR and a Notre
Dame graduate
,
appears to have been closely involved with
the decision to present the degree to the President in the
midst of the swirling controversy over the Knight's letter.
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Notre Dame President John O'Hara was delighted with the
prospect and traveled to Washington to complete the
arrangements. Cardinal Mundelein presided at the
presentation at South Bend on December 9 and said his
presence was to insure the President he was "among friends."
The Cardinal, in a direct reference to the Knight's
controversy, said no one group had the right to claim to
speak for all Catholics. Secretary of the Interior Harold
Ickes confided to his diary that the Cardinal's speech
amounted to "a pretty complete endorsement of the
President." For his part FDR gave a ringing endorsement of
the concepts of "freedom of education and freedom of
religious worship" as a necessity for "true national life."
The sight of the President receiving an honorary degree from
Notre Dame from a Cardinal of the church would surely put to
rest the idea that the President was secretly encouraging
the spread of Communism. FDR was thus able to move into the
election year of 1936 with what Arthur Krock of The New York
Times described as a Catholic endorsement of the President.
But 1936 would bring the President into yet more controversy
with American Catholics, and again the issue would be
Communism, at home and abroad. [11]
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CHAPTER 4
A COMMUNIST IN WASHINGTON'S CHAIR
The 1936 presidential campaign began in earnest in
January when Al Smith addressed a glittering gathering of
the nation's wealthy at Washington's Mayflower Hotel. The
sponsor of the evening was the American Liberty League, a
self -proclaimed nonpartisan political group organized in
1934. The organization's principal sponsors, however,
included business and industrial leaders such as Irenee Du
Pont, John J. Raskob, William S. Knudsen and J. Howard Pew.
The Liberty League was opposed to virtually every aspect of
Roosevelt's New Deal, viewing it as "creeping socialism" at
best and outright Communism at worst. The League managed to
recruit both Smith and 1924 Democratic presidential
candidate John W. Davis as their spokesmen, hoping that
having two former Democratic presidential candidates telling
the nation that the New Deal was a betrayal of American
principles would cause a split in the party and possibly
deny FDR the 1936 nomination.
A national radio audience heard the onetime "Happy
Warrior" of the Democratic Party denounce the inflationary
spending policies of the administration, call for a return
to the principles of state's rights and assert the need to
honor the constitution. Smith said the choice was clear;
America had to choose between "Washington and Moscow, the
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pure air of America or the foul breath of communistic
Russia... the stars and stripes or the red flag of the
godless.
. .Soviets." Smith said the President himself was not
a Communist or a socialist, but was being misled by those
around him. [1]
Jim Farley, again heading the president's campaign,
claimed Smith made a major mistake aligning himself with the
very elements which fought against his run for the
presidency eight years earlier. Farley believed Smith had
alienated himself from the urban Catholic working-class
constituency which once formed the basis of his strength
within the party. FDR's crushing defeat of Herbert Hoover in
1932 had achieved the very coalition of urban working-class
Catholics with rural Protestant farmers of the South and
Midwest which had been the goal of the Populist Party. The
Democratic Party had again been unable to pull off such a
coalition in 1928 with Smith as its standard bearer. The
Protestant "core" was unwilling to accept the leadership of
the Catholic "periphery." Now the Liberty League was hoping
to drive a wedge into the New Deal coalition by separating
the core from the periphery over the issue of Communism.
While Smith, the only Catholic ever nominated by a
major party to run for president, broke with FDR over the
New Deal early on, another important former Catholic
supporter of FDR would soon do the same. Father Charles E.
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Coughlin was becoming more critical of FDR with each passing
week. Shortly after praising the President's State of the
Union address the radio priest made his final break with
FDR, charging that the President's Brain Trust was Communist
infiltrated, virtually the same thing Smith was saying. He
apologized to his radio audience for his earlier support of
FDR and told them, "The slogan 'Roosevelt or Ruin' must now
be altered to read 'Roosevelt and Ruin.'" Two of the most
popular Catholics in the country were both accusing
Roosevelt of leading the nation down the road of Communism.
How would the President respond to this new challenge? [2]
American Catholic voters were being asked to make a
decision on the New Deal: was it Communist? These same
Catholic voters were faced with something of a paradox: some
prominent, politically popular Catholics like Smith and
Coughlin were declaring the New Deal Communist or Communist
inspired. Other prominent, politically act ive Cstholics like
Farley, Joseph P. Kennedy and many more were active
partici pants in the New Deal and seek ing FDR 's reelection.
And both groups we re decidedly anti -Commun is t . Th i s is
hardly surprising in view of the general ant i -Communist
rhetoric of the Catholic Church and the speci f ic
ant i -Communist campaign being waged by the Jesuit order in
America. In early April of 1934 the father general of the
society wrote to the fathers provincial in America "to
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organize a plan of concerted action against Communism as it
exists and labors in your country." Father Edmund Walsh of
Georgetown University took up the challenge and implemented
a fourteen point program of "practical and concerted" action
against American Communism. At the same time Coughlin and
Smith were charging the New Deal was Communist inspired
American Catholics were being deluged with some 4.5 million
pamphlets on a variety of subjects, but "Communism was the
topic most in demand, being represented with 18 titles...."
The Catholi c Periodical Index for the period 1934-1938 lists
eight hundred thirty-eight entries under the heading of
communism, quadruple the number for 1930-1933. [3]
The Catholic doctrine being so widely disseminated
contained three elements. 1) That the origins of Communism
were moral and spiritual. 2) That Communism is inherently
atheistic and anti-God. 3) That Communism acquires its power
through deceptive propaganda. The first of these elements is
crucial to an understanding of Catholic thought. Leo XIII in
his encyclical Rerum Novarum issued in 1898 saw the origins
of both socialism and Communism in "the religious and moral
destitution in which wage-earners had been left by liberal
economics." Liberalism was thus "designated an amoral,
materialistic philosophy originating with the Enlightenment
which promoted a laissez-faire attitude toward economic
arrangements." This produced the rankest sort of materialism
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which left Catholics condemning both Communism and
Capitalism. As Robert Frank describes the effect "a
religious and amoral liberalism begat individualism which
begat socialism which begat communism." This "liberalism" in
turn was perhaps more dangerous than outright Communism
because it allowed liberals to fall under the sway of
element number three: the power of deceptive Communist
propaganda
. [ 4 ]
According to Catholic doctrine the Communist ability
to deceive liberals created something of a multiplier effect
enabling the relatively small number of actual Communists to
become a genuine threat to the nation. By virtue of their
ability to deceive "the millions of unwitting 'dupes' of the
communists mostly 'liberals' and most of these consisting
of teachers, writers and assorted union activists" the
Commun ist threat was far greater than their actual numbers
indicated. While the Popular Front tactics of the Communists
during the Thirties may have enabled them to penetrate and
manipulate a host of liberal causes, they were not fooling
the Catholics. J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the FBI and a
devout Catholic, entitled his book on Communism Masters of
Dece i
t
for just this reason. In his encyclical Divini
Redemptor is Pius XI noted that "in the beginning communism
showed itself for what it was thus alienating the people,"
but with the adoption of Popular Front tactics by the
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Comintern "it has therefore changed its tactics, and strives
to entice the multitudes by trickery of various forms,
hiding its real designs behind ideas that in themselves are
good and attractive." Thus the liberal FDR was being cast by
both Smith and Coughlin as something of a "dupe" of
communists that had infiltrated his New Deal Braintrust. The
New Deal was just another liberal program that might be
"good and attractive" in and of itself but which was being
corrupted by Communist "trickery." [5]
In April Senator David I. Walsh of Massachusetts gave
a speech to the Tidewater Holy Name Society of Tidewater,
Virginia. Walsh's theme was not greatly different from many
others of the period, but it is an indication of where he
and many other American Catholics were heading in this
crucial period. The Richmond Times Dispatch proclaimed on
April 27 that "Senator (Walsh) Heralds War of Churches Vs.
Reds." The Norfolk Virginia Pilot reported on the same day
that "Walsh Sees Fight Facing Christianity" and that the
senator told the members of the Holy Name Society they "must
battle Communism." [6]
The speech suggests that Walsh perceived the great
threat to western civilization as being the threat of
Communism, not against democracy per se, but against
Christianity. An anti-Communist speech coming from a
Catholic senator in 1936 would hardly be surprising, but
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neither would it be surprising coming from a Protestant
senator. The core and periphery, which had clashed so
alarmingly in the 1920's, seemed to have a common issue
around which to rally in the 1930's, the threat of Communism
to Christianity. However, much of non-Catholic America was
not yet ready to jump on the ant i
-Communist bandwagon,
especially if Catholics were holding the reins. The
Christian Century, arguably the most influential Protestant
periodical of the era, took up the argument with a series of
articles with such titles as "The Catholic Anti-Red
Campaign,"; "Shall Protestants Accept the Pope's
Invitation?"; and "Stay Out!". Clearly the center-core
groups were not entirely ready to accept the Catholic
perception that Communism presented the greatest threat to
the Republic. [7]
The spring primaries which demolished the hopes of the
Liberty League created a more disturbing problem. Father
Coughlin had turned his National Union for Social Justice,
which he claimed had more than five million members nation-
wide, into a political movement. Coughlin announced the
Union would endorse congressional candidates that espoused
its principles. In Pennsylvania, Coughlin endorsed twenty
Democrats and twelve Republicans. Twelve of them won,
including Representative Michael J. Stack in Philadelphia,
who was opposed by the local Kelley machine. However, ten of
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the twelve were incumbents, and with the economy beginning
to show signs of recovery, incumbency was a strong position
to hold for congressional races. In Ohio, the radio priest
endorsed seventeen Democrats and fifteen Republicans.
Fifteen of the candidates won, and the Cleveland Democratic
machine was defeated along with two incumbents. Coughlin
claimed similar victories in Wisconsin, Massachusetts,
Michigan and Maine. While a Coughlin endorsement did not
seem to guarantee victory, both parties were surprised at
his apparent ability to translate his public popularity into
votes. Perhaps more importantly, he had overcome the
opposition of the big city machines so traditionally Irish
and Catholic and staunchly Democratic.
This was exactly what the President and Farley had
feared, and Farley was undoubtedly ready to call in all the
political lOU's. Catholics had been one of the groups to
benefit most from FDR's patronage. The percentage of
Catholics appointed to the federal judiciary increased from
four percent during the combined administrations of Wilson,
Harding, Coolidge and Hoover to 29 percent under Roosevelt.
Many prominent Catholic politicians were calling on the
American church to take a public position against Coughlin.
Edward J. Flynn of the Bronx, a close Roosevelt ally, was
reported threatening to leave the church if the clergy did
not repudiate the priest. Joseph P. Kennedy, Chairman of the
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Securities and Exchange Commission, and Frank Murphy,
Governor of Michigan and former close friend of Coughlin,
were assigned to work against the priest among Catholic
laymen. [8]
Both Murphy and Kennedy had close ties to the radio
priest. Kennedy visited Royal Oak on several occasions, and
once brought his young son Jack to meet Coughlin. The two
disagreed on many aspects of politics, with Kennedy
referring to Coughlin often as a "jackass," but this only
solidified the priest's respect for Kennedy's openness and
down-to-earth style. The Kennedy-Murphy duo kept FDR
informed of Coughlin's shifting opinions. In late 1935
Coughlin told Murphy: "the general criticism against Mr.
Roosevelt is due to the fact that he has broken nearly every
promise that he has made while he prefers to seek means and
methods closely allied with socialism and communism to
rectify our economic ills. Joseph Kennedy agrees with me in
this analysis." Indeed Kennedy often openly disagreed with
many of FDR's policies; the same candor and frankness which
produced his friendship with Coughlin had the same effect on
FDR until Kennedy's own break with President. [9]
Kennedy, at FDR's request, arranged a meeting between
the President and Coughlin in September of 1935 at the
President's home in Hyde Park. Kennedy met the priest's
train in the early morning hours of September 10 at Albany,
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and both were taken by surprise by the early morning
headlines announcing the death of Huey Long. They arrived
to find the President still asleep, and in the informal
tradition surrounding Hyde Park prepared their own breakfast
in the President's kitchen. When the pair finally heard the
President moving about upstairs, Coughlin ran up and
announced, "your boyfriend is dead." The news must
certainly have changed the president's approach to the
forthcoming discussion as Farley's greatest fear was the
potential alliance of Coughlin's rhetoric and popularity
with Long's political acumen. [10]
After the president had breakfast the two got down to
business: "Cards on the table Padre, cards on the table. Why
are you cooling off to me?" the president asked. Coughlin
produced a check given to him by Bishop Gallagher. The check
had been sent to Gallagher by the bishop of Guadalajara and
was allegedly issued by a communist sympathizer in the
Treasury Department to Mexican revolutionaries. "Michael
Gallagher's afraid we're going soft on the Communists down
there," Coughlin said. FDR was surprised and promised to
look into the matter. Coughlin then raised the issue of the
president's recognition of the Soviet Union, but was not
overly concerned because the US had to look out for its own
interests, and no nation could go bankrupt, as the Soviet
Union surely would, without it effecting the rest of the
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world. Coughlin then turned to domestic affairs, telling the
President he should pursue more inflationary fiscal policies
and get rid of the Federal Reserve. FDR replied that he was
"only the President" and that Coughlin should not "be so
innocent as to think that the President of the United States
can also be the Congress of the United States." He then
reminded Coughlin the country still faced serious problems
which would be compounded if a Republican were elected in
1936. If Coughlin were to lead a third party movement in
1936 the prospect of a Republican victory would be enhanced,
and was that what he wanted, the President asked. Coughlin
was noncommittal, but surely the knowledge of Long's death
strengthened the President's hand and weakened Coughlin's.
[11]
By the summer of 1936 Coughlin allied his National
Union for Social Justice with three other groups
disenchanted with the New Deal: the remains of Huey Long's
Share Our Wealth Society, now under the leadership of the
Reverend Gerald L.K. Smith; Dr. Francis E. Townsend of
California, the spokesman for a movement advocating monthly
old age pensions; and Congressman William Lempke, spokesman
of neopopulist plains state farmers. Lempke would be the
candidate of the Union Party, as the new organization was
called. But the real threat to Roosevelt now that Long was
no longer part of the political equation lay in the
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possibility that Coughlin could translate his huge radio
audience into a national voting block. On June 19, Coughlin
announced the formation of the new party and his support of
Lempke for President on a special nationwide broadcast.
Claiming a "new day for America," Coughlin called on "agri-
culture, labor, the disappointed Republicans and the out-
raged Democrats" to join the new party and help "avoid the
treacherous pitfalls of red communism." [12]
In early August the followers of Dr. Townsend convened
for their convention. Reverend Smith spoke to the delegates
in a speech that was to set the tone for the upcoming
campaign. The country was faced with a choice: "in the
presence of atheistic Communist influence.
. .It is the
Russian primer or the Holy bible... the Red flag or the Stars
and Str ipes ... Lenin or Lincoln ...Stalin or Jefferson." H.L.
Mencken said he never heard a more effective speech
.
Coughlin was not about to be upstaged. Taking the platform
the next morning, he told the crowd that FDR stood for
"Franklin Double-crossing Roosevelt, " a charge which drew
both cheers and boos from the audience. The Sargeant at Arms
called for order, and Dr. Townsend asked that the "booers"
be put out . Coughl in resumed by ask ing the crowd why the
American Communist Party was supporting Roosevelt for
president. Ripping off his Roman collar, he called FDR a
"liar" and a "betrayer." In a state of near exhaustion.
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Coughlin was assisted from the stage. Once again the
criticism of the Popular Front tactics of the American
Communist Party in endorsing Roosevelt and his New Deal
comes to the fore. Swept away by his own rhetoric, Coughlin
is now associating FDR himself with the Communist plot,
calling him a liar and betrayer. [13]
Church leaders were taken aback by the ferocity of
Coughlin's attack on the President. His immediate superior.
Bishop Michael Gallagher of Detroit, was about to leave for
Rome and discussions with Pius XI. Questioned about
Coughlin's speech, Gallagher said he did "not approve of the
language Father Coughlin had used in expressing himself on
the President." The bishop said he did not believe Roosevelt
was a Communist and that disagreement over policy was not a
reason to call a man a "liar." However, Gallagher said he
could not censure Coughlin and would not be discussing the
priest with Vatican officials "unless they speak of it."
[ 14 ]
The Vatican would indeed "speak of it" when Gallagher
arrived in Rome. While Gallagher and his traveling
companion. Bishop Joseph Schrembs of Cleveland, were en
route to Rome, the Vatican released a statement saying that
Coughlin's characterization of Roosevelt as a liar was a
"painful expression." Coughlin took the opportunity to
publish an apology to the President in the form of an open
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letter to FDR in his newspaper Social Justice. Coughlin
wrote "in the heat of civic interest in righteous
anger...! used the word 'liar.' I now offer the President my
sincerest apology." [15]
On arriving in Rome Gallager and Schrembs denied
rumors that Gallagher had been called to Rome specifically
to discuss Coughlin and went so far as to defend Coughlin's
"fight for the preservation of American democracy." The
bishops would quickly change their tune. After meeting with
Vatican officials, including Monsignor Giuseppe Pizzard, the
Pope's closest political advisor, Gallagher announced that
he "personally, would favor Mr. Roosevelt more than any
other candidate at present" and that he and Schrembs "have
been advised to cease talking about Father Coughlin." [16]
Coughlin did not appear ready to compromise. Taking to
the campaign trail in early August, he continued to hammer
at FDR, now referring to him as a "scab" President leading a
"scab army' of reliefers. Coughlin claimed the New Deal was
"surrounded by red and pink Communists and by 'frankfurters'
of destruction," a pointed reference to Harvard Law School
Professor Felix Frankfurter, an important advisor to FDR.
The President would appoint Frankfurter to the Supreme Court
in 1939. Coughlin became threatening in Providence, R.I.,
claiming there "would be more bullets in the White House
than you could count with an adding machine" if FDR were
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reelected. In New Bedford, Massachusetts he told an audience
of 12,000 that he had been instrumental in removing Herbert
Hoover from the White House and "I will be instrumental in
taking a Communist from the chair once occupied by
Washington." [17]
Returning to Cleveland for the national convention of
his National Union for Social Justice in mid-August, both he
and Smith returned to the now familiar theme of Roosevelt
and Communism. Smith gave one of the most dramatic speeches
of his career. The New Deal was led by "a slimy group of men
culled from the pink campuses of America with friendly gaze
fixed on Russia... and they had the face to recognize Russia,
where two million Christians had been butchered." Smith
concluded to a roar when he announced that the election was
really meaningless to him: "My real mission is to see that
the red flag of bloody Russia is not hoisted in place of the
Stars and Stripes." [18]
Coughlin appeared angered at the enthusiastic response
given Smith's speech by his National Union members. But his
flair for the dramatic would once again come to his rescue
in his battle of one-upsmanship with Smith. Speaking under a
hot sun the following day, Coughlin told his followers that
both Roosevelt and Rexford Tugwell, a key Roosevelt advisor,
were "communistic." Once again the theme comes across that
the President and his advisors, if not outright Communists,
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were at best "Communistic" in the sense of being either
"dupes" or "fellow travelers." Referring to the campaign as
a "war," he advised the National Union members "to go to
your homes as to a trench." He then collapsed and was
assisted from the stage. He was treated for a mild case of
exhaustion and advised to rest. [19]
The political threat that Coughlin and the Union Party
presented to FDR was beginning to take a back seat to the
threat to the church presented by his activities. The
specter of a revived ant i -Cathol ic ism which had dominated
presidential politics as recently as the 1928 campaign began
to surface. A faculty member of the Concordia Lutheran
Theological Seminary stated publicly that "the voice behind
that radio priest is the voice of his church." At the same
time the New Republic
^
a liberal periodical, reported that
"the Union Party marks the deliberate entrance of the Roman
Catholic Church into national politics" and suggested that
the Vatican was backing Coughlin because it was depending on
the financial support of "wealthy American Catholic
families." In addition, "influential and wealthy Americans
such as Al Smith and John J. Raskob, think he can help
defeat Roosevelt." [20]
Both the Vatican and the American Catholic hierarchy
were concerned with distancing themselves from Coughlin and
assuring all Americans that his views were not those of the
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church. But in a very real way they were. His ant i
-Communist
rhetoric claiming deception and infiltration of the New Deal
by Communists or liberals deceived by Communist propaganda
was clearly the message the Jesuits were proclaiming. That
was the Catholic message on Communism being directed at
labor unions and other organizations. Coughlin and others
were now directing the same message at the New Deal. On
September 2, Osservatore Romana criticized priests that
challenged the constituted authorities in the countries in
which they lived and pointed out Coughlin's attacks on the
President as an example. The article also took issue with
Bishop Gallagher for stating that the Vatican approved of
Coughlin's activities. Both Coughlin and the press were on
hand when Gallagher's ship returned from Rome. Seemingly
overwhelmed by Coughlin's presence, the bishop was quoted as
saying: "It's the voice of God that comes to you from the
great orator from Royal Oak. Rally round it." The bishop
denied the report in Osservatore Romana was accurate.
Coughlin was overjoyed with this seeming endorsement, but
then was shocked to hear Gallagher claim that Roosevelt was
the best-qualified candidate for the presidency. When asked
about the Osservatore editorial, Coughlin claimed it was
only "one newspaper's opinion." The Vatican then took the
unusual step of sending a note to all press organizations
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confirming that the Osservatore editorial represented the
official Vatican position on this issue. [21]
Just how much of a political threat the Union Party
represented to FDR is an open question. The President was at
the height of his popularity, despite the sniping and
accusations of Communist sympathies. Publicly, Farley
dismissed the third party movement; privately, he was taking
no chances. He was continually monitoring the Union Party
strength through his vast network of personal contacts,
party workers and even postal authorities. FDR had
instructed Farley to monitor postal receipts for Royal Oak
to keep tabs on the priest's popularity. Several states were
reporting great strength among Coughlin supporters. Both the
nation's conservative and liberal press were taking the new
party seriously. The conservative Los Angeles Times , perhaps
wistfully, suggested that "Lempke's third party may defeat
Roosevelt." The liberal New Republic editorialized "this
party is far more formidable than Al Smith's Liberty
League.... It might prove that the New Deal has not been
radical enough to satisfy popular discontent." The
Minneapolis Tribune suggested that Lempke's popularity in
the farm states would challenge FDR's earlier vote. A New
York Times survey revealed Townsend's popularity in
Washington, Oregon and California would disrupt traditional
Democratic and Republican voting patterns. [22]
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Unquestionably, Coughlin's strength rested with
Catholic voters. Massachusetts political leaders were
virtually unanimous in their fear of Coughlin's campaign.
Governor James Curley, Congressman John McCormack and
Senator David Walsh all reported to Farley that Coughlin's
popularity would translate into a large Lempke vote.
McCormack, who survived the September primary in
Massachusetts despite the Union's opposition, wrote to FDR
proclaiming Coughlin's supporters were "sullen discontented
and bitter, using any argument they think will appeal to the
hearer." The President's son, James Roosevelt, claimed
Coughlin was "stronger in Massachusetts than in any other
state." Farley disagreed, stating that Ohio was the
strongest Coughlin state. Reports were coming in almost
daily of the threat Coughlin forces represented in
Cleveland, where Coughlin's endorsement in the spring
primaries had been credited with defeating the local machine
candidate. The priest was demonstrating great influence
among both German and Irish Catholics. One party worker
claimed: "I am not anti-Cathol ic, . . . but go into any Catholic
settlement in Northwestern Ohio and you will find a lot of
strong Lempke sentiment and following." [23]
Just who was supporting Coughlin at this point? One
writer has described the priest's final audience as "the
congregation of despair." One early supporter of both
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Coughlin and FDR wrote to Roosevelt exclaiming, "You are a
Christian Gentleman, and ...you abhor and despise
Corruption, and the wealth of the Nation in the Hands of the
Few, who strangle the Poor even unto Starvation." The same
writer now told the President "I loved you, and you betrayed
me." Clearly the Coughlinites were comprised of those who
felt the New Deal had not gone far enough. This was the same
analysis being put forward by The New Republic and
Congressman McCormack
. [24]
While Senator Walsh was demonstrating a lukewarm
attitude toward the administration, his longtime rival in
Massachusetts politics, James Michael Curley, was going all
out for FDR. When Curley's brother John arrived at the
Democratic convention, it set off "speculation of an attempt
to put Curley on (the) ballot as vice-president."
Realistically, Curley had no chance of being named FDR's
running mate, and John probably started the speculation
himself. Real "Hotel gossip" was swirling around the third
ticket possibilities of Father Coughlin's Union Party.
Boston District Attorney Thomas C. O'Brien had been given
the Union Party nomination for vice-president and would be
Congressman William Lempke's running mate. Most of the
Massachusetts delegation, according to news reports,
"believe that the selection of O'Brien was a ploy engineered
by Governor Curley to keep O'Brien out of the Senatorial
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contest in Massachusetts in September." This speculation
centered around the fact that the Lempke-0
• Br ien ticket was
announced "after the visit of Father Coughlin to Boston and
his conference with Governor Cur ley . " ( 25
]
In addition to removing a potential rival to Curley's
bid for the senate the fact that an Irish Catholic would be
on the ticket in Massachusetts, where Coughlin was
considered very popular, added to the possibility that the
Union Party could cost FDR the state. On the other hand, a
Catholic on the ticket was potentially dangerous in terms of
alienating the core, which had soundly rejected Catholic Al
Smith only eight years earlier. FDR was not about to be
saddled with the volatile James Michael Curley, even in
Massachusetts, and shortly after the convention he named
Walsh as his campaign chairman in Massachusetts. FDR thus
had his own Irish Catholic politician running his campaign
in Massachusetts and one with a far better vote-getting
record than Curley in the state.
In August The Boston Herald carried a story under the
headline "Walsh Afraid of Lempke Vote . " The article quoted
Walsh as saying, "if the Union party polls 100,000 or more
votes in Massachusetts, President Roosevelt will lose the
state." Polls at the time were indicating Lempke would
receive seven percent of the Massachusetts vote • Something
of the old progressive still remained in Walsh, however , as
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the same article carried his attack on "those calling FDR an
enemy of the constitution and of liberty," wording that
could have referred to either or both the Union Party and
the Republicans. Walsh declared, "what they mean by liberty
is the freedom of the exploiter to gain untold wealth at the
expense of the general welfare." Indeed, FDR had used
similar rhetoric at the Democratic convention when he
attacked the "economic royalists" who sought to create a
"new despotism." "They complain that we seek to overthrow
the institutions of America," the President exclaimed, "What
they really complain of is that we seek to take away their
power." Both Walsh and FDR were using the very type of
Bryanesque and Wilsonian rhetoric used by Coughlin and were
now using it to undercut his appeal. Ironically, Walsh would
break with FDR over his court-packing scheme and end up a
critic of the New Deal. [26]
In mid-October the Associated Press carried a story in
which Walsh declared that president Roosevelt's reelection
had been "virtually certain" from the outset of the
campaign. The outcome in Massachusetts, however, was still
in doubt and "hinges on the size of the vote polled by the
third party ticket backed by Father Coughlin." Walsh said
FDR would carry the state easily in a "straight two party
vote," and indeed he could still win "even with Democratic
deflections to the third party there." Walsh's predictions
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proved accurate when the Union Party polled its strongest
showing in Massachusetts, but FDR carried the state. [27]
While Catholic politicians and laymen were busy
solidifying FDR's position among Catholic voters, the clergy
was no less active in making its position known. In July,
shortly after Coughlin's opening attack on the president.
Reverend Maurice S. Sheehy of Catholic University wrote to
Roosevelt informing him that his "friends are not ignoring
the calumnies of Father Coughlin." Sheehy told FDR of a
meeting he had attended in New York with four bishops and
three monsignori at which Coughlin's attacks on the
President had been the topic of discussion. The result was a
plan on "how this matter might be handled most effectively
and we have taken action." [28]
Although Sheehy's letter to FDR did not outline the
plan of action discussed at New York, it soon became clear
that the church hierarchy intended to refute Coughlin at
every turn and disassociate his campaign rhetoric from any
official sanction by the church. Coughlin continued to
attack the president as a "communist" and the New Deal as a
Communist-inspired program developed by the President's
advisors. He told the public that in -voting for Roosevelt
"We are voting for the Communists, the socialists, the
Russian lovers, the Mexican lovers and the K ick -me-downers .
"
Before a crowd estimated at 100,000 in Chicago he decried
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the "Commies" in the administration: "Rexie Tugwel 1 . . . hand
shaker of Russia, plow-me-down Wallace Josephus
Daniels-the man who applauds the slaughter of priests and
nuns in Mexico." He was raising again all the issues
associated by Catholics with communist influence in the
years of the Roosevelt administration
.[ 29
)
But now his remarks were not going unchallenged. When
Coughlin gave a speech in Cincinnati in which he declared
Roosevelt a "dictator" and said it might become necessary to
use "bullets" instead of "ballots," Archbishop McNicolas
responded that he "cannot let pass the advocacy of the use
of bullets and I condemn such remarks." South Dakota's
Bishop Bernard Mahoney publicly called Coughlin a "Cultural
vulgarian," and Boston's Cardinal William O'Connell spoke
out against him. [30]
In early October the anti-Coughlin campaigns of the
Catholic politicians and the Catholic clergy converged.
Senator Joseph 0 'Mahoney of Wyoming reached Monsignor John
Ryan of Catholic University with a request that Ryan make a
radio speech rebutting Coughlin's charges of Communists in
Washington. Ryan agreed to make the speech and submitted
several drafts to O'Mahoney. FDR himself seems to have had
some input into the speech. An early draft, with a specific
reference to Coughlin was edited to delete his name; then it
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was put back in, "reportedly at the direction of the
president." [31]
Ryan went on the air on October 8, addressing himself
to "the wage earners" and "toilers" who had suffered the
most from the depression and benefited the most from the New
Deal. This category of course contained the great bulk of
working-class Catholics that had made up the great waves of
immigration concentrated in America's urban areas. Ryan
dismissed Coughlin's charges that FDR and his advisors such
as Felix Frankfurter and Rexford Tugwell were Communists.
Ryan charged that Coughlin's explanation of what was wrong
with the American economy was "at least 50 percent wrong"
and his solutions were "at least 90 percent wrong." He
concluded by begging "the toilers of America" not to abandon
Roosevelt in the coming election. Ryan quickly began to hear
from Coughlin's supporters. The letters again demonstrated
that Coughlin's support rested with Irish and German
Catholics. Of 78 letters attacking Ryan's position, 36 were
written by persons with Irish names and 39 by persons with
German names. [32]
The Vatican, meanwhi le, had again stepped into the
picture. On September 30 it was announced that Cardinal
Secretary of State Eugenio Pacelli would visit the United
States for a three-week "vacation." The American hierarchy
was taken completely off guard by the announcement, with the
7 4
exception of Boston's Auxiliary Bishop Frances Spellman, who
was secretly notified of the visit in August. The bishop
confided to his diary his reservations of the second most
powerful prelate in the Vatican visiting the United States
in the midst of a heated election in which Catholics were
playing such a prominent role. Spellman realized, or knew,
that this visit would not be confined to a simple
"vacation." A nationwide tour for the Cardinal was
organized. Pacelli spent four relatively quiet days at a
secluded Long Island estate before embarking on a trip that
took him to Boston, Cleveland, Philadelphia, Washington,
Chicago, St. Paul, Los Angeles, San Francisco, St. Louis,
Cincinnati and back to New York. Pointedly omitted from the
Cardinal's itinerary was the Diocese of Detroit, Father
Coughlin's home base. [33]
Bishop Gallagher was angered at the snub and traveled
to Cincinnati along with his friend Bishop Schrembs of
Cleveland seeking to meet with Pacelli. Although the two
arrived early in the morning, they were informed that the
Cardinal was already in a meeting with McNicholas. The two
bishops were left waiting most of the day and then informed
the Cardinal would not grant them an audience. The next day,
however, Gallagher was informed by Pacelli "to exercise more
control over Father Coughlin and to inform him that he was
not to participate in political campaigning once the 1936
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election was over." Gallagher seems to have tinally gotten
the message. On October 30, with Pacelli still in the
country, Gallagher forced Coughlin to make a public apology
for calling Roosevelt a "scab President." He also implied
that Coughlin would no longer be allowed to participate in
politics after the election, something which Coughlin later
confirmed. Pacelli 's national tour in the closing days of
the election drew Catholic attention away from Coughlin at
the most critical point of the campaign. [34]
When the votes were counted, Roosevelt won an
overwhelming victory. The President carried 46 states with a
popular vote plurality of over 11 million votes. Coughlin's
Union Party had not been a factor in the outcome.
Nonetheless Lempke received 882,000 votes nationally. The
evidence seems clear that Farley had pulled out all the
stops to keep Catholic voters from deserting FDR in favor of
the popular Coughlin and had succeeded dramatically.
Election analysts agreed that Catholics voted for Roosevelt
in huge numbers. They disagreed only on the exact magnitude
of the percentage that voted for FDR. George Gallop
estimated the Catholic vote for Roosevelt at over 70
percent. R.M. Darrow said of Catholics voting over 80
percent voted for FDR. Catholic voters had apparently
resolved the ant i -Communist rhetoric and charges against the
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New Deal in favor of the ant i
-Communist Catholics within the
New Deal. [35]
In the midst of Pacelli's whirlwind tour of the
country Spellman noted in his diary on October 24: "Joe
Kennedy arranged for President to invite Cardinal to lunch
with him on November 5th and so told me, but I said to have
Cardinal invited directly and through neither of us." The
day after the election Roosevelt met with Cardinal Pacelli
at his home at Hyde Park. The guest list for the
post-election day luncheon hosted by the President's mother,
Sara Delano Roosevelt, was surprisingly limited; the
President, Cardinal Pacelli, Bishop Spellman, Bishop Stephen
J. Donahue representing Cardinal Hayes of New York, Count
Galeazzi, Joseph P. Kennedy and Mrs. Kennedy and Frank C.
Walker and Mrs. Walker. In a letter to his brother Bishop
Spellman said such a meeting "before the Presidency of
Franklin Delano Roosevelt, would have been considered
fantastic." The President-elect and the Cardinal sat before
the fireplace and discussed a wide range of topics. "This
was a great day for America and for Catholic America,"
Spellman concluded. [36]
Little else is known of the events of that day or of
what the President and the future Pope talked about in front
of the fireplace. A crowd of reporters gathered outside the
President's home waiting for the Cardinal to emerge. They
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speculated that the two men discussed Communism, Father
Coughlin, and the possibility the President would recognize
the Vatican: sending an envoy to the Pope. Their hopes for a
quote on any of these matters were dashed when the Cardinal
emerged. The following day The New York Times reported that
Pacelli left the meeting with FDR and greeted the waiting
correspondents. However, attempts to question the cardinal
"were stopped before a single question could be completed."
The Cardinal's escort. Bishop Spellman, "declared that the
Cardinal had given no interview and should give none now."
Despite efforts to convince the Cardinal that questions he
did not want to answer would be considered "as not having
been put," Bishop Spellman "firmly declined." [37]
The lesson of the day was not lost on either the press
or President Roosevelt: Bishop Spellman carried great weight
with Cardinal Secretary of State Pacelli. This would become
increasingly clear in future years as FDR relied on Spellman
as a private channel of communication to the Vatican,
circumventing normal diplomatic channels such as the
Apostolic Delegate in Washington and other, higher ranking
members of the American Catholic hierarchy. It was just such
a message which Spellman sent to Pius XII outlining FDR's
postwar plans in late 1943.
Although Roosevelt was overwhelmingly reelected and
the Union Party crushed in the 1936 election, it would be a
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mistake to view the election results as a complete
repudiation of Coughlin, Analysts have correctly pointed out
that the Union Party faced more than the usual obstacles
placed in the path of American third-party movements. There
was never a real political organization associated with the
Union Party. No cadres to get out the vote, no workers to
canvass and identify potential vote's. Both Coughlin and
Smith used the party to advance their own personal agenda
rather than to foster a new political movement. The party
managed to get on the ballot in only 36 states, and in six
of those states the party label did not appear on the
ballot. As the campaign progressed the desention within the
party became evident until even Dr. Townsend recognized the
problem and switched his support to Landon. Voters were
faced with the usual third-party dilemma: would their vote
be wasted? In spite of all these problems, the party polled
almost as many votes as the Socialist Party at the height of
its popularity in 1912. One can only speculate on how that
might have been different with Huey Long at the head of the
ticket rather than Lempke.
There is no measure to determine how much of the
public believed the charges of Communist influence within
the New Deal or the accusation that FDR himself was a
Communist. Certainly it did not affect the presidential
voting. But the charge hung in the air. The New Deal
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coalition between the core and the periphery held together,
in large measure due to the efforts of anti-Communist
Catholics working to beat back the charges of Communist
influence on the New Deal. To a large degree the periphery
had dominated the campaign. The issue of Communism and
Communists in government would not go away. And for
Catholics the issue would become more critical very soon.
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CHAPTER 5
"...THE LOSS OF EVERY CATHOLIC VOTE..."
The President barely had time to celebrate his
reelection before Catholic ant i
-Commun ism was once again
thrust into his decision-making process. Events at home and
abroad were again beginning to focus around the fear of the
spread of international Communism, and around charges that
FDR was fostering Communism within the U.S.
In July of 1936 General Francisco Franco led a revolt
of the Spanish army against the democratically elected
Popular Front government, which included elements of the
Spanish Communist Party. The Popular Front received only 46
percent of the votes cast in the Spanish elections. However,
the proportional representation used to allocate seats in
the Diet resulted in the Front receiving almost two-thirds
of the seats. The anti-Catholic sentiments of the extreme
left within the Front quickly manifested itself in
widespread incidents of ant i -cler ical ism: churches were
burned, religious education attacked, and priests, bishops
and nuns murdered. Catholics argued that Franco's revolt
was based on the fact that the democratic elements within
the coalition had "succumbed to the extreme Leftist groups"
and was founded "on the legitimate ground that the
government had betrayed the electorate ."[ 1 ]
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Franco's revolt was widely viewed as the latest
manifestation of European Fascism challenging the rule of
democracy. Therein lay the problem for American Catholics.
Commonweal opened the new year with an editorial on January
1 taking issue with its Protestant counterpart. The
Christian Century, which had editorialized in late 1936 that
the Catholic Church was conducting a world-wide campaign
against Communism because "the Holy See is really concerned
with supporting Fascism, ' with its inevitable accompaniments
of autocracy and brutal ity, and for the special pr ivi leges
which the Roman Catholic Church is able to enjoy under
Fascist governments.'" The editors of Commonweal found this
charge incredible and pointed to the opinion of the editor
of Per Anqr iff, Joseph Goebbels, who charged that Cardinal
Pacelli's visit to the United States was part of a plan to
set up a "Cat ho lie Center Party" in order to prevent the
spread of National Social ist doctr ine and that FDR '
s
reelect ion was "one ano inted by the Vat ican . " The Commonweal
editors doubted both views could be correct . [ 2
]
The Church's condemnation of Communism was not
political, according to Commonweal , but religious. Communist
propaganda, as in Spain, embodied in the slogan "join with
Communism against Fascism to save democracy" was a false
issue. The real issue was not between Communism and Fascism
but between "democracy and all forms of total i tar i an ism.
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including Communism." Fascism was nothing more than a
reaction against Communism, without which it could not
exist. The editorial framed the issue for American Catholics
and would form the basis of the Catholic approach to Spain
as long as the civil war went unresolved. More importantly,
the Catholic attitude would carry great weight with FDR. [3]
Isolationist sympathies in the United States were
greatly strengthened following the revelations of the Nye
Committee in 1934. These hearings produced the 1935
Neutrality Act prohibiting U.S. arms manufacturers from
supplying belligerents in any foreign war. FDR attempted to
apply the act to the Spanish Civil War, but the act did not
mention civil wars, and U.S. arms manufacturers began to
make shipments to both sides. When the administration's
efforts at moral persuasion failed FDR asked for an
amendment to the 1937 renewal of the act that would include
civil wars and expand executive discretion in applying the
act. Congress willingly approved the inclusion of civil wars
in the act. The extension of executive powers was another
matter
.
( 4
]
FDR opened his second term with perhaps the most
serious political blunder of his years in office: his
attempt to pack the Supreme Court. Much of the congressional
debate surrounding the extension of executive powers sought
by the President in the Neutrality Act revolved around his
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attempt to assume "dictatorial powers." Senator Hiram
Johnson, an ardent isolationist, said Roosevelt's attempt to
alter the nature of the court would lead to him making
himself "an absolute dictator in fact." The court fight
spilled over into the Neutrality Act fight over the question
of extension of executive powers. The nature of the Spanish
fight was also changing. In March Italian troops were
captured at Guadalajara, proving the charges that Italy and
Germany were actively supporting the Franco "Nationalists."
[5]
As the civil war in Spain intensified, American
opinion on the Neutrality Act began to shift. The
Guadalajara incident shifted the argument from direct help
to the Loyalist government to imposition of the Neutrality
Act against Italy and Germany. At the same time the Vatican
was clarifying its position on the conflicting ideologies
involved in the struggle. In early March Pius XI issued
back-to-back encyclicals. The first, Mit Brenneder Sorge,
(With Burning Sorrow) was an open attack on German National
Socialism. The encyclical charged the Nazi government with
violating the 1933 concordat concluded between the Reich and
the Vatican and with sowing "suspicion, discord, hatred,
calumny" and "secret and open hostility to Christ and His
Church." The Pope attacked the racial and religious policies
of the Third Reich and predicted "destructive religious
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wars... which have no other aim than ... exterminat ion . " The
concordat of 1933 had been negotiated by Eugenic Pacelli,
then serving as Papal Nuncio in Germany. It guaranteed
freedom of the Catholic religion and the right o£ the church
"to regulate her own affairs." The Reich broke the concordat
within five days of its signing. Thousands of priests and
lay leaders were arrested and confined to concentration
camps, church property was confiscated. Catholic
publications suppressed and the sanctity of the confessional
was violated by the Gestapo. [6]
The second encyclical, Divini Redemotoris . attacked
"the principles of dialectical and historical materialism"
and condemned communism as "intrinsically wrong." It further
stated that "no one who would save Christian civilization
may collaborate with it in any undertaking whatsoever." This
"plague on both your houses" attitude of the Vatican may
explain why American Catholic opinion was split on the
question of Spain. With Communists on one side and Fascists
on the other. Catholics were being forced to choose between
the lesser of two evils, as Commonweal suggested. The
American Catholic hierarchy, however, had no difficulty in
choosing sides. Increasingly, the struggle in Spain was
portrayed in terms of the Communist faction within the
Loyalist coalition. While the Catholic press was
highlighting the anti-clerical atrocities of the Loyalist
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government, bishops throughout the country were associating
the government's activities with the spread of international
Communism. [ 7
]
In late April the bombing of Guernica thrust the
entire question of the embargo back into the spotlight. It
also exemplified the confusion surrounding the entire matter
for American Catholics. German-made planes bombed the Basque
city for several hours, leaving 1,654 people dead and
another 889 wounded. Calls immediately went out for an
embargo against Germany and Italy. The Basque region was
largely Cathol ic, and the bombing should have outraged
Catholic opinion in America as it did the rest of the
country. But the Basques were fighting for the Loyalists,
which meant the Communists
. German planes be ing used to bomb
Spanish Catholics who were fighting for the Communists? It
was enough to confuse any Catholic. [8]
In the meantime FDR finally worked out a compromise
with Senator Pittman regarding the extension of the
Neutrality Act. The President was forced to accept less of
the discretionary power he first sought under the act in the
face of P i ttman 's objections to the expans ion of
"dictatorial powers." On May 1, the permanent Neutrality Law
went into effect. Norman Thomas met with the President in
June after returning from Spain and observing the war first
hand. When Thomas raised the issue of the war in Spain and
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the embargo, the President told him his position "had been
and would be guided by what he thought was the attitude of
the Catholic Church in America." [9]
Was the President's position on Spain a payback for
the role the Catholic hierarchy played in the 1936 election?
Catholic public opinion was, and would continue to be, split
on the question of what to do about Spain. The hierarchy of
the church, however, was virtually unanimous. The debate
over the civil war in Spain would continue through the rest
of 1937 and 1938. FDR continued to refuse to apply the
embargo to Berlin and Rome and to lift it against Spain. He
did this in spite of polls indicating the overwhelming
support such a move would have with the American people. A
Gallop Poll conducted in December of 1938 asked: "Which side
do you sympathize with in the Spanish Civil War?"
Nationally, 76 percent sympathized with the Loyalists, while
only 24 percent sympathized with Franco. When broken down by
religion, however, only 42 percent of Catholics sided with
the Loyalists, compared to 83 percent of Protestants. Franco
was favored by 58 percent of Catholics compared to only 17
percent of Protestants. Clearly, Catholic opinion on Spain
varied widely from its Protestant counterpart in America.
However, the position of the Catholic periphery would come
to dominate the political center. [10]
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For FDR the issue was framed in terms of the
opposition of the Catholic hierarchy. Clearly, Catholic lay
opinion on Spain was divided, as the poll indicated. As the
congressional elections in the fall of 1938 approached, FDR
put the matter in purely political terms. Secretary of the
Interior Harold Ickes was furious when Roosevelt failed to
act on lifting the embargo against Spain. He recounts in his
diary how he overcame FDR's logistical objections to lifting
the arms ban only to have the President relate that he had
discussed the matter that morning with congressional leaders
and they feared that to raise the ban "would mean the loss
of every Catholic vote in the coming fall elections." The
Interior Secretary exclaimed in his diary: "This proves up
to the hilt what so many people have been saying, namely,
that the Catholic minorities in Great Britain and America
have been dictating the international policy with respect to
Spain." Surely the periphery was dominating the core and the
issue was ant i -Communism .[ 1 1
]
Clearly, FDR's position was political, as any
President's would be. It was also consistent, as the two
conversations with Thomas and Ickes demonstrate. The thrust
of both conversations, coming over a year apart, indicate
that the President was unwilling to risk losing the Catholic
vote over the issue of Spain. They also demonstrate that his
fear was that the Catholic hierarchy's strong ant i -Communist
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position on Spain was the deciding factor. The ability of
the hierarchy to offset Coughlin's influence in the 1936
election was a lesson not lost in the White House. Some
historians argue that recollections of private conversations
with FDR cannot be taken at face value because he had a
tendency to tell people what they wanted to hear, and then
did what he wanted. Clearly, what FDR was telling both
Thomas and Ickes was not what they wanted to hear, and what
he did was not what they wanted him to do but rather what he
felt he needed to do.
While the controversy over lifting the arms embargo
against Spain was raging, the question of Communist
influence within the administration would not go away.
Father Coughlin briefly left the air following the 1936
election, as he said he would if the Union Party was not
victorious, but quickly resumed his broadcasts and
supervision of his Social Justice newspaper. By July of 1937
Coughlin was again on the attack against Communists, this
time within the Congress of Industrial Organizations. He
labeled the entire CIO as a "Moscow tool teeming with
communists" and charged they were taking instructions from
the "Communist Central Committee of the United States."
Earlier, Coughlin labeled CIO head John L. Lewis a "labor
dictator" and "a communist tool being used to prepare the
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way for the eventual victory of Marxism in the United
States
.
" [ 12 ]
With Coughlin back in stride questions began to
surface in places generally considered more congenial to the
President. Writing in Commonweal in September Oliver McKee,
Jr. denounced the "class prejudice" being fostered by the
New Deal. McKee argued that FDR's "political strategy and
many of his policies have ... tended to incite class
prejudice, and create in the public mind the impression that
property is necessarily the foe of human rights." McKee does
not charge that FDR is a Communist, or even being influenced
by Communists, but the suggestion that the New Deal is
promot ing class war fare and "appeals to class consciousness
to win popular support" demonstrate that even the liberal
Commonweal was beginning to question the aims of the New
Deal. [13]
In early 1938 Coughlin was again attracting
considerable attention, so much so that the Gallop Poll
conducted a survey in an attempt to gauge his strength. The
poll revealed that some 8.5 million American families with
radios listened to Coughlin either regularly or "from time
to time." This represented one-third of the 24 million
households with radios. More importantly, 8 3 percent of
those listening to Coughlin "approved" of what he said. The
survey was crude by today's standards and did not break down
92
the audience by religion, income, region or other indicators
of where Coughlin's message was having an effect. [14]
Clearly, however, large numbers of Americans were
still listening to Coughlin and agreeing with what he was
saying. At the time of the poll Coughlin's attacks on FDR
and the New Deal were becoming increasingly vitriolic. In
October of 1937 Coughlin commented on the "personal
stupidity of President Roosevelt" in an interview, while on
the same day an article in his Social Justice declared that
Catholics could not belong to the CIO because "Catholicism
was as incompatible with the CIO as Catholicism was
incompatible with Mohammedanism." He now added a new aspect
to his attack on international Communism, associat ing it
with " inter national Jewry . " The pages of Social Justice
became filled with ant i -Semi t ic articles and pro -German
sentiments, placing him in direct oppos it ion to the
ant i -Nazi position asserted by Pius XI in his encyclical
"Mi t Brennender Sorge" . [15]
The Communist threat was everywhere according to
Coughl in : in labor unions, colleges, and the administration.
The radio priest was providing the widest possible audience
to the elements of the Jesuit campaign discussed earlier. In
the process the per iphery pos i t i on is coming to dominate the
developing popular culture of ant i -Communism. The political
atmosphere, poisoned by Coughlin and others, continued to
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focus on the inability of the New Deal to bring the
depression to an end, and manifested itself in the summer of
1938 when the House voted 181 to 41 for the creation of the
House UnAmerican Activities Committee. Ostensibly, the
committee was chartered to investigate extremist political
activity on both the left and right. However, under the
chairmanship of Martin Dies of Texas, the committee focused
almost exclusively on the question of Communist infiltration
of organized labor, education, and government.
The committee issued its first report in January 1939,
defining UnAmer icanism and Communism. Citing the "Trojan
Horse" tactics of Communism, the report suggested Communists
infiltrated existing organizations or set up "front
organizations" dedicated to popular causes, but in reality
under the direction of Moscow. Witnesses identified 640
organizations, 483 newspapers and 280 labor unions which
they said were Communistic, including the Boy Scouts, Camp
Fire Girls, and several Catholic organizations. At least one
member of the committee branded the New Deal itself as
Communist. Representative J. Parnell Thomas, a Republican
member of the committee claimed the New Deal was "working
hand in glove with the Communist Party" and that it was
"either for the Communist Party, or is playing into the
hands of the Communist Party." [16]
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One of the "experts" on Communism called to testify
before the Dies Committee was Father Charles Coughlin. In
his ongoing battle with the CIO he released to the committee
a copy of remarks made to him in a private conversation with
Homer Martin, former head of the United Auto Workers, in
which Martin claimed most of the leadership of the union
were Communists. When Martin was forced to acknowledge the
comments in public, it made the split within the UAW
irreversible, providing Coughlin with a sense of victory
over the CIO. [17]
The fact that a standing committee of the congress was
leveling the same charges as Coughlin, and providing him
with yet another forum for his attacks, could do nothing but
lend credence to his charges. The criticism leveled at the
tactics of the committee, and the ridicule of some of the
testimony by the press, was not keeping the public from
being impacted . A poll conducted in November of 19 3 8 showed
that 60 percent of the respondents had heard of the
committee, and 7 4 percent of those f ami liar with the
committee felt its f ind ings were "important enough to
justify continuing the investigation." A year later, a
similar poll found support for continued funding of the
committee at 75 percent . [ 18
]
As FDR approached the midpoint of his second term he
found himself embroiled once again in charges that he was a
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Communist or under the influence of Communists within the
New Deal. He openly admitted to both Harold Ickes and Norman
Thomas that his policy on Spain revolved around the position
of the Catholic hierarchy, which was based on the now
official anti-Communism of the church, and the need to keep
Catholic voters in the Democratic Party. A resurgent Father
Coughlin was continuing his attack on the New Deal and the
President. Conditions in Europe were rolling toward war and
speculation was beginning to mount that the President would
seek an unprecedented third term. Having seen the effort FDR
made to keep the "Catholic Vote" in the 1936 election, and
his position on Spain designed to keep it in the 1938
midterm elections, it seems clear that a pattern was
developing in the President's political relations with
American Catholics centering around the issue of
ant i -Commun ism and leading to Teheran and Yalta.
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CHAPTER 6
PAPA ANGELICUS
Events in Europe were rapidly deteriorating in early
1939 when Pope Pius XI died on February 10. While the
College of Cardinals began to assemble in Rome to choose a
successor. Hitler was pressing the government of what
remained of Czechoslovakia. The Munich agreement, which had
"guaranteed peace in our time," was falling apart under the
onslaught of Nazi demands.
On March 2, the traditional puffs of white smoke arose
from the Vatican announcing to the world the selection of a
new Pope. Eugenio Cardinal Pacelli had been elected and
chosen the name Pius XII. The former Papal Secretary of
State who sat by the fire with FDR at Hyde Park after his
reelection in 1936 was now the leader of worldwide
Catholicism. The election of a new Pope whose career within
the church centered on Germany and diplomacy was widely
regarded as a signal the church planned on playing a role in
seeking a peaceful solution to the problems in Europe. The
election also initiated a series of events which would alter
the relationship between FDR and American Catholics.
The new Pope was immediately faced with a crucial
decision concerning the American church left by the sudden
death of his predecessor. The most powerful position in the
American hierarchy had been vacant since the death the
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previous September of Cardinal Hayes of the archdiocese of
New York. Speculation on a successor to Hayes centered on
Archbishop Edward Mooney of Detroit and Archbishop John
McNicholas of Cincinnati, both longtime friends of FDR.
However, barely a month after being named Pope, Pacelli
turned to his old friend the auxiliary bishop of Boston,
naming Francis J. Spellman the new archbishop of New York.
Under Spellman's tutelage the chancery office of the
archdiocese would come to be known as the "Powerhouse" by
political leaders of both parties and all religious
denominat i ons
.
With the deteriorating European political situation
the new Pope needed as many friends in high places as he
could find. By the end of March Czechoslovakia disappeared
from the map of Europe, absorbed by Germany, Poland, and
Hungary. Hitler was now turning his attention to Poland . The
attitude of the new Pope toward the Third Reich was of great
interest to the Fuehrer. Pacelli served as Papal Nunc io in
Germany from 1917 to 1929 and negotiated the concordat
between the Reich and Vatican in 1933. There were some 35
million Catholics in Germany (including Hitler who was a
nominal Catholic), and they, along with the Socialists, had
provided the main support of the Weimer Republ ic . Hitler
despised the political nature of the German church and
immediately outlawed the Catholic Party upon taking office.
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In spite of the concordat, confessional schools came under
attack, along with Catholic Action Leagues, Catholic labor
unions, and the Vatican itself as a non-German foreign
influence
. [ 1
]
While Hitler was completing the destruction of Czech-
oslovakia, the German Foreign Office was completing an
analysis of the new Pope. The memorandum on Pacelli stated:
"His advocacy of an orthodox church policy repeatedly
brought him into conflict with National Socialism on matters
of principle." The Foreign Office regarded Pacelli as a
"Germanophile" as a result of his long tenure in Germany. He
admired German culture, phi losophy, mus ic, and literature.
The report also drew attention to the fact the new Pope
seemed particularly affected by the appellation "Papa
Angelicus" associated with his reign. The term referred to
the prophecy of St. Malachy which attributed to the 106th
Pope a revival of Apostolic simplicity and zeal which would
inaugurate a new age. [2]
While Hitler continued his pressure on Poland, his
Axis partner Mussolini took the opportunity to invade
Albania in early April. This move solidified the resolve of
Great Britain and France as both countries guaranteed the
borders of neighbor ing Greece and Yugoslavia. FDR meanwhi le
sent a letter to Hitler on April 15 listing 31 countries and
asking the Fuehrer "to give assurances that your armed
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forces will not attack or invade the territory" of any of
them. The President sought the support of the Vatican for
his peace initiative. Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles
approached the Apostolic Delegate Ameleto Cicognani through
Monsignor Ready of the National Catholic Welfare Conference.
The Vatican already had been approached by both Britain and
France to support the proposal. The Vatican, however, took
the position that the President's letter reflected an
unneutral attitude, would be rejected out of hand by the
Axis leaders and would reduce the pope's influence in
Germany if endorsed by the Vatican. [3]
Hitler's response to FDR's peace proposal indeed took
the form of the total rejection the Vatican predicted. The
Fuehrer publicly rebuked the President before the Reichstag
on April 28. William Shirer called Hitler's speech that day
"the most brilliant oration he ever gave." As Shirer put it,
"for sheer eloquence, craftiness, irony, sarcasm and
hypocrisy, it reached a new level that he was never to
approach again." [4]
The Fuehrer's rejection of FDR's proposal did not
deter the Pope from putting forth his own peace plan in
early May. The Pope's plan was given to the Fuehrer by the
apostolic nuncio in Berlin, Cesare Orsenigo. According to
the German report of the meeting, the nuncio told Hitler of
the Pope's concern about the tension in Europe and his
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desire to do all in his power to prevent the outbreak of
war. He suggested a conference of the five great powers of
Europe to discuss the German-Polish and Franco-Italian
problems before they got out of hand. Hitler responded that
the danger of war was exaggerated by propaganda, and in any
event he would have to discuss such a proposal with
Mussolini first. He concluded by saying he would "in a very
short time...let the Pope have his answer . " [51
The five great powers of Europe included in Pius' plan
were Britain, France, Poland, Germany and Italy. The British
Foreign Minister, Lord Halifax, in a conversation with the
apostolic delegate in Britain, expressed regret that the
Russians were not invited to attend the conference and was
told "that in no circumstances would it be possible for the
Pope to consider such an approach." His predecessor's
encyclical effectively banned any cooperation with the
Soviet Union. This official Catholic ant i -Communism would
become an increasingly difficult problem for FDR and
American Catholics to deal with in coming months. [5]
However, despite Halifax's admonitions,the British
were in something of a quandary themselves at that moment as
to what role the Soviets were to play in the European
situation. Foreign Commissar Maxim Litvinov approached both
the British and French in April with the possibility of
forming an alliance of the three governments to protect all
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the nations of central and eastern Europe which felt
threatened by Germany. When the British government had not
accepted the proposal by early May, Winston Churchill was
openly critical stating "there is no means of maintaining an
eastern front against Nazi aggression without the active aid
of Russia." [7]
On May 17 Berlin Nuncio Orsenigo was finally given
Hitler's response to the Pope's peace initiative. Foreign
Minister von Ribbentrop told the nuncio that while Hitler
and Mussolini were "very grateful to the Holy Father for his
benevolent intervention on behalf of universal peace.
. .they
think the moment is not yet ripe for a conference" to
discuss the outstanding issues between the various nations.
The nuncio reported that when questioned on the current
international situation, Ribbentrop replied that "Poland, if
she judges badly enough to provoke a war, will be crushed in
less time than it takes to say it." He also offered that
Germany was not afraid of war with France and England,
neither of which would be able to penetrate Germany 's
defense in the west except at a cost of a million men. More
importantly, Ribbentrop raised the prospect of Germany
reaching an agreement with Russia. Noting Stalin's
displeasure over the British and French position and the
dismissal of Litvinov, he said, "We have no quarrel with
Russia except about Bolshevism, in other words we do not
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want its perfidious propaganda for a world revolut ion . . . but
should Russia drop this propaganda nothing prevents us from
drawing closer together." [8]
While the Pope "in no circumstances" would approach
the Soviet Union, and the British were putting off
responding to Soviet overtures for an alliance against
Germany, the German Foreign Minister was acknowledging to a
Vatican official the prospect of a German-Russian
accommodation. The prospect of an alliance between Hitler
and Stalin must have seemed so remote as to border on the
preposterous. There is no indication in the Vatican
documents that this information was passed on to any other
European embassy
.
FDR meanwh ile reopened the prospect of establishing
some type of permanent diplomatic relationship with the
Vat i can . Sumner Welles had been meeting regularly with the
Apostolic Delegate to Washington, Ameleto Cicognani, and
Msg. Ready of the National Catholic Welfare Council. Welles
was expressing the continued desire of the President to
convene a conference aimed at resolving the European
situation: He added that the "United States government was
prepared to take part in a conference of nations to adjust
the present causes of world unrest." FDR seems to have been
disturbed by the exclusion of the U.S. from the Pope's
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original proposal for a peace conference and was indicating
a firm wish to be included in any future plans. [9]
In August, FDR asked Welles' opinion on the
advisability of establishing diplomatic relations with the
Vatican. Welles responded that the Vatican had access to
valuable sources of information "particularly with regard to
what is actually going on in Germany, Italy and Spain" which
the U.S. did not possess, and the ability to get that
information "was of cons id er able importance . " The U.S. had
maintained official diplomatic relations with the Vatican
prior to 1867, when congress reacted against an unpopular
President and a more unpopular Pope by cutting off funds for
the mission. The subsequent loss of the Papal States removed
the justification for maintaining relations with the Vatican
as a foreign state, but the Lateran Treaty had returned that
status to the Vatican. Speculation that FDR intended to
reestablish diplomatic relations with the Vatican had been
high at the time of Pacelli's visit to the U.S. in 1936, and
i ndeed FDR discussed the possibility with Archbishop
Spellman several times over the next two years. [10 1
In October, after the outbreak of war, the President
again raised the issue with Spellman, saying that "he was
looking for a moment and occasion suitable for a persuasive
appeal to the American people." Spellman said that the
present situation in which both the Vatican and the U.S.
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were working for the similar aim of restoring peace seemed
"favorable and propitious." When Spellman raised the
possibility that such an action would undoubtedly raise
criticism, the President agreed, but added, "I think that
every moment brings us nearer to the conclusion of this
matter," The President obviously had a plan, which he then
outlined to Spellman. He projected that the Congress would
adjourn sometime in November after taking up the revision of
the Neutrality Act and would not return until January 3. He
felt an announcement during that time would be appropriate
and that it could be justified by his belief that "such an
association would be of great help to the peace of the
world, as in effect it is." He also suggested the mission
could be viewed in terms of assistance to the refugee
problem. [ 11
]
That the President had already made up his mind seems
clear. He then discussed the question of f und ing such a
mission and proposed that it be considered a "special
mission of the United States Government to Rome accredited
to the Holy See" because special missions did not require an
act of Congress for fund ing, "but once the mission has been
launched, if everything goes well. Congress could be induced
jnore easily to vote the funds for a permanent mission." FDR
had already narrowed the field of candidates to head the
mission to Myron Taylor and former ambassador to Italy
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Breckenridge Long. Spellman said either man would "be
suitable" because the Pope already knew Taylor and Long had
substantial diplomatic experience. [12]
If the President had not already decided on Myron
Taylor to head the mission to the Vatican at the time of his
meeting with Spellman, he soon did. Taylor was almost the
perfect candidate for the job. A Protestant, Episcopalian
with Quaker ancestors, he would not be accused of being
pro-Catholic. He could also not be accused of being a wild-
eyed New Deal social reformer. Formerly Chairman of the
Board of United States Steel, he still sat on the Board of
Directors. He was also a Director of American Telephone and
Telegraph and The First National Bank of New York. In
addition he had his own villa in Florence and could take
care of his own expenses if need be until government funds
were provided.
While FDR was working out the details of this mission
to the Vatican, the war in Europe seemed to come to an end
as abruptly as it started. The Nazi Blitzkrieg overwhelmed
Poland just as Ribbentrop told Orsenigo back in May. The
lull in the war was now being dubbed Sitzkrieg , or the
sit-down war, by the western press. Hitler was making
overtures to the British that the war need not continue. The
Foreign Office was taken completely by surprise by the
Pope's latest effort to secure a peaceful settlement to the
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conflict. Sir D'Arcy Osborne, British ambassador to the
Vatican, informed the Foreign Office in late November that
Pius had been approached to act as an intermediary for a
discontented group within the German Abwehr led by Colonel
Hans Oster. This group contacted Monsignor Ludwig Kaas,
former leader of the German Centre Party living in exile in
Rome, with a proposal for a military coup against Hitler
involving members of the General Staff. The conspirators
sought the Pope's guarantee that if the coup were successful
the British would negotiate a peace based on the restoration
of Poland and non-German Czechoslovakia, but leaving Austria
as part of Germany. In other words post-Munich Germany would
remain intact, but without a Nazi government. [13]
Notes went back and forth between Halifax, Chamberlain
and Osborne. The Foreign Office wanted to bring in the
French, but the Pope wanted to limit knowledge of the plan
to as small a number of people as possible and was convinced
the French would go along if the British agreed. The
negotiations dragged on unt i 1 March with the Foreign Office
apparently vacillating between taking the matter seriously,
and then raising doubts about the nature of the conspiracy
.
Osborne's diary relates his frustration with the long
process of communicating questions from Halifax and
Chamberlain to the Germans through the Pope and then their
response. The Germans in turn were attempting to find out
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who would be acceptable to the British in a non-Nazi
government. The whole thinq collapsed as the Generals
involved, including Beck and Haider, put off acting as final
preparations for the Spring offensive in the west drew
nearer
. [ 14 ]
Meanwhile, on December 24, FDR announced he was
sending Myron Taylor to Rome as his "personal representative
to the Pope." The President was still clearly worried about
reaction to his announcement
. He sent a letter to Pi us
informing him of Taylor's appointment and a similar letter
to Dr. Charles A. Buttrick, President of the Federal Council
of Churches of Christ in America, and Rabbi Cyrus Adler,
President of the Jewish Theological Seminary of America. The
President couched his appointment of Taylor in spiritual
terms, seeking the Pope's opinion on matters of peace and
guidance in these troubled times. He also asked Buttrick and
Adler to do the same . The difference, however , was
substantial, as pointed out by Cicognani: "the President is
sending a Representative to the Holy See, while to the two
above mentioned gentlemen he is extending a simple
invitation to call on him." [15]
The American Protestant community also noted the
difference. Buttrick's organization called for Taylor's
immediate recall. Protestant groups throughout the country
condemned the appointment, some in open ant i -Cat hoi ic
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hostility, others calling on the tradition of the separation
of church and state. Dr. George Truett, president of the
Baptist World Alliance, said the Pope "has in fact no better
title to receive governmental recognition from the United
States than... the head of the least of the Baptist
associations in the hills of North Carolina." FDR weathered
the criticism, cracking jokes at a press conference about
just what an ambassador to the Vatican would do each day.
The strategy he outlined to Spellman worked, however, and
Congress raised little objection to the Taylor mission when
it returned. [16]
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CHAPTER 7
"THE DEVIL IS A COMMUNIST"
The evening before the final session of the Teheran
Conference FDR dined with Churchill and Stalin. When dinner
was over, the President excused himself from after dinner
coffee and cigars claiming he was not feeling well.
Churchill, Eden, Stalin and Molotov engaged in general
conversation which eventually turned to the question of
Poland. According to Eden, the discussion went favorably
with both sides believing the sooner the issue could be
resolved the better. The problem lay in the fact that the
"Americans are terrified of the subject which Harry
[Hopkins] called 'political dynamite' for their elections."
Eden told Hopkins the situation would only get worse the
longer it was left unresolved and that in six months, with
Russian armies in Poland, the elections would be that much
closer . [ 1 ]
The conversation turned to generalities about the
progress of the war during which Churchill remarked that he
believed God was on the side of the allies. Stalin grinned
when he heard the translation of the Prime Minister's remark
and interjected that the devil was on his side "because, of
course, everyone knows that the devil is a Communist, and
God, no doubt, is a good conservative." Over coffee and
cigars on the final evening of the Teheran Conference the
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stumbling blocks of the postwar peace were outlined: Poland,
religion and the American election. [2]
The President returned from Teheran in time to present
his annual Christmas message to the American people from his
home in Hyde Park. He told the nation that he had gotten
along fine with Marshal Stalin and that he believed in the
future "we are going to get along very well with him and the
Russian people-very well indeed." As events unfolded in
early 1944 the public optimism the President expressed in
his Christmas message began to give way to the hard
political reality of dealing with Stalin's demands, [3]
The stalemate which existed in Soviet-Polish relations
since the previous April took on new significance on January
4 when Soviet forces entered Poland. Now that Soviet troops
were returning to eastern Poland the London Poles were
anxious to resume relations and establish a basis for
cooperation between the advancing Red Army and the
Underground Home Army. In Washington, Jan Ciechanowsk i , the
Polish Ambassador of the government-in-exile, was told by
Secretary of State Cordell Hull that in his opinion "the
British Government, as an ally of both Poland and of Russia,
was in a better pos ition to initiate appropriate steps than
the American Government" in terms of mediating a
reconciliation between the Soviets and the
government-in-exile. Hull was conveying to the London Poles
114
tne same message FDR had given to Stalin at Teheran: he
could not take a public stand on the Polish issue. Averell
Harriman later summed up the President's thinking at this
point: "The 1944 election was fast approaching and he
preferred to postpone the Polish outcry until after the
votes were counted, leaving Churchill to take the lead mean-
while." The formal treaty obligations the British had with
both Poland and Russia provided FDR with an escape mechanism
to avoid taking a public position on Poland. [4]
It soon became evident that Hull had not delivered the
U.S. position to the Poles too soon. The offer of the London
Poles to resume relations with the Soviets and coord inate
activities between the Red Army and the Home Army was
tersely rejected. The Soviets also rejected the "erroneous
affirmation" by the London Poles that the area the Red Army
was operating in was part of Poland. It was well known, they
said, that the "Soviet constitution established a
Sovi et -Po 1 ish frontier corresponding with the desires of the
population of western Ukraine and western White Russia...
[and]the territories. . .were incorporated into the Soviet
Union." In other words the Soviets were operating within
their June 1941 borders. [5]
On January 22, Churchill met with the premier of the
Polish government-in-exile, Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, and
proposed a f ive -point program as the bas is for renewed
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recognition by the Soviets. The Premier was told that if his
government would agree to the acceptance of the so-called
Curzon Line as the basis of the western Polish frontier
(linking the eastern frontier to the grant to Poland of East
Prussia, Danzig and Upper Silesia to the Oder River), Poles
on the Soviet side of the eastern frontier would be granted
the right to return to Poland, all Germans within the new
Polish frontiers would be removed, and the guarantee these
agreements would be honored by the three principal United
Nations, relations with the Soviets could be resumed. In
reality this was the agreement the "Big Three" had reached
at Teheran. It was also the outline of the new Poland Myron
Taylor had carried to Rome in September of 1942. [6]
Churchill kept Stalin apprised of his negotiations
with the London Poles. He also cabled Roosevelt on the
position he was taking with Mikolajaczk. He informed the
Polish Premier that even though England had gone to war over
Poland it had done so not for the sake of "any particular
frontier," but rather for the existence of a strong, free,
independent Poland." Churchill said Stalin also supported
this view and that even though England would have continued
to fight Germany alone "the liberation of Poland from the
German grip is being achieved mainly by the enormous
sacrifices and achievements of the Russian armies." Poland
would have to accept the fact that the allies would have a
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large say about "the frontier of territory she should have."
The Poles were willing to consider the matter, according to
Churchill, but they refused to settle border issues prior to
a general peace conference after the war. [7]
The border issue became secondary in early February.
Stalin informed British Ambassador Sir Archibald Clark Kerr
that at least three of the members of the Polish
government-in-exile were unacceptable to him and he would
not deal with them. FDR was anxious where this latest
difficulty would lead. On February 7, he cabled Stalin that
he appreciated his desire "to deal only with a Polish
government in which you can repose confidence," but while
public opinion was still solidifying around the "broad
principles subscribed to at the Moscow and Teheran
conferences," it would be better to allow the Polish Prime
Minister to make changes in the makeup of that government
"without any evidence of pressure or diet at ion from a
foreign country." [8]
While the question of Poland was beginning to heat up,
the President found himself embroiled in yet another issue
highlighting the ability of the Vatican to bring both
domestic and international political pressure to bear on
American public opinion: the bombing of Rome. Although Italy
formally surrendered to the Allies in September of 1943,
stiff German resistance continued in that country. As Allied
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forces began to move up the peninsula in early 1944 bombing
raids in Rome and other military targets resulted in damage
and casualties within Vatican City, the Papal Villa at
Castelgandolf o and the Abby of Monte Casino.
By mid-February public attention was being divided
between the deteriorating Polish situation and the flurry of
diplomatic correspondence between the Vatican and
Washington. Archbishop Amleto Cicognani, Apostolic Delegate
at Washington, was conveying the objections to the bombing
by Pius XII and Luigi Cardinal Maglione, Vatican Secretary
of State, to the President and the State Department. The
Vatican flatly denied Allied military reports that Monte
Cassino and Castelgandol f o were housing German military
personnel. General Mark Clark of the U.S. Fifth Army later
confirmed that no German military personnel were using
either site. Archbishop Spellman notified Roosevelt that he
intended to speak out publicly on the matter, a departure
from the archbishop's usually cordial relations with the
President. At St. Patrick's Cathedral on Washington's
birthday Spellman deplored the fact that American armed
forces had attacked "the territory of a neutral state" in
spite of the fact that the Pope himself had denied that
German troops were ever stationed in the areas under attack.
[9]
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On March 12 and April 1 the archbishop spoke on the
subject again, as bombing raids in and around Rome continued
to damage churches and shrines. The fact that Spellman would
speak out publicly against the actions of American armed
forces in the midst of a popular war effort and an election
year suggests the possibility something deeper was involved.
In fact, the Vatican was marshaling an international effort
on the bombing issue. On March 15, the Irish Ambassador to
the United States delivered a message from Prime Minister
deValera seeking an agreement by which "Rome may be saved."
The Irish vote could not be overlooked. Similar appeals came
from the Spanish government and from several South American
Republics. [10]
The situation was becoming serious in the eyes of the
administration. On March 18, Secretary Hull cabled all
diplomatic representatives in the South American Republics
to "give your serious and urgent attention to the
possibility of discreetly stimulating some comment on the
part of high public officials, cultural leaders, and
prominent newspapers" that responsibility for placing
Christian shrines in jeopardy in Rome lay with the Nazis,
who continued to use the city for military purposes, and not
with the Allied airforce. The administration was promoting a
counterattack of world opinion. Domestically, the situation
was not much better. A poll conducted in late April asked
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"Do you think the Allied Airforce should bomb Rome?"
Nationally, only 37 percent of the respondents replied yes,
while 57 percent said no, and 12 percent had no opinion.
Among Catholics only 24 percent said yes, with 67 percent
saying no, and 9 percent with no opinion. Protestant
response was 36 percent yes, 52 percent no, and 12 percent
no opinion. Clearly, a majority of American public opinion,
led by American Catholics, was lined up against the
administration. Just as in the case of the Spanish Civil
War, American Catholic opinion was dominating the political
center on a question of international importance .[ 11
]
At virtually the same time that Spellman opposed the
bombing of Rome, Reverend Gerald G. Walsh, professor of
history at New York's Fordham University and editor of
Fordham's quarterly journal Thought
^
spoke to the Women's
Press Club of New York. The theme of Rev. Walsh's speech was
the postwar peace. He quoted from a 1939 speech of Pius XII:
"The real lesson of history - that what is common to all men
and women is that they love the place where they were born,
and any future world must be planned on the premise that
they want their homeland to be free." In an obvious
reference to the recently concluded Teheran Conference Rev.
Walsh went on to say that peace plans currently under
discussion were merely "selfish nationalism based on the
military force of the Big Four." [12]
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A respected Catholic historian and journalist, in an
election year, was publicly questioning the conduct of the
President's postwar planning in front of an influential
media group. His superior. Archbishop Spellman, had just
publicly questioned the President's conduct of the war. And
this was not the first time Spellman had used Fordham in an
election year to send the President a message. In 1940, when
FDR was seeking an unprecedented third term, Spellman
invited FDR to a Fordham ROTC inspection, the timing of
which was widely regarded in the press as a subtle
endorsement of the President, The prospect could not be
ignored that a breach was deve lop ing between Roosevelt and
the Catholic hierarchy he had so assiduously cultivated over
the years. Since Spellman was fully aware that FDR's
position on postwar Eastern Europe went far beyond what had
been made public following the Teheran Conference makes this
public criticism even more telling.
In the meantime, the Polish border question would not
go away. By early March, the cables between Churchill and
Stalin were becoming acrimonious. Stalin accused Churchill
of leaking confidential correspondence on the Polish issue
to the London press "with many distortions which I have no
possibility of refuting." Churchill responded that the leak
of information had come from the Soviet Embassy in London
and in the case of The London Times had come directly from
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the Soviet Ambassador Feodor Gusev. At the same time he
informed Stalin that he would announce to the House of
Commons that efforts to resolve the situation between the
Polish and Soviet governments had broken down, that Britain
continued to recognize the government-in-exile, that
territorial questions must await the postwar peace
conference and that Britain would recognize no forcible
transfers of territory. Stalin responded by saying he
considered Churchill's message "full of threats," and he
accused the Prime Minister of reneging on the Teheran
agreements concerning the restoration of the Curzon Line. He
also said that if Churchi 11 del ivered the speech outlined in
his message it would be considered an "unjust and unfriendly
act towards the Soviet Union. " The Soviets continued to
refuse to deal with the Polish government- in-exi le, which
both Britain and the United States recognized as the
legitimate government of Poland. They also continued to
claim the area in which the Red Army was currently operating
was not part of Poland but part of the Soviet Union. [13]
The President apparently thought he clarified the
nature of the political problems the Polish issue would
create for him with Stalin at Teheran, but the Soviet
Premier was doing nothing publicly which would help solve
the President's problems. Poland continued to remain an
issue in U.S. domestic politics. Suddenly, in late April, a
122
Polish Roman Catholic priest from Springfield,
Massachusetts, Rev. Stanislauv Orlemanski, arrived in Moscow
at the personal invitation of Stalin and was granted two
private interviews with the Soviet Premier. The State
Department denied any connection with the Orlemanski visit,
saying his visa had been granted purely as a private citizen
visiting the Soviet Union. Bishop O'Leary of the Diocese of
Springfield denied that Orlemanski was on any mission having
the sanction of church authorities.
While the State Department continued to be rebuffed in
its efforts to obtain a visa for a Catholic priest to travel
to the Soviet Union to assist Father LeBraun in Moscow, a
Polish priest from a small parish in Massachusetts not only
obtained a visa but was granted private interviews with
Stalin. While not well known outside Polish-American
circles, Orlemanski was not a stranger to either Stalin or
FDR. He first came to the attention of the OSS Foreign
Nationals Branch in the late summer of 1943. At that time he
established a "Kosciuszko League" in his local parish to
give moral support to the Kosciuszko Division which Stalin
had established in Russia to fight with the Red Army. This
organization quickly came to the attention of a pro-Soviet
Polish-American group in Detroit which had been involved in
the bitter sit-down strike union struggle of the 1930's. The
leader of this group, Waclaw Soyda, invited Orlemanski to
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Detroit to establish a Kosciuszko League there as a prelude
to making it a national organization. [14]
In early November Orlemanski delivered a speech at
Detroit in which he attacked the Polish government-in-exile,
claiming they had "forsworn" their right to represent the
Polish people when they fled Poland. He also attacked their
position on the territorial question of borders, arguing
that only the "Polish landed aristocracy was interested in
keeping the territory because they held great estates
there." TASS issued a lengthy report on the formation of the
Kosciuszko League and the fact that Orlemanski was named
"honorary president." Branches of the League sprang up in
Chicago, Winnipeg, Roxbury and West Springfield. According
to an FBI report on the League, all the branches were
largely made up of "communists or communist sympathizers."
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In January, shortly after returning from Teheran,
Stalin had Foreign Minister Molotov propose to Ambassador
Harriman the inclusion of three Polish-Americans as part of
the government-in-exile: Oscar Lange, a professor at the
University of Chicago, Leo Krzycki, a leftist vice president
of the CIO, and Orlemanski. Harriman was taken aback by the
proposal and told FDR not to dignify it with a response. In
February, however, Soviet Ambassador Andrei Gromyko
requested that Lange and Orlemanski be permitted to visit
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the Soviet Union. At the same time DeWitt Poole of the OSS
was reporting that Orlemanski was having second thoughts
about his association with the pro-Soviet groups. Poole's
report confirmed that Orlemanski was not a Communist but "a
strange blend of naive patriot, shrewd peasant and loyal
Catholic." He viewed his pro-Soviet activity as a means of
supporting FDR's position that the Soviets were our wartime
ally and declared that "if Roosevelt would declare war on
Russia today I would break all my sympathies for the Russian
cause and as an Amer lean go against Russia." (16]
Whi le Father Or lemansk i was meeting with Stalin the
political power of the Polish vote FDR was so concerned
about began to make itself felt. Just how important the
Poles were politically became clear when one hundred and
forty-seven speeches were made in congress celebrating
Polish Independence Day on May 3, while Orlemanski was still
in Moscow. Jan Ci echanowsk i , Polish ambassador to the United
States, notes in his memoirs that he was told the Polish
vote was critical to the President in five states; Illinois,
Michigan, New Jersey, Pennsylvania and New York. The
connection between this analysis and the total Catholic vote
is dramatically supported by a survey of religious
affiliations conducted among the members of the 78th
congress and reported in the Spring 1944 issue of Publ ;c
Opinion Ouarterly . The survey found that of 435 members of
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the House 80, or 18 percent, were Catholic. In addition, 63
of the 80 were concentrated in nine states, the five listed
by Ciechanowski along with Massachusetts, California,
Wisconsin and Louisiana. The importance of these nine
states, which represented 218 of the 266 electoral votes
needed to win the presidency (over 80 percent), is quickly
evident for any presidential candidate. Also, the Democrats
had suffered substantial losses in the mid-term elections of
1942 when their majority in the House had fallen from 91 to
only 14, and they had lost 8 Senate seats. Clearly, an
erosion in the Catholic vote represented by the loss of the
Poles would jeopardize the President's chances for a fourth
term. Is it any wonder then that Harry Hopkins termed the
Polish issue "political dynami te? " ( 1 7
]
The President needed some indication from Stalin that
his concerns expressed at Teheran over the Polish vote, and
by implication the Catholic vote, would be addressed. The
answer was forthcoming from Father Orlemanski. On May 6
Father Orlemanski left Moscow to return to the United States
carrying with him a letter signed by Stalin which dealt with
the question of religious freedom in the Soviet Union and
the possibility of cooperation between Stalin and Pius XII
"in the matter of the struggle against persecution and
coercion of the Catholic Church." The American embassy in
Moscow learned of the contents of the letter from Harrison
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Salisbury of the United Press. Orlemanski had allowed
Salisbury to make a copy of the letter under the condition
it would not be made public until he could discuss it with
Catholic authorities in the United States. [18]
The embassy cabled the President and the Secretary of
State on May 9 that while Orlemanski came to the Soviet
Union "primarily interested in the Polish question," he now
believed the letter he was bringing back from Stalin "moved
into the much broader field of general relations between the
Kremlin and the Catholic Church." The Embassy reported that
Orlemanski did not feel capable of dealing with a subject of
that magnitude and would submit the letter to Catholic
authorities in the United States. Salisbury believed the
letter represented "a definite manifestation of a desire to
bring about improved relations between the Soviet government
and the Catholic Church and to remove a present source of
friction not only in Soviet-Polish relations but also in
relations with the United States." The cable concluded by
saying, "The Embassy agrees with this estimate." [19]
Stalin seems to have been using the visit of Father
Orlemanski, arranged by FDR, to send a message that he was
willing to compromise on the issue of religious freedom in
the areas of Eastern Europe that the Red Army would soon
have under its control and that FDR had already acknowledged
to Spellman would remain under Soviet control. Perhaps
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Stalin felt this was the type of statement which Myron
Taylor had requested through Ambassador Maisky in London
back in October of 1942, or at least a starting point for
negotiating such a statement. Stalin was well aware of the
President's preoccupation with the question of freedom of
worship in the Soviet Union, dating back to the original
negotiations over recognition in 19 33.
Clearly, Stalin was as aware as Roosevelt that
Catholicism could be the key to the Polish problem. Polish
nationalism and Polish Catholicism went hand- in-hand . The
staff at the American embassy in Moscow apparently believed
that Stalin was sincere in this effort to rel ieve the
mounting tension over the Polish issue. Spellman noted in
his memo to the Vatican the President's hope "that the
Russ ian intervention in Europe would not be too harsh." With
this in mind, and the President's repeated efforts to assure
some measure of freedom of worship in the Soviet Union, it
seems fair to conclude that FDR would view the possibility
of a rapprochement between the Vatican and the Kremlin as a
step in the right direction in terms of relieving the
"harsh" Russian intervention in Europe . Domestic Cathol ic
reaction to such an arrangement could also be expected to be
less harsh in terms of possible defections from the
Democratic coalition.
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However, the State Department soon had reason to doubt
the supposed importance of Orlemanski's letter. On May 24
Charles (Chip) Bohlen, Chief of the Division of Eastern
European Affairs, reported to the Deputy Director of the
Division the gist of a conversation between Andre Visson of
the New York Herald Tribune and Vladimir Pravdin, head of
the Soviet Tass Aqencv
. According to Visson, Pravdin told
him it was the intent of the Soviet government to support a
"well organized, dynamic and state-controlled Orthodox
Church which would have great influence throughout the
Balkans and the Near East" after the war. Pravdin doubted
the Vatican would respond favorably to the Orlemanski letter
because it was too "well informed" not to recognize Soviet
backing of the Orthodox Church as a much greater "threat to
Catholicism than Atheistic Communism had ever been." Pravdin
concluded by saying it was necessary to have "some force to
combat the Vatican" and as Protestantism was too divided to
do so "the only force capable of doing so was the Greek
Orthodox Church controlled by the Soviet Government ."[ 20
]
In the meantime, military events were rapidly changing
the context within which the political discussions were
taking place. On June 4 Allied forces liberated Rome. Two
days later Allied Armies landed at Normandy and the
long-awaited second front was finally established. Some of
Stalin's resentment seems to have given way to his
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enthusiasm over the landing on the continent. He cabled
Churchill "the landing, conceived on a grandiose scale, has
succeeded completely" and that "the history of warfare knows
no other like undertaking from the point of view of its
scale, its vast conception, and its masterly execution." He
was obviously pleased to have some of the pressure taken off
the eastern front. [21]
On June 5, the very eve of the Normandy invasion,
Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, premier of the Polish government
-in-exile, arrived in Washington for talks with FDR. The
first meeting took place on June 7, and Jan Ciechanowsk i
,
Polish ambassador to the U.S. described FDR as being in good
spirits following the successful landing the previous day.
FDR repeatedly stressed to Mikolajczyk the need for the
gover nmen t - i n-ex i le to reach an accommodation with the
Soviets. "When a thing becomes unavoidable one should adapt
oneself to it," FDR said, and asked Mikolajczyk if he agreed
with that theory. When the Polish Premier replied that the
Soviet demands were irreconcilable with the concept of
Polish independence and sover e ignty, FDR r epl i ed : "remember
there are five times more Russians than Poles" and that
Russia "could swallow up Poland if she could not reach an
understanding on her terms." Clearly, Roosevelt was trying
to impress on the Polish Premier the seriousness of the
situation facing the Poles. In his memo to the Vatican,
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Spellman recorded what FDR told him regarding the Soviet
position on Poland and at one point remarked: "Poland, if.
reestablished, would get Eastern Pruss ia . " ( emphas is added)
FDR obviously feared for the very existence of Poland, and
Soviet military might was already dictating the realities of
the situation on the ground in Poland. Just as the Soviets
refused to acknowledge the Red Army was in Poland rather
than Russia in January, they could in fact, as FDR said,
just "swallow up" all of Poland. For FDR the very existence
of Poland was at stake, and if Poland ceased to exist, what
would be the reaction of American Poles and their fellow
anti-Communist Catholics? To succeed in reestablishing the
Polish state would be a major diplomatic achievement, even
if some territorial concessions were needed to compensate
for Soviet security fears. FDR was giving the Poles the same
message in June that Churchill gave them in January. [22]
FDR then said he thought it would be construetive for
Mikola jczyk to meet persona lly with Stalin. However , the
Polish Premier r epl ied that without the support of the
President Stalin would insist on acceptance of his
conditions prior to any meeting; he asked Roosevelt to tell
Stalin he supported the government- in-exi le 's position.
Roosevelt replied that as a politician himself, Mikolajczyk
could understand that in his "political year" he could not
intervene with Stalin on the Polish issue. Both men were
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obviously concerned with the impact of American public
opinion
.
Mikola jczyk was hoping to force the Pres ident '
s
hand into public support of the government-in-exi le ' s
position on the frontier issue by playing to the large
Polish electorate he knew FDR needed in November.
Roosevelt, having already agreed to much of Stalin's
position on the frontier issue at Teheran, was trying to
preserve some semblance of a Polish state and reach a
compromise acceptable to Poles in the United States as well
as Poland. One way to do that would be to insure the
reestabl ishment of the prewar Polish state after the war. A
possible alter native would be to insure that Poles would be
able to practice their Cathol ic r el igion
.
Subsequent conversations between Roosevelt and
Mikolajczyk revolved around the efforts of the Polish Home
Army and the need to supply them now that the Soviets were
in Poland. The President agreed that the underground army
was performing vital services to the Allies by disrupting
German activities behind the front. FDR used this issue to
stress again the need for Mikolajczyk to meet personally
with Stalin and inform him of the strength and activities of
the Home Army. He felt Stalin would be impressed and would
agree to coordinate Red Army plans with the Poles in order
to defeat the Germans.
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The conversation then took an interesting turn. FDR
brought up Father Orlemanski's visit to Moscow. He said he
had been asked to meet with the priest but had not yet
decided if he would. It is interesting to note FDR's comment
that he had not yet decided on meeting with Orlemanski. On
June 2 the President was sent a memo by Secretary Hull
advising against such a meeting. Hull disagreed with the
idea that the offer brought back from Stalin represented a
"real departure from the position of the Soviet government."
He referred to the "criticism from Polish-American and
Catholic circles." Hull believed all the information that
could be gathered on Orlemanski's visit with Stalin had been
obtained in the OSS interview conducted with him on his
return and that an "off the record" meeting could not be
kept secret and would generate more "unfortunate publicity."
Besides, Orlemanski had been summarily suspended from his
parish duties and ordered to the Passionist Monastery in
West Springfield by Bishop Thomas O'Leary of the Springfield
Diocese. Bishop O'Leary had been contacted by the Apostolic
Delegate Archbishop Amleto Cicognani wanting to know "what
provision had been made for the parish of Father
Orlemanski." The reasons given for Orlemanski's suspension
were that he had left his parish without permission and that
he had consorted with Communists in violation of Pius XI 's
133
1937 encyclical. It was obvious the reaction of the American
Catholic Church was not what Orlemanski had expected .[ 23
]
In any case, FDR told Mikolajczyk he was interested in
the part of the priest's meeting with Stalin in which they
had discussed freedom of religion in Russia, particularly
freedom for the Roman Catholic Church. Stalin was reported
to have said he had no objection to freedom of religion,
only to the fact that there were so many religions in the
world. He added that to give religious freedom to one or two
denominations would result in dozens more applying and felt
"it might be better to unify religions." According to Jan
Ciechanowski, the President felt this statement "might be an
indication that Stalin would favor a union between the
Russian Orthodox and Roman Catholic churches," and he might
even be willing "to admit the Pope's leadership and allow
him to become head of the two united churches . " The
President was making quite a leap from the note concerning
cooperation with Pi us XII to all owing the Pope to head a
united church in Russ ia . Perhaps the Pres ident had in mind
Bohlen's memo outlining Stalin's postwar plan and the
possibility of working around that problem. The Pres ident
then asked Mikolajczyk what he thought of Stalin's comments
and the Premier replied that Stalin could indicate his
sincerity by releasing the Catholic priests imprisoned in
the Soviet Union. The President then turned the conversation
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to other matters. FDR did not divulge to the Polish Premier
that the American embassy in Moscow believed Stalin's
remarks were intended as a gesture "to remove a source of
friction" in Soviet-Polish relations. Neither did he attempt
to ascertain the potential threat to Polish Catholicism of a
revitalized Orthodox Church under Soviet domination,
expressed in Bohlen's memo. [24]
On June 14 Mikola jczyk
,
having failed to extract a
public commitment from FDR to support the government-in-
exile's position on the frontier issue, returned to London.
The following day Roosevelt lunched with Archbishop Spellman
and made arrangements for the Catholic prelate to fly to
Rome on an Air Force plane. The President quickly informed
Stalin that the visit of Mikolajczyk to Washington would
have no bearing on their Teheran agreements. FDR cabled the
Soviet Premier on June 17, and in what may have been a
reference to the upcoming U.S. elections he stated "I deemed
his visit at this time as desirable and necessary for
reasons which Ambassador Harriman had already explained to
you." The President expressed the opinion that Mikolajczyk
was most concerned about the cooperation of the Red Army
with the Polish Home Army and the need to coordinate their
activities to defeat the Germans. He stated that Mikolajczyk
would be willing to go to Moscow to discuss the problems
between the Soviet Union and his government-in-exile but
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took no position favoring the Polish viewpoint as requested
by the Polish Premier. FDR concluded by saying, "You will
understand, I know, that I am in no way trying to press my
personal views upon you in a matter which is of special
concern to you and your country." The President was
acknowledging the special significance attached to the
Polish situation in terms of security to the Soviet Union
expressed by Stalin. [25]
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CHAPTER 8
CULTS AND VOTES
On July 1,1944, Averell Harriman notified the State
Department of an announcement in Moscow concerning the
creation of a Council for the Affairs of Religious Cults
under the Council of the Commissars of the USSR. The council
was to provide liaison between the government and religious
cults in the USSR, including the Catholic and the Greek
Catholic churches. Bohlen was quick to recognize one
possible implications of the new council. He viewed it as a
potentially positive step giving a "greater degree of
recognition than heretofore accorded" these religions and
said the council should be viewed in connection with the
"assurances given by Stalin to Father Orlemanski concerning
the Catholic Church." He concluded that the council was
"undoubtedly related with the Polish question and is
probably designed to provide machinery to handle questions
involving the Catholic population of eastern Poland which
the Soviet government intends to incorporate in the Soviet
Union." [1]
The Orlemanski mission was continuing to influence
State Department thinking in spite of Hull's rejection of
the letter from Stalin as offering nothing new to
Soviet-Polish relations. Bohlen had not forgotten the
Pravdin conversation, however, and pointed out that "the
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Greek Orthodox faith ...has virtually been recognized as the
State religion and unquestionably will be utilized in that
guise as a political instrument of the Soviet State." No
other religion was going to be allowed to "develop to a
point where they might threaten the position of the official
Orthodox church." [2]
On July 12 the Pope's most recent concerns over the
Soviet Union were revealed to Myron Taylor in a lengthy
audience. The Pope raised three issues with Taylor: the
spread of Communism in Europe and "its development in a
strong way in Italy," the "Russian attitude toward Poland"
and the "Russian attitude re: freedom of religion
generally." Taylor had told Joseph Davies that he was
disappointed the Vatican had not responded favorably to the
Orlemanski mission. Now he presented to the Pope a draft of
a statement which evolved following his discuss ions with
Ambassador Maisky in London in 1942 dealing with the form of
"assurance to be made by Marshal Stalin [that] would be
acceptable." He also informed the Pope that he had
"discussed the subject with the President of the United
States, with Secretary Hull and others, including members of
the Catholic hierarchy in America." [3]
The statement Taylor provided to the Pope contained
two elements. The first called on the Soviets to publicly
proclaim "complete freedom of religious teaching and freedom
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of worship in all Soviet territory." This would be in accord
with article 124 of the Soviet constitution and an
acknowledgement of "the loyal participation in the defense
of the Fatherland by all Russian people," supposedly
including Catholics. The second stipulated that "any abuse
of these privileges, whether to organize movements or incite
the people to overthrow the Government, will be dealt with
in each case according to law." Taylor said both Pius XII
and his political advisor Monsignor Tardini accepted the
first point but rejected the second. Following his audience
with the Pope, Taylor met with Tardini who presented him
with a lengthy memorandum outlining the Vatican's objections
to Soviet behavior toward the Catholic Church in Russia,
which Tardini said showed no significant improvement since
the war began. The memorandum concluded "in view of what has
been stated above and after the sad experience of the past,
it is necessary to follow a policy of watchful expectation
and r eser ve . " [ 4 ]
The Vatican did not rule out the possibility of
reaching an agreement with the Kremlin but preferred to
watch developments unfold. Taylor suggested to FDR raising
the issue at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, which had just
convened in Washington. FDR returned a message to Taylor
telling him he had reached "the reluctant conclusion that at
this particular moment it would be unwise to raise the issue
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[religious freedom] openly." He said the Russians were "most
sensitive" and might consider such a request an "affront" to
the various statements they had already made concerning
"freedom of worship in the Soviet Union." Instead, FDR
wanted to pursue a policy of exerting U.S. "influence
quietly and constantly " to obtain "practical tests of
Soviet respect for that principle." This, he believed, was
more in keeping with the Vatican's position that they were
"wary of statements and intent upon concrete application."
[5]
By late July, events were coming together on all
fronts. FDR was overwhelmingly renominated by the Democratic
Convention to seek a fourth term; Archbishop Spellman was in
Rome where the Amer ican press was speculating on his "real
mission" as he had been granted several private audiences
with the Pope, and Polish Premier Mikolajczyk flew to Moscow
to talk personally with Stalin. On the same day the Pope
gave a speech encouraging Poles to work with the advanc ing
Soviet armies . In an address to 500 Polish soldiers, the
Pope "asked that Poles not seek vengeance aga inst the
Germans or Russians that overran Poland in 1939, but in fact
should collaborate with the Russians." Pius said he was
still seek ing an independent Poland . Members of the
diplomatic corps, commenting on the speech, said they
believed it was extremely cautious. This speech takes on new
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meaning when seen in the context of the conversations held
on July 12 with Myron Taylor. Pius was publicly
acknowledging Catholics' ability to cooperate with the
Soviet Union within days of being told the President of the
United States was still working to produce a satisfactory
agreement which would guarantee the church freedom of
movement in eastern Europe, even if under Soviet control. [6]
On August 1, with encouragement from radio broadcasts
from Moscow, the Polish underground in Warsaw began open
resistance to the Germans occupying the city. The Red Army
was only 10 miles from Warsaw and the Poles expected a quick
Soviet advance to liberate the city. By early September,
however , it was clear that the Red Army was not going to
assist the uprising. It remained exactly where it was when
the uprising began. Pleas for assistance from Stalin met
with excuses that military necessity prevented resupplying
the underground or allowing the Red Army to advance on
Warsaw. He also refused permission for U.S. planes to land
at Soviet bases if they attempted to drop supplies.
Churchill was furious and tried to get FDR to agree to send
American planes to drop supplies to the Poles regardless and
land at Russian bases without permission. While the
President complained to Stalin along with Churchill about
the lack of help to the embattled Poles, he was not willing
to follow the Prime Minister's latest plan. To do so would
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have destroyed the basis of trust which FDR was trying to
establish with Stalin. FDR finally notified Churchill that
he was informed the underground Poles had left Warsaw and
"there now appears to be nothing we can do to assist them."
The fighting continued, however, for another month. Finally,
in what Robert Dallek has termed "an apparently cynical
effort to refute accusations that they wished to see
Poland's non-Communist underground destroyed," and after yet
another British appeal, the Red Army resumed its advance on
Warsaw, dropped supplies to the Poles and agreed to let
American planes land at Soviet bases after dropping
supplies. It was too late, however, and the rebellion was
crushed with some 250,000 Polish casualties. [7]
In the meantime, the President was involved in a
bitter reelection campaign. Polls conducted in August and
early September showed Republican Party candidate Thomas E.
Dewey holding a narrow lead over FDR overall, but in key
electoral vote states Dewey was ahead by large margins:
Illinois, 54 to 46 percent; Ohio, 54 to 46 percent;
Michigan, 57 to 43 percent; Wisconsin, 56 to 44 percent.
These were the same states cited by Ciechanowski where the
Polish vote could make the difference. By early October FDR
was clinging to a narrow 51 to 49 percent lead nationally.
[8 ]
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It was beginning to appear that the President's fear,
expressed to Stalin at Teheran, was becoming a reality.
Events in Poland were driving American Poles to seek answers
from the President. Just what was his position on Poland?
Jan Ciechanowski claims he was repeatedly being asked by
various Roosevelt campaign operatives his opinion on what
would be the most effective way to ensure the "Polish vote."
And it cannot be forgotten, as Secretary Hull pointed out
during the Orlemanski affair, "Catholic circles" in general
were also showing a great interest in Poland.
On August 15, Secretary Hull forwarded to FDR a
memorandum from Taylor dealing with the source of the
information which had led to the Pope's belief that American
Catholics supported a negotiated settlement to the war.
Taylor had heard from the British Minister to the Holy See,
Sir D'Arcy Osborne, that Archbishop Spellman had made the
same comment to him. Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal,
currently in Rome, indicated that Spellman told him the same
thing prior to leaving for Rome. Taylor felt these
disclosures "may indicate a movement to bring about a
negotiated peace, along lines undisclosed to us directly."
It seems entirely possible that Spellman was advocating to
the Pope a policy that would bring an end to the war before
Russian armies could occupy the areas of Eastern Europe that
FDR had told him a year earlier would certainly remain under
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Soviet domination. He may also have been attempting to raise
the prospect of a potential revolt of 30,000,000 Catholics
against FDR's foreign policy in the midst of a heated
campaign, not just the possible loss of six or seven million
Polish voters. Whatever his motives, Taylor was spending
much of his time trying to convince the Pope that "there is
no possibility of a negotiated peace and that the only terms
that will be offered to the German Army are unconditional
surrender . " [ 9 ]
On October 11, the White House issued a press release,
accompanied by photos, of a meeting between FDR and members
of the Polish American Congress (PAC), the same group that
had led the attack against Orlemanski's visit. The Poles
were at the White House to get the President's vi ews on the
continued application of the principles of the Atlantic
Charter, specifically how those principles applied to
Poland. According to Ci echanowsk i , the Polish language press
in the United States was not satisfied with the President's
answers. Roosevelt knew of the continued dissatisfaction and
arranged another meeting with Charles Rozmar ek of the PAC
aboard his campaign train in Chicago on October 28, seven
days before the election. Ciechanowski says the President
promised Rozmarek that he would "take active steps to insure
the independence of Poland." The next day Rozmarek endorsed
the Democratic ticket. The President was being disingenuous
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with Rozmarek. He was indeed pursuing a policy for an
independent Poland, it was just not the same Poland the
Poles were talking about. But, as the President had told
Premier Mikolajczyk, "when a thing becomes unavoidable one
should adapt oneself to it." [10]
Meanwhile, Republican candidate Dewey was doing his
best to revive with voters the anti-Communist theme of
Father Coughlin. In a speech at Boston, Dewey told his
audience that FDR had put his party on the auction block,
and the highest bidder was the Communist Party. "Now the
Communists are seizing control of the New Deal," Dewey said,
"through which they aim to control the Government of the
United States." He suggested that FDR pardoned Earl Browder
in time to help organize for the fourth term bid. Roosevelt
was furious, but his advisors were telling him he had to
answer the charges because "the voters were more afraid of
communism than fascism." [11]
The Polish vote held, however , and the President won
reelection on November 4 , but although the electoral vote
count was overwhelmingly in Roosevelt ' s favor , the margin of
victory in the nine key states identified earlier as having
strong Polish or Catholic votes, was narrow indeed . In most
cases FDR won these states by the narrowest of any of his
previous elections, and his ability to hold the Catholic
vote could indeed be pointed to as the margin of victory.
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The President won Pennsylvania with 51 percent of the vote,
and his plurality of 105,000 was over 500,000 less than his
1936 victory. Illinois was virtually the same, 51.5 percent.
New York 52.3 percent, Michigan 50.2 percent. In California
the President won with 56 percent of the vote, down from 67
percent in 1936. Ohio and Wisconsin went Republican for the
first time since 1928. James MacGregor Burns pointed out
that it was "remarkable that a forty-two-year-old governor
with experience in neither war nor diplomacy could come so
close to toppling a world leader at the height of a global
war." Soon after the election the Catholic hierarchy served
notice that it might not be so easy to maintain the Catholic
vote in the future. [12]
On November 13, a week after the election, the
American Catholic Bishops released a resolution on eastern
Europe passed by the administrative board of the National
Catholic Welfare Conference. The resolution noted the
"sufferings, misery and fears" of their fellow bishops,
clergy and religious throughout all of Europe and "the
circumstances of the moment excite in them a particular
anxiety for the fate of religion among their fellow
Chr ist ians in Poland, the Baltic States, and neighbor ing
Cathol ic lands . " The resolution concluded, "Amer ican
Cathol ics would ever resent their country 's being made a
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party to the de-Chr istianization of historic Catholic
peoples . " [ 13
]
Three days later, on November 16, the bishops released
a second, more lengthy statement on "International Order."
With victory in the war seeming more certain each day the
statement opened: "We have met the Challenge of War. Shall
we meet the challenge of Peace?" The bishops statement was
in response to the recently concluded Dumbarton Oaks
Conference. The State Department had asked for comments from
the public on the establishment of an international
organization aimed at securing future peace. The New York
Times carried a page one story on the bishop's statement and
reprinted the entire text on an inner page. The Times
concluded the bishops were not opposed to the creation of
such an organ i zat ion but were putting forward moral
principles on which it should be guided. The statement said,
"we have no confidence in a peace which does not carry into
effect, without reservations or equivocations the principles
of the Atlantic Charter." This seems a direct reference to
the previous statement on conditions in eastern Europe. [14]
Proper organization of the international community was
essential to establishing a just peace, according to the
bishops, and "to do this we must repudiate absolutely the
tragic fallacies of 'power politics' with its balance of
power, spheres of influence in a system of puppet
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governments, and the resort to war as a means of settling
international difficulties." Without specifically mentioning
the Soviet Union the bishops said, "the ideology of a nation
in its internal life is a concern of the international
community" and stipulated that as a condition of membership
"every nation guarantee in law and respect in fact the
innate rights of men, families and minority groups in their
civil and religious life." In essence the bishops were
continuing to call for a statement guaranteeing religious
freedom in the Soviet Union and the countr ies of eastern
Europe . [ 15
]
The bishops had just raised the stakes. Poland was no
longer an isolated ethnic pol i t ical issue, if it ever had
been. It was now a Catholic issue, as was the fate of all
eastern Europe. FDR could not have been mistaken about what
the bishops were saying . The statement was s igned by Edward
Mooney, Archbishop of Detroit; Samuel Stritch, Archbishop of
Chicago; Francis Spellman, Archbishop of New York ; John
McNicholas, Archbishop of Cincinnati and John Noll, Bishop
of Fort Wayne. These were all the President's old friends,
the men who defended him in his battle over Mexico and
against the charges leveled by Father Coughlin; the men
whose pos ition on Spain had influenced his pol icy
.
Just what effect was all this having on American
public opinion? A poll conducted that same November revealed
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that a majority of the American people still believed Russia
could be trusted to cooperate with the Allies after the war
by a margin of 47 to 35 percent, while 18 percent did not
know. The poll was further broken down by income groups and
religious affiliation. Trust in continued Russian
cooperation was highest in the upper-income group, with 56
percent overall believing in continued cooperation. However,
there was a 14 percent difference within this group between
Catholics and Protestants; 44 percent of Catholics believed
Russia could not be trusted compared to only 30 percent of
Protestants. The margin of distrust narrowed in the
mi dd le- income group where 34 percent of Catho lies distrusted
the Russ ians and 31 percent of Protestants . Among
lower-income groups 48 percent of Catholics distrusted
Russ i a compared to 34 percent of Protestants . Clearly,
although still not a majority, distrust of Russia * s postwar
cooper at ion was running high as the war drew to a close, and
American Catholics were far more likely to distrust Russian
intentions than their fellow Americans. Just as in the
thirties the periphery was far more distrustful of Communist
intentions than American core groups. The question was could
the periphery's opinion come to dominate the pol i t ical
discussion on postwar issues as it did on the Spanish
question. FDR believed it could, and was about to take
action to try and prevent it. [16]
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CHAPTER 9
"SAUL ON THE ROAD TO DAMASCUS"
As 1945 opened it was becoming increasingly clear that
Stalin intended to have his way on the Polish question. On
January 3 he formally recognized the Polish Committee of
National Liberation, known as the Lublin Committee, as the
provisional government of Poland. This was a move that both
FDR and Churchill had been attempting to forestall until the
Big Three met at Yalta. Anglo-American forces in the west
were just beginning to regain the offensive following the
breach of their lines in the Battle of the Bulge. And the
public was beginning to have serious doubts regarding the
conduct of the president's foreign policy. Pollster Hadley
Cantril reported to the President in early January that his
polls showed "a significant decline since the previous June
in public confidence that the President and other officials
were successfully handling the nation's interests abroad."
[1]
The President knew he was faced with a potentially
disastrous domestic political situation as he prepared to
leave for Yalta. The polls showed Catholic opinion in the
country at much higher levels of distrust in continued
postwar cooperation with Russia, and overall opinion on the
President's policies was now down as well. The Catholic
hierarchy had called into question the cornerstone of the
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President's peace plan and challenged him to live up to the
principles of the Atlantic Charter. According to Edward J.
Flynn, the situation of Catholics in eastern Europe was on
FDR's mind as he prepared to leave for Yalta. Flynn, a
Tammany associate of Al Smith and political boss of the
Bronx, tied his political future to FDR following the
disastrous 1928 election. Smith never forgave him, and when
FDR wanted New York Governor Herbert Lehman to appoint Flynn
to the U.S. Senate seat being vacated by Roosevelt's
nomination of Senator Royal Copeland as ambassador to
Germany, Smith effectively blocked the nomination. Lehman
would not make the nomination without Smith's approval, as
he felt he owed his election as governor to Smith's backing,
and Smith would not give his approval. [2]
In the long term, however, the backing of a powerful,
popular President proved more beneficial to Flynn than the
lack of approval from the ex-governor and defeated
presidential candidate. Flynn was named Democratic National
Chairman by FDR in 1940, and now, in 1945, would be thrust
into the international limelight. According to Flynn, FDR
raised the issue of the "position of the Roman Catholic
Church in Russia and the Balkans after the war" during a
conversation in the White House. Flynn said FDR told him
"there could never be a permanent peace unless the large
Catholic populations in Poland, Lithuania and the Balkans
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were permitted to practice their faith freely." He then
asked Flynn to accompany him on the trip to Yalta and take
up the problem with Stalin and Molotov. The thrust of the
conversation described by Flynn seems to indicate that FDR
had not changed his position on Russian domination of
eastern Europe that he outlined to Spellman in September of
1943, but was continuing to try to find a means of making it
"less harsh," especially for American Catholics. [3]
On January 22, as the President and his party were
boarding for the journey to Yalta, a single page document
was prepared in the White House for the President's
signature. It was addressed: "To all diplomatic, consular,
army and navy officers of the United States Government." The
document said the bearer, "the Honorable Edward J. Flynn,"
was "engaged in a mission for me which involves a visit to
Moscow, with the approval of Marshal Stalin, and also a
visit to Italy before returning to the United States." It
then instructed all personnel coming in contact with Flynn
to "permit him to pass, without let or molestation" and to
extend to him all courtesies normally associated with
diplomatic personnel. The President, apparently with the
approval of Stalin, was in effect granting Flynn a personal
passport allowing him to travel anywhere in Europe under
U.S. military control. [4]
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While FDR seems to have been embarking on yet another
attempt to resolve the divisions between the Vatican and the
Kremlin, Stalin was apparently embarking on his own plan.
While the Big Three were negotiating at Yalta, George
Kennan, now back in the Moscow Embassy as Charge
, was
sending a flurry of cables to the State Department dealing
with some rather remarkable events taking place in Moscow
surrounding the Russian Orthodox Church. A Holy Synod of the
Russian Orthodox Eastern Church had been convened for
purposes of electing a new Patriarch of Moscow. Invitations
had been extended "through official Soviet diplomatic
channels" to the patriarchs of Constantinople, Antioch,
Alexandria and Jerusalem. The Patriarchs of Antioch and
Alexandria accepted personally and the others sent "rather
imposing delegations of Metropolitans, Archbishops and
Bishops." The visitors were treated as official dignitaries
and shown great hospitality by the Soviet government
(including a performance of the Moscow Ballet). [5]
The Synod elected Alexei, Metropolitan of Leningrad
and Novgorod, as Patriarch on February 2, and an elaborate
coronation ceremony was planned for February 4, which Kennan
described as "in effect the ceremonial climax to the
reestablishment of the Orthodox Church in the Soviet Union."
Kennan followed his first cable with a second, interpreting
the events and placing them in their political context. The
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revival of the Moscow Patriarch had nothing to do with "any
spontaneous movement on the part of the church but [of] a
deliberate policy on the part of the Soviet Regime." The
move was seen as an attempt to promote an "all-Slav" policy
based on the religious sentiments of the Slav populations in
areas coming under Soviet control. Also, the revival would
provide the Soviets a channel of communication "to all
believers of the Eastern Church.... An iron in the fire of
Near Eastern politics through Russian Church
property.
.. [and]a means of disarming cr iticism.
. . in western
religious circles." Kennan is describing the opening phase
of what Vladimir Provdin had predicted earlier would result
in a "well organized, dynamic and state-controlled Orthodox
Church..." as an instrument of Soviet foreign policy. [6]
On February 8, Kennan sent another cable on the
implications of the recent religious activity in Moscow,
dealing with the Soviet attitude toward the Roman Catholic
Church. He thought the fact the Soviet government was
sponsoring the reemergence of the Russian church might be
the result of "the unfruitful outcome of Father Orlemanski's
mission." Kennan felt the failure of Moscow and Rome to
reach an agreement following Stalin's statement to
Orlemanski resulted in the ability of the Russian Church to
emerge from "its former obscurity." He added, "Today, all
things indicate that the Kremlin is prepared to do open
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battle against the influence of the Vatican." The Soviet
press was currently attacking the Vatican openly, but "how
this anti-Catholic tendency will affect Soviet policy in
Poland, Hungary and Croatia is however still not apparent."
He felt the Soviets' policy toward Catholics in Central
Europe would present a "highly delicate problem for Russian
Church diplomacy." [7]
When William Bullitt wrote to FDR in early 1943, he
warned the President against the widespread assumptions
taking hold that Stalin had "changed his political
philosophy" that he "has abandoned all idea of world
communism" and wanted to "have the Soviet Union evolve in
the direction of liberty and democracy, freedom of speech
and freedom of religion." To accept such a view, he said,
"implies a conversion of Stalin as striking as the
conversion of Saul on the road to Damascus." As Ed Flynn
flew to Moscow with Averell Harriman following the Yalta
Conference he was embarking on a mission that was directly
contrary to the most recent evidence of Soviet intentions
expressed by Kennan, a policy that had been revealed to the
State Department eight months earlier. [8]
On February 14, The New York Times reported that Flynn
had flown to Moscow with Ambassador Harriman. The story said
Flynn had taken no part in the Crimea Conference but had
simply accompanied the President "as an old friend and
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associate." in conclusion, the story said, "it was
emphasized that there was no significance in Mr. Flynn's
mission to the Soviet Union." The following day The Times
reported on Flynn's activity in Moscow, saying he sat next
to Soviet Foreign Commissar Molotov at a performance of the
Bolshoi Ballet. The story said, "While Mr. Flynn said he had
no official mission here he was much interested in Poland."
Only after several weeks did The Times begin to suspect that
Flynn was up to more in Moscow than a simple vacation.
In a story datelined Rome on March 6, The Times
confirmed that Flynn would visit the Pope after leaving
Moscow. According to the report, "Despite President
Roosevelt's bypassing of a press conference question
concerning Mr. Flynn's mission to Moscow, the impression
prevails that Mr. Flynn has been selected to provide the
preliminary liaison between Moscow and the Vatican and that
he may become the key figure in an eventual rapprochement."
The story concluded by saying Archbishop Spellman of New
York was expected in Rome at the same time as Flynn.
By the time Flynn reached Rome his mission was front-
page news. On March 23, as the war in Europe was raging
toward its conclusion. The Times reported Flynn had been
granted an audience with Pius XII which lasted "far longer
than the usual personal pilgrimage." It also reported that
Flynn met with bishops Montini and Tardini of the Vatican
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Secretariat of State. According to The TimP. . "Mr. Flynn
smiled and said 'no comment' at a press conference when
asked if he had discussed with Premier Stalin efforts toward
a rapprochement between Moscow and the Holy See. 'l don't
think I ought to discuss it until I get home and discuss it
with him [Roosevelt],
•
but admitted reports 'were quite fair
speculation
'
.
" [ 10 ]
By this time FDR had received a preliminary report
from Harriman indicating there still might be a possibility
of success. On March 14 Harriman sent a top-secret dispatch
to the President telling him that Flynn had concluded the
Moscow portion of his mission and had left for Rome by way
of Teheran. Harriman said Flynn met twice with Molotov, and
"although he declined to give Ed a message to the Vatican,
Molotov showed undisguised interest in the subject." He said
Molotov was pessimistic about the possibility of success,
but "he indicated without saying so directly that he was
open to suggestions." He believed, however, that while the
door was still open, the ending of hostility would have to
begin with Rome. [11]
While in Moscow, John Melby, a Foreign Service officer
assigned to the U.S. Embassy, was given the task of
accompanying Flynn on his travels in the Soviet Union.
According to Melby, Flynn told him in the course of their
weeks together that FDR "hoped to get some kind of Kremlin -
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Vatican concordat, to end the feud between those two great
power bases." Melby confirmed that Molotov felt the Vatican
would be more troublesome on the issue, but told Flynn "...
go ahead and talk with the Pope and see how he feels about
it." He said he believed Flynn already knew the Pope would
"if not enthusiastically, still go along with the idea."
Melby said Flynn was so confident an agreement would be
reached that Flynn asked him if he would be interested in
being his assistant in Rome when Roosevelt appointed him to
serve as liaison between the Vatican and the Kremlin. At the
same time Flynn told Melby not to discuss what he had told
him with anyone from the State Department "because neither
Stettinius nor anybody else in the State Department knows
anything about it." According to Melby, Flynn said, "This is
a straight White House operation." The only one who would
have any information was Harriman. [12]
In the meantime, the State Department was attempting
to get some idea of what Flynn's mission was about. On March
8, Grace Tully, the President's secretary, placed a memo on
the President's desk informing him that Mr. Bohlen of the
State Department telephoned with a message from Harriman
that Flynn was about to leave Moscow, and was seeking
authorization to make travel arrangements and to pay for
them. She said Bohlen told her "the State Department says
they do not know the nature of his work but if he is on an
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official mission all they ask is that you send a chit over
authorizing them to pay for his expenses." Bohlen may have
been seeking to get some hint from FDR on the nature of what
Flynn was up to in Moscow, but FDR was not about to divulge
any information before he was ready. On March 10 he sent a
simple memo to Secretary Stettinius stating: "I hereby
authorize the State Department to take care of all expenses
in connection with Honorable Edward J. Flynn's confidential
mission abroad." [13]
On the same day the press was reporting on Flynn's
audience with the Pope, Flynn prepared a lengthy memorandum
for FDR that was sent to Washington with Taylor's diplomatic
correspondence. He outlined for the President his
conversations with Molotov which centered, as FDR's
conversation with Stalin at Teheran, on the domestic
political reaction of American Catholics to Soviet
activities. Flynn told Molotov "there are many millions of
Roman Catholics in the United States" and that "the
President was extremely anxious to create as good feelings
as possible between the people of the United States and the
Soviet Union." He pointed out "that a rapprochement between
the Soviet Union and the Vatican would do much to improve
the relations between the two countries." Molotov repeatedly
stressed the Soviet position that the Vatican was openly
hostile to the Soviet Union and at one point commented that
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the "Vatican had often made favorable steps towards Germany,
even Hitlerite Germany; but that it rarely had a good thing
to say about the Soviet Union." Harriman raised the issue of
the Roman Catholic Church in Poland and the Soviets'
intentions there. Molotov replied that "the Red Army had
liberated Poland and that he had never heard that its
presence there had any effect on the religious feeling of
the Polish people." [14]
Molotov claimed that the Soviet Union respected all
religions as long as they did not "interweave their policies
with policies hostile to the Soviet Union." He was dealing
with politics and not religious dogma and "the attitude of
the Vatican is not only not friendly towards the Soviet
Union, but unneutral." Flynn said Molotov thanked him for
the frank exchange of views and promised to give the matter
further consideration. He then said he would inform his
colleagues of their conversations. This left Flynn and
Harriman to believe "the door was deliberately left open for
further conversations or for further action," He concluded
it was his personal opinion "that some sort of rapprochement
might be worked out." [15]
The Flynn mission had attracted the attention of
more than just the western press. Writing in his diary on
March 23, Joseph Goebbels also commented on the Flynn
mission to the Pope, noting: "Clearly Roosevelt wants to win
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the Catholic Church over to his side." Goebbels claimed the
Pope had been displeased with the results of the Yalta
conference but that other considerations were at work as
"The Americans are working actively in the background to
cheat not only the Soviets but also the British out of the
international game." Goebbels at this point was grasping at
any straw which might indicate a breakdown in relations
between the Allies. He still held out, even at this late
date, for a miracle which would allow the Reich to conclude
a separate peace, and his main hope still rested with the
Soviets. [16]
On March 23 Taylor wired Secretary Stettinius that he
presented Flynn that morning to Pius XII "following which
there ensued for forty-five minutes a full review of Mr.
Flynn's recent visit to Russia, the details of which are
pledged to be strictly secret and as there is no apparent
urgency in the situation I am convinced that it would be
more appropriate for Mr. Flynn to report to you in person
than through me by message." In spite of the widespread
speculation in the press concerning the state of the
President's health, there was "no apparent urgency" in
sending a diplomatic wire on the results of Flynn's talk
with the Pope. This view was reinforced on March 29 when
Flynn cabled Harriman that nothing had happened requiring
immediate attention but that if something did Taylor would
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contact him. Flynn concluded by saying: "Will write after
talk with President." [17]
Flynn arrived in London on April 3, for discussions
with Churchill and other British leaders. While in London,
he learned of the President's sudden death on April 12. He
left immediately for Washington, faced with the task of
informing a new president of "a straight White House
operation" of which the new occupant knew nothing. In his
memoirs, Truman says he met with Flynn almost immediately
upon his return to Washington but that Flynn brought up
domestic politics which he felt inappropriate to discuss
under the circumstances. He told Flynn they would get
together at a later date. For Flynn to have brought up
domestic politics is entirely consistent with the nature of
his mission. FDR had framed his discussions with Stalin on
Poland at Teheran in terms of domestic political
considerations. Flynn's discussions with Molotov revolved
around FDR's concern about acceptance of Soviet policy in
terms of American public opinion, particularly Catholic
opinion. The entire mission revolved around domestic
politics. Truman, however, had no idea what FDR was thinking
when he sent Flynn to Moscow, and neither did anyone in the
State Department. [18]
Melby said Flynn sent word to him that he felt "pretty
sure that Mr. Truman, once he got used to the idea of being
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President and got caught up on his homework, was going to
tell him to go ahead and do it, carry through with it."
Flynn was right. Truman's appointment calendar for July 3,
as he was preparing for the upcoming Potsdam Conference,
lists an appointment with Flynn arranged by Democratic
National Committee Chairman Robert Hannegan. Hannegan
apparently "thought [it was] important for the President to
talk with Hon. Edward J. Flynn before going to Big Three
meeting." By this time Melby was back in the United States,
having returned to attend the San Francisco conference
opening the United Nations. He met Flynn in New York who
told him "he was still very confident that the thing
[Kremlin-Vatican concordat] was going on." Melby also
confirmed that in Flynn's meetings with Pius the pope, while
not enthusiastic, had expressed interest and told him, "go
ahead and see what you can do. See what we can work out."
The available evidence suggests then that Flynn had
commitments from both Molotov and Pius XII to continue to
seek a resolution. [19]
Roosevelt's death probably ended what little chance of
success that existed for achieving a rapprochement between
the Vatican and the Kremlin. Stalin had already set in
motion his plan to make the Russian Orthodox Church an
instrument of Soviet policy, and without the influence of
FDR to attempt a compromise in the Soviet attitude "to do
167
open battle against the influence of the Vatican," the
result could only be a hardening of American Catholic
anti-Communist opinion. Catholics were not the only
Americans with an aversion to Communism. However, their
growing political strength combined with the official
anti-Communist position of the church led to the series of
policy conflicts outlined here. In turn FDR's postwar
planning took into account early in the war Catholic
attitudes and the prospect, which he tried to head off, of
renewed charges of Roosevelt sympathy for Communism. We must
now turn to postwar events with this in mind.
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CHAPTER 10
"...WORK FOR RELIGION AND DEMOCRACY"
The rapid breakdown of the wartime alliance among the
Big Three has been examined from virtually every perspective
except the one which FDR outlined to Edward J. Flynn in
January of 1945: "...there could never be a permanent peace
unless the large Catholic populations in Poland, Lithuania,
and the Balkans were permitted to practice their faith
freely. " [ 1
]
Generally, cold war historians have not looked at
developments from this perspective. Rather, they have been
lumped into two schools, orthodox or revisionist, largely
dependent on whether they viewed Soviet or American
intentions as the source of the confrontation. Michael
Leigh, in an attempt to sort out the "revisionist thesis,"
states that the "most contentious element of the revisionist
thesis... is the claim that certain features of the American
economic system limited the options of American
decision-makers in their dealings with the Soviet Union."
Ronald Steel describes a "general agreement" among
r evis ionists "that Amer ican policy after the death of
Roosevelt caused the Soviet Union to tighten its hold on
Eastern Europe," in spite of the fact "there was no
objective threat [italics added] to American security to
account for the uncompromising anti-Soviet attitude of the
Truman administration . " [ 2
]
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These economic interpretations of the origins of the
Cold war assert that "the United States could not recognize
legitimate Soviet interests in Eastern Europe, Germany or
elsewhere," because the "survival of the capitalist system
at home required the unlimited expansion of American
economic influence overseas." Thus, the outcome of "open
Door" diplomacy described by William Appleman Williams is at
the heart of the Cold War. [3]
While these arguments of Williams, D.F. Fleming,
Gabriel Kolko, Gar Alperovitz, David Horowitz and others are
certainly compelling, they do not take into account the more
s"t)tle subjective threat to the Truman administration, and
indeed to subsequent administrations as well. This was the
potential threat of a political revolt of Catholic voters
that FDR worked so hard to prevent in 1944 and which he
hoped to stave off in future elections by sending Flynn on
his mission to Moscow and Rome.
One of the principal arguments put forth by
revisionist historians is that a dramatic change in policy
occurred with the ascension of Truman to the Presidency.
Ambassador Harriman had been urging FDR to take a harder
line with the Soviets since the previous September.
Relations had steadily worsened over the Polish issue and
the question of the makeup of the Polish government since
the end of the Yalta Conference. Harriman now reported that
Stalin seemed genuinely shaken by Roosevelt's death but
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said he assumed there would be no changes in policy. He
agreed to Harriman's suggestion that Molotov attend the
opening ceremonies of the United Nations in San Francisco as
a gesture of respect for the dead President. In mid-April
Truman gathered his foreign policy advisors to assess the
situation regarding U.S.
-Soviet relations. [4]
The record of this meeting reveals there indeed would
be a change in policy. Harriman restated his concern,
expressed in a personal memo to Harry Hopkins the previous
September, that the Soviets viewed the American attitude of
"generosity and cooperation" as a sign of weakness and
approval of their policies. Terming the current Soviet
activity a "barbarian invasion of Europe," Harriman said
Soviet control of a country meant the extension of the
Soviet system complete with secret police, extinction of
freedom of speech and other freedoms. Truman repeatedly
expressed his intent to be "firm" with the Russians. The new
President said the Russians needed us more than we needed
them and that while he did not "expect to get 100 percent of
what we wanted... on important matters he felt that we should
be able to get 85 percent." [5]
President Truman did not share FDR's belief that
giving the Soviets their way in eastern Europe was a method
for establishing an atmosphere of trust. More importantly,
he did not share FDR's belief, as expressed to Spellman in
September of 1943, that the United States would not play an
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important role in Europe after the war. Truman, and the new
circle of advisors he was gathering around him, were
believers in the concept of the "American Century-
proclaimed by Henry Luce in 1941. While Truman brought a
more nationalistic viewpoint to the Presidency in contrast
to FDR, it was not simply a more provincial attitude nor a
simplistic anti-Soviet outlook.
Revisionists point to the confrontational atmosphere
that charged the first meeting between Truman and Molotov
less than two weeks after FDR's sudden death. The issue of
course was Poland - Catholic Poland. Virtually all accounts
of the meeting center around the climax of the conversation
after Truman pointedly told Molotov the U.S. would never
recognize a government in Poland that had not been freely
elected. According to Truman's later account, Molotov
responded by saying "I have never been talked to like that
in all my life," to which the President replied, "Carry out
your agreements and you won't get talked to like that."
However, Charles "Chip" Bohlen, who served as Truman's
interpreter during the meeting, claims the final exchange
never occurred. Bohlen says Truman simply cut the
conversation off by saying: "That will be all Mr. Molotov. I
would appreciate it if you would transmit my views to
Marshal Stalin." [6]
Perhaps a more important aspect of the conversation
occurred earlier in the meeting when Truman informed Molotov
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that "he hoped that Moscow would bear in mind how greatly
American foreign policy depended on public support" and
that "American economic assistance programs after the war
would require the vote of Congress." This is virtually the
same argument Molotov had heard less than a month earlier
from Flynn during their discussions in Moscow, it seems
logical to conclude that Truman, President for less than two
weeks, was acutely aware of the atmosphere in the Senate
where he had spent the last ten years. And that atmosphere
was increasingly hostile toward the Soviet Union. Moreover,
"public support" for American foreign policy was rapidly
diminishing as Polish groups and the Catholic hierarchy
continued to focus attention on the situation in Poland and
Eastern Europe. [7]
Thus, while it may have been Truman's natural
disposition to take a tougher line with the Soviets, he was
also fully conscious that in doing so he would have the
political support of the Senate, public opinion, and the
great majority of FDR's former advisors. Truman was first
and foremost a politician. In many respects that was why he
was where he was. A product of the Pendergast machine in
Kansas City, he in large part owed his nomination as Vice
President to none other than the man FDR had sent to Moscow
and Rome, Edward J. Flynn.
Flynn, Bob Hannegan of St. Louis, Edward J. Kelly,
Mayor of Chicago, Frank Walker of Michigan and George Allen
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were uncomfortable with the prospect of Henry Wallace being
renominated for Vice President in 1944. The group had been
formed at FDR's request to select his running mate. In
Flynn's own words James F. Byrnes of South Carolina was the
"strongest candidate," but he "wouldn't do because he had
been raised a Catholic and had left the Church when he
married, and the Catholics wouldn't stand for that." Flynn,
Kelly, Hannegan and Walker, all Catholics, eliminated the
incumbent Vice President, Wallace, and the "strongest
candidate" to replace him, Byrnes, and settled on Truman,
again demonstrating the power of the Catholic periphery in
the political process. [8]
Meanwhile, the Catholic hierarchy was doing its best
to keep the issue of what was happening in Poland before the
public. Throughout 1945 Catholics flocked to churches and
cathedrals to hear their leaders praise Poland as a
"Christian Democracy" and call for her "spiritual
liberation." A high Mass "for the cause of Poland" was held
in San Francisco during the discussions of the United
Nations Charter. When the United States finally recognized
the Soviet-sponsored government of Poland in the summer of
1945, Charles Rozmarek of the Polish-American Congress
declared it was "a tragic historical blunder" and the
product of a "shortsighted policy of appeasement." Believing
his last minute endorsement of FDR in 1944 had kept
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Polish-American votes in the Democratic column, he may have
felt betrayed. [9]
The meeting at Potsdam did nothing to assuage mounting
Catholic fears concerning Eastern Europe. And while the
major focus of attention remained on Poland, other Catholics
were concerned about the effects of the Yalta agreements on
eastern Germany and the Balkans. This may have been one of
Truman's concerns as well. Gar Alperovitz has argued
that Truman was conducting a deliberate policy of delay in
confronting the Soviet Union at this time hoping that a
wartime demonstration of atomic power would give the United
States the upper hand in dealing with the Russians.
According to Alperovitz, the first fruits of this policy
were realized with Soviet concessions on elections in
Hungary and Rumania. [10]
Nonetheless, in September, with the war in the Pacific
over, and relations with the Soviets becoming increasingly
acrimonious, Truman approved a resumption of the Flynn
mission. The New York Times reported on September 12 that
Flynn, after meeting with Truman at the White House, "would
return to Rome and Moscow to complete a special diplomatic
mission he undertook for President Roosevelt." However,
Flynn suffered a heart attack in early November and was
never able to reopen the discussions. The episode does
demonstrate, however, that Truman was not relying
exclusively on atomic weaponry in attempting to deal with
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the Soviets as Alperovitz would have us believe. In
addition, as Flynn stated to Melby, Truman was used to the
idea of being President and had "got caught up on his
homework," especially the idea that millions of Catholics
were not pleased with what was going on in Eastern
Europe .[11]
The end of the war in Europe also produced a flurry of
activity and rumors surrounding the Vatican and its wish to
tie itself to U.S. power. Harold Tittman, a State
Department official in Rome, reported that the Pope was
considering naming Spellman as Papal Secretary of State. The
Pope wanted to demonstrate his gratitude to America and the
American Church for its assistance and material aid during
the war, as well as to strengthen the Church in the battle
against Communism and to begin a process of
internationalizing the Curia. Tittmann reported that the
Pope "was emphatic that the Holy See must 'look to the
United States . ' " [ 12 ]
By November, however, the Pope had changed his mind,
both because Spellman did not want to go and the Pope
realized he could be more important to him in the United
States. The Pope made the importance of the American church
clear in February of 1946 when he raised four Americans to
the College of Cardinals. Spellman, along with Archbishops
John Glennon of St. Louis, Edward Mooney of Detroit, and
Samuel Stritch of Chicago would join Cardinal Dougherty of
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Philadelphia, giving the American church five Cardinals for
the first time. [13]
Pius XII 's recognition of the importance of the
American church in the effort to fight Communism was again
clearly demonstrated during the Senate hearings on the issue
of a $3 billion dollar loan to Great Britain. Many scholars
have viewed the conditions under which the loan was granted
as evidence of United States determination to "exact the
price of opening the British imperial markets to all on
nearly equal terms." What is largely overlooked is the
protracted fight in the Senate to approve the loan. The
question hung in the balance for nearly six months. Hugh
Dalton, Chancellor of the Exchequer in the British Labor
government, was fearful that the loan would not be approved
until late in March 1946 at which time Lord Keynes reported
that he believed it "was in the bag." Keynes believed the
"recent troublesome attitude of Russia" had been helpful,
but more importantly "the Roman Catholic Church was now
strongly supporting it." According to Keynes, "The Pope
recently instructed all Cardinals that nothing was to be
done which would weaken British power to resist Communism."
The Pope's instructions apparently had the desired effect as
both Joseph Kennedy, former Ambassador to Great Britain, and
Leo Crowley of the State Department reversed their previous
opposition to the loan. Kennedy, who had been publicly
critical of the loan, was now calling for an outright grant
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to the British. Overall, according to Dalton, "the Irish
Americans had been told to keep quiet." The periphery was
again demonstrating its ability to define the parameters of
public debate in the United States, and the episode is a
clear example confirming Truman's admonition to Molotov
about the role of public opinion on foreign policy. [14]
This, I believe, gets to the crux of the matter. Much
of what has been written about American Catholicism in the
immediate postwar era attempts to place events within the
context of a developing American Catholic nationalism. The
pride American Catholics took in the large numbers that
served in the armed forces during the war was seen as proof
that Catholics would finally have to be accepted as part of
the mainstream of American life. No longer could it be
charged that Catholics had a split alligence between America
and Rome. In addition. Catholic postwar ant i
-Communism is
generally viewed in the same perspective. Catholic
anti -Communism was a perfect fit with American
ant i -Communism and therefore made Catholics better
Americans, or so the argument goes. But as we have seen
above (Chapter 6) American anti-Communism, at least as
represented by the Protestant core was not as virulent in
the 1930s or early 1940s as it would soon become.
The very idea of Catholicism as an international
religion with political ambitions provided the pretext for
much of the American anti-Catholicism of the nineteenth and
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early twentieth centuries. Just as the Protestants of
Northern Ireland could proclaim "Home Rule means Rome Rule,"
many American Protestants could believe electing a Catholic
like Al Smith to the presidency in 1928 would mean that the
chief executive would be taking his orders directly from
Rome. It was this aspect of American an t i -Cat ho 1 i c i sm which
led many Catholics to assume an ul tra- isolat i on i s t position
during the critical period of the 1930s. Many Americans
feared a return to prewar isolationism would follow the
breakdown of the peace process just as it had after WWI
.
Catholic internationalism rather than Catholic nationalism
would play a leading, if not decisive role, in preventing
this.
"The recent troublesome attitude of Russia" alluded to
by Lord Keynes in March of 1946 would seem to be in
reference to Stalin's February speech in which he declared
that war with the capitalist powers was inevitable and that
the Soviet Union would begin preparing for it immediately.
He told the Soviet people that consumer goods "must wait on
rearmament" and that the basis of a new five-year plan would
be a tripling of defense spending. Supreme Court Justice
William 0. Douglas pronounced the speech the "Declaration of
World War III." Stalin's comments took on additional meaning
for official Washington in light of a military analysis
conducted by U.S. intelligence in November of 1945. The
report detailed the devastation wrought by the war on the
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Soviet union and its capacity to fight a major war in the
near future. In several key areas: losses in manpower and
industry; lack of technicians; lack of strategic air force;
lack of modern navy; conditions of railway and military
transport systems; lack of atomic bomb and other vital
shortcomings led the authors of the report to conclude the
Soviets would not be prepared to fight a major war for some
fifteen years. Yet now, within six months of the report,
Stalin was announcing plans to undertake preparations for
just such a war. [15]
In light of Stalin's speech Walter Lippmann concluded
the United States had no alternative but to match the Soviet
arms buildup. Truman meanwhile was faced with a Congress and
a nation that was increasingly unwilling to move in that
direction. It was in the aftermath of the furor created by
Stalin's speech that Truman traveled to Fulton, Missouri in
early March with former British Prime Minister Winston
Churchill. On the train the night before Churchill was to
deliver his speech Truman read and approved the final draft,
commenting that it would "do nothing but good" and "make a
stir . " It did . [ 16 ]
The President, Churchill said, had given him "full
liberty to give my true and faithful counsel in these
anxious and baffling times." He noted his admiration for
both the Russian people and his wartime ally Marshal Stalin.
Nevertheless it was clear that "From Stettin in the Baltic
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to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain had descended
across the Continent." All the major capitals of Eastern and
central Europe lie behind the curtain in what Churchill now
called the "Soviet Sphere." He did not believe the Soviets
wanted war, only "the fruits of war" and the "indefinite
expansion of their power and doctrine." Churchill proposed
an "English-speaking union of the United States and Britain"
to stand against the common threat. Reaction to the speech
was almost universally hostile. Stalin referred to it in
Hitlerian terms as a "racial theory" in which the English-
speaking peoples "should rule over the remaining nations of
the world." The Wall Street Journal h.^i^..^ the United
States did not need alliances with any other nation. The
believed Truman had been "remarkably inept" in
associating himself with the speech. Walter Lippmann saw the
speech as an "almost catastrophic blunder." Truman was
shocked by the reaction, even though he had predicted it
would "make a stir." The President now denied having prior
knowledge of the contents of Churchill's speech. He offered
to send the battleship Missouri to bring Stalin to the U.S.
where he could speak at the University of Missouri as freely
as Churchill had. [17]
The effort to move the British loan through Congress
must be viewed against this nascent neo-isolat ionist
tendency demonstrated by the hostile reaction to Churchill's
speech and the suggestion that the United States ally itself
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with a European power. If the Irish Americans had been told
to keep quiet in order not to "weaken British power to
resist Communism," as Dalton suggests, it would mark one of
the rare times indeed that Irish Americans placed British
interests before their own agenda. All the American
Cardinals -- Spellman, Mooney, Stritch, Glennon and
Dougherty were of Irish extraction. Irish nationalism was
never easy for the Catholic hierarchy to put aside when
British interests were at stake, as witnessed by the efforts
of Cardinals Gibbons and O'Connell to include the Irish
question at the Versailles Peace Conference and the Irish
desertion of Wilsonian idealism in the 1920 presidential
election. So this move to an internationalist position
marked a turning point for the American church which would
have far-reaching effects on U.S. foreign policy.
Another attempt to influence public opinion was
underway in early 1946. As mentioned above many American
Catholics were also concerned about the fate of Germany with
its large Catholic population. Allen Dulles circulated
a confidential memo to certain influential members of the
foreign policy community, including Laird Bell, the Chicago
banker and president of the Chicago Council on Foreign
Relations. The memo dealt with the problems being
encountered by the de-Nazi f icat ion process and the need to
convince Truman or Secretary of State Byrnes that to
"continue to ruin Germany by indiscriminate de-Nazif icat ion
184
ea
and unrelenting deindustr ial ization can only confirm Europe
as a liability." Bell told Dulles he was in contact with a
group from Notre Dame University "headed up by some of the
Catholic hierarchy" that had formed a "Save Europe Now
Committee." The group was in the process of convening a
congress to discuss the problem. Bell's core instincts wer
at work as he told Dulles he dreaded the prospect of such
congress "but apparently something will have to be done to
create public opinion" on the issue, and he hoped to "do
something through the Chicago i 1 y n.^.. » The implications
of Bell's response seem clear. Reluctantly, the Protestant
core was being forced to accept the leadership of the
Catholic periphery on questions dealing with developing
public opinion on foreign policy matters. [18]
By late 1946 Truman seemed in disarray politically. He
had not as yet, at least publicly, entered into the cold war
rhetoric of confrontation as had Churchill and Stalin. His
attempt to steer a middle course erupted in controversy in
mid-September when Secretary of Commerce Henry A. Wallace
delivered a speech personally cleared by the President. The
speech called for American understanding of Soviet security
needs in Eastern Europe: "...we should recognize that we
have no more business in the political affairs of Eastern
Europe than Russia has in the political affairs of Latin
America, Western Europe and the United States." In addition
Wallace declared, "Whether we like it or not, the Russians
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will try to socialize their sphere of influence just as we
try to democratize our sphere of influence." [19]
Elsewhere in the speech Wallace declared, "We must not
let our policy be influenced by those inside or outside the
United States who want war with Russia but this does not
mean appeasement." Just who were those elements "inside or
outside" the United States that wanted war with Russia?
Herbert Feis argues that Truman approved the text of
Wallace's speech in an effort to reach out to the liberal
wing of the Democratic Party to which Wallace appealed. He
claims, "There still sounded in Truman's spirit echoes of
Roosevelt's wariness of British diplomacy." In his Memoirs
Truman also claimed that he approved the speech because
Wallace told him "he intended to say that we ought to look
at the world through American eyes rather than through the
eyes of a pro-British or rabidly anti-Russian press." [20]
But Wallace also had other than "American eyes" in
mind. In late December of 1945 he confided to his diary his
speculations about just which groups were interested in
promoting war with Russia: "In addition to a small group in
the Catholic hierarchy there is also a small group among the
English Tories and a small group in the American army...
a
small group among the American big-business hierarchy, a
substantial group among the Chinese Nationalists, the London
Poles... and a very strong element in the Republican Party."
Wallace was optimistic in the short run because "these
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various groups that want a third world war in order to li
Russia are not at the present time working together." In
the long run, however, "as time goes on they will tend more
and more to coalesce"; and concluded: "This is the great
danger of the future." [21]
Although Wallace's speech dealt with foreign policy,
it must be remembered that it was a political speech and
part of the kickoff for the November congressional
elections. Wallace was taking aim at the Republican Party
and its spokesmen Thomas E. Dewey, Arthur Vandenberg and
John Foster Dulles, who were calling for a tougher stand
against Soviet expansion. Vandenberg was at that moment in
Paris with Secretary of State James Byrnes attempting to
negotiate peace treaties with Molotov. Both Vandenberg and
Byrnes saw Wallace's statements as undercutting their
negotiating position, particularly over the difficult
issues of German occupation and partition. Byrnes demanded
Wallace's resignation, and Truman reluctantly complied by
asking Wallace to step down. [22]
Such disarray within the administration did not bode
well for the coming elections. Liberals within the
Democratic Party, who substantially agreed with Wallace,
were now left without a spokesman within the administration.
The Catholic hierarchy, however, could only express a quiet
satisfaction at the results. Well aware that Wallace's
"sphere of influence" for Russia in Eastern Europe
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accurately reflected FDR's sentiments as expressed to
Cardinal Spellman, they were actively opposing such a
policy. In effect, two of the most important segments of the
New Deal coalition were alienated and parting company with
the President over the same issue but for different reasons:
liberals because the President was being too tough on the
Russians; Catholics because he wasn't being tough enough.
The day before Wallace's New York speech Archbishop
Aloysius Stepinac of Yugoslavia was arrested by Josip Tito's
government on charges of having collaborated with the
Germans and Italians during the war. Stepinac was "widely
regarded as one of the leading spokesmen for worldwide
Catholicism," and American Catholics were outraged at his
arrest. The National Council of Catholic Women called on
Secretary of State Byrnes to personally intercede on
Stepinac's behalf with the "atheistic Communist forces" in
Yugoslavia. The Bishop's trial began on October 1, in the
midst of the congressional elections and, perhaps by
coincidence, on the same day the Nuremburg Court announced
the convictions of Goring, Hess and Von Rippontrop. But the
public trial of one of Europe's leading Catholic Archbishops
on charges of collaborating with the Nazis on the very day
the leading Nazis were convicted of war crimes may be more
than coincidental. [23]
The New York Times carried a story on the opening of
of the trial at which Stepinac denied being guilty of the
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charges. The Times headline also pointed out that Bishop
Joseph Hurley of St. Augustine, Florida was present at the
trial representing Pius XII. Thus the American Church was
associated with Stepinac's trial from the beginning. The
Times also noted that the official Vatican publication
L'Osservatore Romano carried a story on the opening of the
trial saying the "verdict and sentence have already been
decided." [24]
The Boston Evening ni nh^ of the same day reported a
story that dealt with a very different aspect of the trial
than Nazi collaboration. Under a headline which announced
"Abp. Stepinac Tells Court His Conscience is Clear," the
Globe reported Stepinac "denied knowledge of the alleged
forced reconversion of 230,000 Serbs from the Orthodox to
the Roman Catholic Church during the Ustashi (Puppet) regime
in Croatia, a part of Yugoslavia." As we have seen earlier
George Kennan in dispatches from Moscow in early 1945 had
warned of just such an attempt to promote an "all-Slav"
policy based on the religious sentiments of the Slav
population in areas coming under Soviet control. While
Kennan noted that "all things indicate that the Kremlin is
prepared to do open battle against the influence of the
Vatican," he did not know "how this anti-Catholic tendency
will effect policy in Poland, Hungary and Croatia." The
break between Tito and Stalin would not be complete until
1948, and although the relationship between the two
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Communist leaders was already strained in 1946, it is
conceivable that Tito had knowledge of Stalin's "all-Slav"
policy, just as Kennan did, and was using it to further his
own objectives in Croatia. [25]
Only days after the opening of Stepinac's trial
Cardinal Spellman addressed a World Peace Rally in New York
on October 6 and called on the Catholic faithful to pray for
Stepinac "whose only crime is fidelity to God and country."
Spellman went on to say "the confidence and conscience of
the American peopl e . . . have again been outraged by this
latest infamy and affront to human dignity and decency."
Catholics, and the American public in general, in the midst
of a national election were witnessing an administration
seemingly in disarray over its policy toward Russia and
helpless in the face of religious persecution taking place
behind the "Iron Curtain." The 200,000 member Catholic War
Veterans repeatedly attacked "the silence of President
Truman," and the State Department's failure to act on the
Stepinac question. [26]
The 1946 mid-term elections were nothing short of a
catastrophe for the Democrats. Republicans gained control of
both the House and Senate for the first time since 1928. In
the House they had a majority of 246 to 188 Democrats. In
the Senate their majority was 45 to 41. But that was not
all. The Republicans gained a majority of state
governorships as well, including Thomas E. Dewey's
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reelection as Governor of New York by the largest margin
ever recorded. The big city machines, longtime home of the
catholic bosses and their Catholic constituents, went down
to defeat in Detroit, Jersey City, Chicago and New York. The
very elements that had secured the Vice Presidency for Harry
Truman in 1944 now seemed repudiated. The Republicans had
made anti-communism a key issue in the campaign, including
charges of widespread communist infiltration of domestic
organizations. [27]
Despite the hardening of public opinion toward the
Soviet Union the election results seemed to portend, the new
year opened with a sense of optimism. The Council of Foreign
Ministers convened in New York in November following the
elections, and by mid-December five peace treaties had been
worked out for Italy and the satellite East European
governments. The increasingly thorny issue of peace treaties
for Germany and Austria was put off for a later meeting.
This "brief season of euphoria" quickly dissipated in
January of 1947, and once again Poland was at the center of
controversy. On January 5,1947 the State Department formally
protested the manner in which the Polish Peasant Party had
been forcibly excluded from recent elections as a violation
of the Potsdam Agreement. Party leaders had been arrested,
and some even killed, others were fired from their jobs, had
their homes searched and papers sympathetic to the party
were closed. [28]
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Hungarian events also widened the breach between the
two powers. In February the Hungarian National Assembly
refused to withdraw parliamentary immunity of Bela Kovaks,
Secretary of the Small Holders Party. When the communist
Minister of the interior accused Kovaks of
"counter-revolutionary conspiracy," the Russians arrested
him. If the Soviets had made concessions to U.S. wishes in
Rumanian and Hungary in deference to American atomic power,
as Alperovitz suggests, they were now clearly beginning to
reassert themselves. At virtually the same time, February
21, 1947, the British communicated to the State Department
they could no longer afford their attempt to restore the
monarchy in Greece or to provide aid to Turkey whose control
of the Dardenelles was being challenged by Stalin. Secretary
of State George C.Marshall concluded, "It was tantamount to
British abdication from the Middle East with obvious
implications as to their successor." [29]
The opportunity was at hand for Truman to make his
public foray into the Cold War. On March 12 he went before
Congress with his request for $400 million in military and
economic aid to Greece and Turkey. "It must be the policy of
the United States," Truman declared, "to support free
peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed
minorities or by outside pressures." The President of
course knew beforehand that he would have the support of the
leadership on both sides of the aisle. But it had not been
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an easy sell. The GOP was already trying to fulfill its
campaign promises to cut taxes and reduce spending. They
were calling for some six billion dollars in cuts to the
federal budget, in their meeting with Truman and
administration foreign policy planners the initial reaction
to assume British obligations in the Mediterranean was cool
at best. Then Dean Acheson spoke up and framed the issue,
not in terms of a Greek civil war, but rather as Soviet
expansion. The Russian goal was nothing less than the
control of the Middle East, South Asia and Africa with the
ultimate objective of Germany and all Europe. "The Soviet
Union was playing one of the greatest gambles in history at
minimal cost," according to Acheson, and "we and we alone
are in a position to break up the play." Senator Arthur
Vandenberg, now Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, told Truman he must frame the argument for the
American public just as Acheson had done at the meeting.
[30]
Roosevelt's policy of cooperation with the Soviet
Union and granting them a "sphere of influence" in Eastern
Europe was now publicly buried. It would be replaced by one
of "containment" first outlined by George Kennan in
an 8000 word telegram to the State Department almost a year
earlier. Kennan argued in his long telegram that the Soviet
Union was "committed fanatically to the belief that with the
U.S. there can be no permanent modus vivendi, that it is
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desirable and necessary that the internal harmony of
society be disrupted, our traditional way of life destroyed,
the international authority of our state be broken, if
Soviet power is to be secure." [31]
The contest then was not just economic or military but
also cultural and spiritual, a test of our national values.
The test was not long in coming. On March 21, less than two
weeks after announcing what would become known as the Truman
Doctrine, the president issued an executive order providing
for the loyalty investigation of all government employees.
Thus, within a matter of ten days, the President had pulled
the political rug from under two of the most prominent
Republican campaign themes of 1946. He and his
administration were now at the forefront of confronting
Communism at home and abroad.
While Assistant Secretary of State Acheson and Senator
Vandenberg were telling the President that public opinion
needed to be cultivated for the fight against Communism, at
least one segment, the Catholic periphery, was already in
it. On March 5, 1947 Archbishop Richard J. Cushing of Boston
sent a letter to all the pastors of the Archdiocese which
was "to be read at all the Masses in all the churches of the
Archdiocese on Sunday, March 9 and Sunday, March 16." The
letter was an exhortation to the Catholic faithful to
contribute to a special collection for the Bishop's War
Relief Fund. It was also a remarkably revealing document on
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the developing trend of thought spreading through not only
the American Catholic hierarchy, but also the Vatican
itself. Gushing acknowledged past generosity of American
Catholics to war relief in Europe through the Red Cross,
UNRRA, "and to the several National Relief Campaigns for
Greece, Italy, France, Poland and elsewhere." Fund-raising
now, however, would go to the Emergency Relief
Committee of the American hierarchy; "The agencies in
Europe and elsewhere which will handle the money raised in
this collection are both Catholic and American (emphasis in
original)" but the money would be distributed "without
reference to race, creed or class." [32]
Cushing went on to say that the new relief program was
"one which is doing a work which can be done only by
Catholics and by Catholics who are Americans," and that it
was "a work for Religion and Democracy." The Archbishop was
warming to his topic. "It might just as well be recognized
that in many areas of Europe the work of Relief will be
either Catholic or Ant i -Cathol ic, either Democratic or
Communist." Cushing was not making a giant or unprecedented
leap in linking religion and democracy in American thought.
After all America was the "City on a Hill." But he was
linking America and Catholicism with democracy in the fight
against communism in the city of John Winthrop. It would be
the height of conspiracy theories to suggest that Truman
announced his new doctrine smack in the middle of this new
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national Catholic Bishop's effort to raise funds for
European relief. But it was certainly fortuitous that the
presidential speech asserting that only America could
prevent the spread of Communism coincided with this message
to some 35 million American Catholics that "...the future of
Faith and Freedom in our generation is dark indeed." [33]
How did Catholics respond to this new call for
American Catholic internationalism? Lavishly, its apparent.
On March 26 Cushing again sent a letter to all pastors
informing them that "the response to the diocesan appeal in
behalf of the Bishops' War Relief Collection was so generous
that I am asking you to express to all your people at Mass
next Sunday my personal gratitude..." In addition, the
Archbishop instructed the clergy to submit the names of
those parishioners who had made "more conspicuous
contributions" along with the amount of their gift so that
he might "acknowledge by personal letter" their part in
making "this important collection so outstanding a
success . " [ 34 ]
Cushing's letter was dramatic evidence that the policy
shift of the Vatican "to look to the United States" for
leadership in postwar Europe to battle communism was
beginning to show results. The policy of the Vatican was
also becoming clear to individuals other than State
Department personnel. J. Alvarez Del Vayo, the last Foreign
Minister of the Spanish Republic, lamented the resurgent
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political power of the Vatican in Italian politics in an
article entitled "Vatican Versus Left in Italy" that
appeared in the April 5, 1947 issue of The Nation . According
to Del Vayo "Italian leaders, asked to explain the rapid
resurgence of Catholic political power, invariably answer,
•the United States.'" Del Vayo saw the shift in Vatican
policy as a break with "centuries" of Vatican policy
"oriented toward the Catholic countries of Europe." The
hierarchy's main efforts were now "concentrated on America,"
and the Pope viewed "that predominantly Protestant country
as the Vatican's chief future ally..." [35]
The Pope had even gone so far as to skip over Italian
candidates when elevating American prelates to the college
of cardinals. In addition, he named Americans as his special
envoys to Yugoslavia (as in the case of Hurley at the
Stepinac trial), Rumania and Germany; positions that in
the past had "traditionally been entrusted to the Italian
members of the Sacred College." According to Del Vayo, these
appointments were meant not only to "flatter American
Catholics" but also "to create the impression that the
Vatican's policy is linked with that of the United States:
the envoys speak as representatives of the church and as
citizens of the strongest country in the world (emphasis in
original)." Convinced that only the United States could
confront "the political advance of the Soviet Union," and
that 80 million Catholics already lived in countries "within
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the Russian sphere of influence" the Vatican was drawing on
"the experience of twenty centuries in its effort to follow
a militantly ant i
-Communist policy" while still conciliating
Russia's neighbors. The result presented a "curious zigzag
strategy, but examination reveals a fixed central objective
-
a Western Christian coalition against godless Russia. "[361
Clearly, FDR's prescient observation to Flynn in 1945
that there could be no permanent peace if Catholics in
Eastern Europe were denied freedom to practice their faith
under Russian rule was beginning to take shape. Catholic
immigrants with strong ties to their native lands were more
concerned with family and friends left behind than with
"open door" diplomacy, and they carried that concern
with them into the voting booth. They were constantly being
reminded of what was happening in their old homelands, both
by the secular press detailing the difficult negotiations
with the Russians over control of their homelands and by
their clergy and the church hierarchy. On April 30, 1947,
John J. Wright, Cushing's Secretary, directed a letter to
the fifteen Polish-speaking parishes of the Archdiocese
announcing that "... the most Reverend Archbishop has been
asked to declare the first Sunday in May, May 4, as a day of
prayer for Poland in the Polish-speaking parishes...."
Wright went on to ask "for special prayers at all the Masses
in your church next Sunday and if you will at the same time
bring to the attention of the faithful the work of the
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Relief for Poland Committee." Such appeals were constant
reminders to Polish-Americans of the fate of their homeland.
In like manner French and Italian-speaking parishes were
reminded of the potential threat Communism posed to those
countries. [37]
The same issue of The Nation revealed still another
aspect of the role American Catholics were playing,
and would continue to play, in international affairs. Del
Vayo was dismayed by the breakdown of the Left in Italy
particularly a split within the Socialist Party over the
issue of relations with the Communists. The split resulted
in the formation of the Italian Socialist Workers Party and
weakened the left to such an extent that it "made it
possible for De Gasperi [a Catholic] to set up a new Cabinet
along more conservative lines." Del Vayo quotes from a
letter sent by the Italian Socialist Party to other European
Socialist parties explaining the split which occurred at the
party congress: "Saragat and his scissionists were inspired
by the Italian American Luigi Antonini, president of the
Italian American Labor Council and a member of the
International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union... He financed
and is still financing ant i -Communist movements of every
descr ipt ion ..." [ 38
]
Antonini's ant i -Communist efforts in Italy must be
seen against the background of Catholic ant i -Communist
activity in the American labor movement in general. The
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Church had been extremely active in the American labor
movement during the 1930s and was supportive of labor's
right to organize, which in that decade was still the
primary struggle of American labor. Unlike Europe, where
separate Catholic trade unions were developed, American
Catholics were encouraged by so-called "labor priests" to
work within the already established labor unions, but with
the objective of promoting "parallel" associations of
Catholic workers. This was the method prescribed by Pius XI
in his 1931 encyclical Quadraaesimo Anno . The Association of
Catholic Trade Unionists evolved from this teaching and
played an active role in union organizing, especially in the
rising industrial unions of the Congress of Industrial
Organizations (CIO). [39]
By 1947 Philip Murray, President of both the CIO and
the United Steelworkers of America, was taking an
increasingly ant i
-Communis t position in regards to Communist
activity in the labor movement. Murray was both a committed
trade unionist and a devout Catholic "friendly to the
Association of Catholic Trade Unionists." In May of 1947
he gained unanimous approval for a statement by the United
Steelworkers that "This union will not tolerate efforts by
outsiders - individuals, organizations, or groups - whether
they be Communist, Socialist or any other group to
infiltrate, dictate or meddle in our affairs." Later that
same year, in November, Murray managed to have the eighth
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constitutional convention of the CIO adopt a resolution
stating: "We
... resent and reject efforts of the Communist
Party or other political parties [Republican?] and their
adherents to interfere in the affairs of the CIO. This
convention serves notice that we will not tolerate such
interference." [40]
Murray's increasingly ant i
-Commun i st position was
consistent with the developing theme of the ACTU . In fact,
Antonini's method of isolating the Communist faction of the
Italian Left as described by Del Vayo followed a similar
pattern used by the ACTU in eliminating Communist influence
in the Michigan Industrial Union Council in 1943. This
alliance of Socialists and ACTU activists resulted in a
victory for John Gibson, a "socialist" leader of the Dairy
Worl^ers and a protege of UAW President Walter Reuther, over
Patricia Quinn an independent leftist who worked with the
Communists as President of the lUC. The ACTU activists were
also instrumental in Reuther 's rise to the presidency of the
UAW, and in convincing the clergy that he and his brother
Victor were "sound leaders, whose socialism, we think will
be mitigated by events." [41]
As mentioned above Truman was more than a little aware
of the need to marshal public opinion on foreign policy
decisions, as he had alluded to Molotov. Scholars have
traditionally contended that Truman and his policy advisors
were manipulating public opinion by creating a "crisis"
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atmosphere in the relations between the U.S. and the Soviet
Union. This work demonstrates that the Catholic periphery
was more instrumental in marshaling public opinion and
dominating the discussion over issues such as Poland,
Hungary, Italy and France. While Truman may indeed have
desired to manipulate and manufacture a crisis atmosphere,
it was not necessary for him to do so. It was already being
done for him by the Catholic periphery. The center/core
groups, which had initially hoped for postwar cooperation
with the Soviets were indeed being pushed into, as Del Vayo
remarked, "a Western Christian coalition against godless
Russia." Public distrust of the Soviets had been steadily
growing since late 1945. "This distrust fed into the
policy process -- via the Office of Public Affairs Public
Studies Division," according to political scientist Michael
Leigh. Truman's personal popularity with the public jumped
dramatically with the announcement of the Truman Doctrine.
Approval of his "handling of his job" increased from 48
percent in February to 60 percent in late March 1947.
Distrust of the Soviets' willingness to cooperate with us
reached a postwar high of 63 percent the same month. Leigh
concludes that Truman, faced with a Republican Congress, and
little chance for innovative domestic policies, "viewed
foreign policy as the realm within which he might best
establish his authority." The bipartisan consensus on
containment Truman was able to forge with the Republican
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leadership, especially Arthur Vandenberg of Michigan with
his large Polish Catholic constituency, would not break down
until after the 1948 election. [42]
In the meantime events in Europe were tending toward
further mobilization of the American periphery. In Hungary
the freely elected Smallholders Party Government was coming
under increasing communist pressure and slowly
disintegrating. In June, Secretary of State George C.
Marshall advocated a plan for massive economic assistance to
the war shattered economies of Europe. It was quickly dubbed
the Marshall Plan. A conference was called at the end of
June in Paris at which the European nations were to discuss
Marshall's offer. The Soviet delegation was headed by
Foreign Minister Molotov, but he walked out of the
conference after three days when it became clear the Western
European nations were willing to make agreements that would
"cut across national lines." The Soviets, however, argued
for national sovereignty over interdependence. After the
Soviets left the conference both Poland and Czechoslovakia
indicated an interest in the plan, but "Russian pressure
forced these two nations to retreat from the Paris talks."
[43]
By August the Soviets had officially rejected
participation in the Marshall Plan and brought Hungary fully
under Communist control. The Communist parties in both
France and Italy "launched intense campaigns of hindrance
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and vilification. In France strikes in one branch of
industry after another occurred." m late September the
Soviets called together a secret conference of nine European
Communist parties seven from Eastern Europe along with
France and Italy. The French and Italians came under severe
criticism for their "timidity" and were urged to act more
"combatively" They were in effect accused of allowing
capitalism to survive in Western Europe due to "Their
faltering and erroneous respect for parliamentary
institutions . " ( 44
]
By November a triumvirate was in place that could have
represented "the Western Christian coalition against godless
Russia" envisioned by Del Vayo
. In France Robert Schuman was
named Prime Minister and would oversee French policy during
the crucial period to mid-1948. Herbert Feis describes him
as "the stabilizing leader in French politics," and a
"creative and effective sponsor who abandoned constricting
foreign policies shaped by fear and hatred for one guided by
a vision of a United Europe in which France and Germany
would cooperate." According to Feis, the rise of Schuman to
power in France "along with Alcide de Gasperi's leadership
in Italy and Konrad Adenauer's in Germany, is one of the
rare wholesome and healing coincidences of history." For
this work it is significant that all three were devout
Catholics and maintained close relations with American
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catholics. It should not be overlooked given the Vatican's
effort to tie itself, and thereby Europe, to American power
[45]
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CHAPTER 11
"...HUNGARIAN CATHOLICISM COULD COUNT ON SUPPORT FROM
CATHOLIC AMERICANS"
The presidential election year of 1948 would provide a
crucial test of whether or not the Catholic periphery would
maintain its loyalty to the Democratic Party. That Catholic
attention was focused on events in Europe is clear. This
attention would increase as events unfolded in 1948.
The European situation took on a decidedly new tone in
January when British Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin notified
Secretary of State Marshall that Britain, France, and the
Benelux countries were about to begin discussions on a
common defense plan. This was not entirely unexpected as
Bevin first raised the matter with Marshall the previous
summer. The Soviets were concerned enough about the prospect
of joint Western defense initiatives for Molotov to issue a
warning that such a move would have dire consequences,
"particularly for France." Molotov was certainly alluding to
France's difficulties, with its large Communist Party,
already upset over participation in the Marshall Plan, and
the prospect that the difficulties would increase. 11]
When the matter came before the House of Commons in
late January, Bevin placed the issue squarely in the context
of the continued threat of Soviet expansion. He declared the
process of Communizat ion "goes ruthlessly on in each
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country" and "the game [is being] played out in Poland,
Bulgaria, Hungary, more recently in Rumania." But that was
not all, according to Bevin, " . . . f r om information in our
possession, other attempts may be made elsewhere." However,
the treaties with France and the Benelux countries were not
enough: "We have then to go beyond the circle of our
immediate neighbors. ...to consider the question of
associating other historic members of the European
civilization, including the new Italy... We are thinking now
of Western Europe as a unit." [2]
That "other attempts may be made elsewhere" to expand
Soviet influence was not surprising. The Soviets were in the
process of pressing both Finland and Norway to sign
agreements that would bring them closer to the "Soviet
sphere." The next move, however, came in February in
Czechoslovakia where a coalition government headed by
Communist Prime Minister Klement Gottwald fell before a
successful coup while Red Army units were camped on the
border. The coup was precipitated by a cabinet vote which
defeated an attempt by the Communist Minister of the
Interior to influence upcoming elections by replacing
Prague's non-Communist police with Communists. The Communist
Cabinet Ministers refused to go along with this vote causing
non-Communist members of the cabinet from the Populist
(Catholic), Czech Socialist and Slovak Democratic parties to
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resign. Their resignations led to Communist charges that a
conspiracy existed to undermine the republic headed by
United States Ambassador Laurence Steinhardt. Opposition
leaders were arrested and jailed. Two weeks later the
mysterious death of popular Foreign Minister Jan Masaryk
compounded the animosity toward the Communist coup. The
Communists claimed Masaryk committed suicide by leaping from
a third floor window into a stone courtyard. Truman and
other Western leaders believed Masaryk was the victim of
"foul play." [3]
The Czech coup resulted in further solidifying
American public opinion against the Soviet Union. Rumors of
a potential outbreak of hostilities were rampant in the
press. More ominously. General Lucius Clay, the American
representative on the Allied Control Commission for Germany,
reported to Washington in early March that he had changed
his mind regarding the prospect of war with the Soviets.
Recent activities left him feeling "a subtle change in
Soviet attitude which I cannot define but which now gives me
a feeling that it (war) may come with dramatic suddenness."
Clay's message alarmed Washington and resulted in a special
CIA analysis which concluded that war "...was not probable
within sixty days." [4]
The impact of the Czech coup on America's domestic
politics was instantaneous and enormous. Taken together with
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the pressure the Soviets were bringing to bear on Finland
and Norway; the solidifying of Soviet-dominated governments
in Poland, Hungary and Rumania; and the activity of the
large Communist Parties of France and Italy, the appearance
of an aggressive Soviet Union bent on dominating all of
Europe seemed only too real.
The Marshall Plan, meanwhile, had been languishing in
Congress. Senator Robert Taft of Ohio was arguing that tax
dollars should not be spent on a "European TVA. " But by
March the Senate approved the Plan by a vote of 69 to 17.
The Republicans seemed on the brink of repudiating the
bipartisan foreign policy developed under the leadership of
Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Arthur
Vandenberg of Michigan. In February Republican Presidential
hopeful Thomas E. Dewey, while not abandoning containment,
attacked Truman's policies "which resulted in surrendering
200,000,000 people in middle Europe into the clutches of
Soviet Russia...." In the midst of the war rumors in March
Representatives Charles Kersten of Wisconsin and Richard
Nixon of California introduced a resolution calling for a
"solemn warning to the conspiracy in the Politboro" that the
U.S. would fight to stop Soviet aggression. Truman's
popularity, after surging with the announcement of the
Truman Doctrine, plummeted again to an all-time low of 32
percent. [6]
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Henry Wallace, campaigning for President on a third
party ticket, appeared to excuse the coup as "evidence that
a 'get tough- policy only provokes a 'get tougher'
policy...." In addition, Wallace seemed insensitive to the
fate of well-respected Masaryk. He compared the rumors of
Masaryk's suicide with the rumors of the suicide of John G.
Winant whose house he owned declaring that "Maybe Winant had
cancer. Maybe Masaryk had cancer... Who knows?" [5]
In the midst of the fallout over the Czech coup Truman
again undercut the Republican political initiative. He made
a special appearance before a joint session of Congress on
March 17, St. Patrick's Day, telling the assembled lawmakers
that he came to "report to you on the critical nature of the
situation in Europe." Three years had passed since the end
of the war in Europe but the desire to achieve a "just and
honorable peace" had been frustrated, not by the "natural
difficulties" that follow any great war, but rather "chiefly
due to the fact that one nation has not only refused to
cooperate in the establishment of a just and honorable
peace, but - even worse - has actively sought to prevent
it." That same nation had undermined the value of the United
Nations by vetoing 21 proposals in a two-year span. "The
Soviet Union and its agents have destroyed the independence
and democratic character of a whole series of nations in
Eastern and Central Europe." This "ruthless course of
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action" and the desire to "extend it to the remaining free
nations of Europe" were the source of Europe's problems. The
tragedy in Czechoslovakia had "sent a shock throughout the
civilized world," and "the hazard of the entire Scandinavian
peninsula" was the latest threat by the pressure being
brought against Finland. [7]
Recent events were heartening, he declared. The Senate
had approved the European Recovery Act and the prospect of
speedy action in the House was encouraging. That very day
five nations in Europe were signing a plan for common
defense, and it "deserves our full support." It was time, he
continued, that "the position of the United States should be
made unmistakably clear." In addition to quick passage of
the European Recovery Act the President called for universal
training legislation and the "temporary reenactment of
selective service legislation in order to maintain our armed
forces at their authorized strength." [8]
Truman then moved to cut off the growing partisan
attacks on his administration. The world situation was "too
critical" and the nation's responsibilities "too vast" to
allow "party struggles to weaken our influence for
maintaining peace." The people, he stated, had "the right to
assume that political considerations will not affect our
working together" and that "...we will join hands,
wholeheartedly and without reservations, in our efforts to
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preserve peace in the world." The President followed up this
appeal for bipartisanship by moving immediately to shore up
his own political base. He flew to New York City to address
the annual dinner of the Society of the Friendly Sons of St.
Patrick. There may have been a friendly son of St. Patrick
in New York who was a Republican, but most of the attendees
were likely to have roots in Tammany. The President followed
Cardinal Spellman to the rostrum. The Cardinal had warmed up
the audience with a "rousing ant i
-Communist speech" of his
own . [ 9
]
The President's address was in the same vein.
Reiterating major features of his speech to Congress that
afternoon, he spelled out in greater detail, however, the
"tragic record" which had left "Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia,
Poland Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Albania, Hungary. And
now Czechos lovak ia .... under the domination of that one
nation" that was obstructing the search for peace. "Nor is
this the whole story," Truman continued, "For that nation is
now pressing its demands on Finland. Its foreign agents are
fighting in Greece and working hard to undermine the freedom
of Italy." The President was warming to his task, encouraged
by the enthusiastic response of the audience prepared by
Spellman. In a departure from his prepared text he left
little doubt this was a campaign speech. "I do not want and
I will not accept the political support of Henry Wallace and
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his communists. If joining them or permitting them to join
me is the price of victory I recommend def eat
. . . . any price
for Wallace and his Communists is too much for me to pay.
I'm not buying." The President was obviously moving to
repair the damage left by the 1946 off-year elections. By
appearing on the same platform with Cardinal Spellman he was
associating himself and his administration with a newer,
tougher stand against the Soviet Union the Catholic
hierarchy had long called for. The Catholic ethnic voters
who had deserted the big city machines in 1946 were being
called back. This was a pattern that would be followed right
up to the end of the campaign. [10]
Truman needed and wanted the cooperation of the
Catholic hierarchy for both domestic and international
reasons. The situation in Italy which Truman referred to
repeatedly was of particular moment. New elections were
scheduled to take place in early April and the entire
administration was concerned about the prospect of a
Communist victory. The Italian Communist Party enjoyed
especially strong support in the industrial north. The
prospect of a Communist victory in the elections followed by
a total seizure of power, which had been the pattern in the
Eastern European countries, and the prospect of Italy
collaborating with neighboring Yugoslavia, still in the
Soviet orbit, alarmed the State Department. According to
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Clark Clifford, the President, a veteran of tough Missouri
politics, was "very practical and approved use of every
means to influence the [Italian] election." The American
embassy publicly advocated the reelection of the government
and hinted that Marshall Plan funds would be withheld if the
Communists won. The Pope reminded Italians that Catholic
cooperation with Communists had been prohibited by his
predecessor in the encyclical Divini Redemotoris . in
February several Italian-American newspapers urged readers
to write relatives in Italy urging a vote against the
Communists. The idea was picked up by Cardinal Ameleto
Cicognani, the Apostolic Delegate to the United States who
urged American Bishops to encourage pastors of Italian
parishes to participate in the letter writing campaign. [11]
The letter sent to all pastors in the Archdiocese of
New York framed the issue in much the same manner that
Archbishop Gushing had used the year before. "[T]he fate of
Italy depends upon the forthcoming election and the conflict
is one between Communism and Christianity, between slavery
and freedom." All persons "of Italian origin living here and
all friends of Italy" were encouraged "to write to relatives
and acquaintances first of all to urge all to exercise their
right of the ballot and to warn them of the dangers of a
communistic victory." Letter writers were instructed to send
their letters airmail and "to emphasize the help which has
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lean
been extended to the Italian people through Amer
generosity...." Spellman went so far as to use radio to
broadcast a personal message to Italy. The campaign
contributed to a victory for the Christian Democrats and
their centrist party coalition members. [12]
With the Italian elections out of the way the focus
began to shift back to the domestic election campaigns. The
Republican Party frontrunner. Governor Thomas E. Dewey of
New York, was being challenged by former Minnesota Governor
Harold Stasson. Stasson won surprising victories in the
Wisconsin and Nebraska primaries, eliminating Douglas
MacArthur in the process and putting great pressure on
Dewey's campaign. The climax came in the Oregon primary in
mid-May. Dewey used the opportunity of the primary to attack
the Truman administration foreign policy, accusing the
president of "wavering between appeasement and bluster." He
promised to "wage peace with all of the energy and
determination and force with which we waged war." Nor was
the issue of domestic Communism forgotten. When Stasson
advocated outlawing the Communist Party, Dewey countered by
arguing it was better to keep the "worms" above ground
"where we can see them and lick them as we have in New
York." Dewey managed a narrow victory over Stasson,
eliminating him from the race but leaving many observers to
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conclude the Republican nomination was in no sense locked up
for the New York Governor. [13]
The man many regarded as posing the most serious
darkhorse threat to Dewey's nomination was the party's chief
foreign policy spokesman Senator Arthur Vandenberg of
Michigan. The President had enlisted Vandenberg's support
for possible American involvement in a European defense pact
following the successful negotiation of the Brussels Pact in
March. The Michigan Senator introduced what became known as
the Vandenberg Resolution to the Senate in early May. In it,
the United States pledged continued support of the United
Nations but allowed American participation in regional
collective security arrangements such as the Brussels Pact
which were permitted under the U.N. Charter. The resolution
placed the isolationist elements within the Republican Party
in a difficult position. They opposed U.S. involvement in
European defense arrangements but were hesitant to attack
their leading foreign policy spokesman. Vandenberg produced
a unanimous vote of approval on the resolution from his
Senate Foreign Relations Committee. With the isolationists
abstaining from the vote the Senate passed the resolution 64
to 4 on June 11, only two weeks before the Republican
national convention. [14]
National polls, meanwhile, continued to demonstrate
the schizophrenic nature of American public opinion on the
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international situation. A Gallup poll taken in mid-April
asked what was "the most important problem facing this
country today?" The response showed 65 percent most
concerned with "preventing war and getting along with the
Soviet Union." Only 8 percent cited inflation and the high
cost of living. An earlier poll, however, found 73 percent
believing the Truman administration was "too soft" on the
Soviets. Perhaps more alarmingly, the April Gallup survey
showed a majority believing the Republicans would be better
at handling foreign policy issues than the Democrats.
Private polls conducted by the Democratic National Committee
produced similar results. The public message seemed clear.
International tensions and the threat of war was the most
serious problem facing the nation, more so than any domestic
issue. The best way to deal with the international situation
was to take a tougher stand against the Soviets. The
American public, not coincidentally I believe, was sending
the same message to the administration as the Catholic
hierarchy. [15]
While the Senate was debating the Vandenberg
Resolution, the President was leaving on a mini version of
his fall campaign tour. The trip was billed as
"nonpolitical, " as the purpose was to receive an honorary
degree and speak at the commencement exercises at the
University of California at Berkeley. Toward the end of the
220
trip at Eugene, Oregon, the President remarked on his
negotiations with Stalin at Potsdam. "I got very well
acquainted with Joe Stalin," he told the crowd, "and I like
old Joe." He went on to say Stalin was a "decent fellow. But
Joe is a prisoner of the Politboro." This was a view the
President had expressed repeatedly in private, but it
stunned the majority of the nation's press and the State
Department as well. Robert Lovett, Under Secretary of State
and a Republican, put through an emergency call to Clark
Clifford who was accompanying the President. Clifford
"tactfully advised the President not to repeat the remark
again." The President told Clifford he "goofed."
Republicans, however, "filed it away for future use." [16]
At least one historian, Robert Divine, attributes
Truman's "goof" to "an apparent effort to attract Wallace
supporters." From the very beginning Wallace's campaign was
dogged by charges that it was Communist controlled, that
Wallace was a "dupe" of the American Communist party and
merely spouting the Soviet line on foreign policy. Labor was
the segment of the American public where Wallace expected to
find considerable support. A friend of labor throughout his
career, he had the very considerable assistance of CIO
President Philip Murray in a losing effort to keep Wallace
on the ticket in 1944. Later that same year Murray had
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presented Wallace with a "distinguished service medal" from
the CIO . [ 17
]
Communists had long been involved with the American
labor movement, and held key leadership positions in many of
the ClO-aff iliated unions. But by 1947, with Taft-Hartley
hanging over its head, coupled with the activity of the ACTU
and an increasingly active government program of harassment,
the CIO was moving to purge Communists from positions of
power. Walter Reuther had won the presidency of the United
Auto Workers in 1946 with "a campaign in which he pledged to
oust Communists from the union payroll." In February of 1948
Reuther told an audience of Americans for Democratic Action
that Wallace was "Joe Stalin's American agent" and was
"separating the forces liberalism and leading them to
Stalin's rustlers." A month earlier the CIO Executive Board
voted 33 to 11 not to support a third party in the fall
elections. While a blow to the Wallace campaign, the vote
did not seem to preclude individual union leaders or their
unions from endorsing or supporting Wallace. Philip Murray,
however, moved to quell any such effort by writing to union
officials that they "should be governed" by national CIO
policy in favor of the Marshall Plan and against Wallace.
When Harry Bridges of the International Longshoreman's and
Warehouseman's Union continued to support Wallace in
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California, he was fired as CIO regional director for
northern California. [18]
The attacks by and on labor leaders associated with
the Wallace campaign continued throughout Spring 1948 as the
Czech crisis unfolded and rumors of war with the Soviets
were rampant. In March the UAW declared that Wallace's
Progressive party was "a Communist Party maneuver designed
to advance the foreign policy interests of the Soviet Union.
In April Murray declared "this is no time to mince words. I
charge
... that the Communist party is directly responsible
for the organization of a third party in the United States."
Murray further charged that the party was "inaugurated at a
Communist party meeting in the City of New York in October
of 1947." In July the ACTU officially announced the
Progressive party "a new front for American Communists."
This was a particularly difficult blow for the Wallace
campaign which was directing its appeal to labor over the
heads of the hostile union leadership to the rank and file,
and "a high proportion of the rank and file was Catholic."
[ 19 ]
Clearly, public opinion on events in Europe and at
home was strongly being shaped by Catholic attitudes. The
success of the letter writing campaign in influencing the
outcome of the Italian elections; Truman's decision to make
a Catholic event the kickoff for gathering public support
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for his proposals to reinvigorate the armed forces with
universal military training and selective service, as well
as to attack Wallace's Communist connections; and the
activities of Philip Murray and the ACTU in both attacking
Communist leadership in the CIO and the Wallace campaign.
The Catholic hierarchy. Catholic politicians. Core
politicians with large Catholic constituencies such as
Arthur Vandenberg, influential Catholic labor leaders and
Catholic intellectuals were calling for a tougher stand by
the president virtually since the end of the war in Europe.
With each successive step; the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall
Plan; the containment policy; the call to arms; the
involvement of the church in the Italian elections with the
consent and cooperation of the government the president was
regaining the confidence of American Catholics. The tougher
his stance the more popular he became. As mid-1948
approached he was again about to be offered an opportunity
to demonstrate his toughness.
All three of the major contending parties --
Democrats, Republicans and Wallace's Progressive Party --
had scheduled their conventions for Philadelphia. The
Republicans were the first to arrive in mid-June. Senator
Vandenberg was again parrying isolationist thrusts within
his party. On June 3rd the House Appropriations Committee
had cut $1 billion from the first-year appropriation for the
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Marshall plan. With the approval of Speaker Joe Martin, a
Catholic from Massachusetts, the full house passed the bill.
The Democrats counterattacked, charging the Republican
isolationists with playing "directly into the hands of the
Communists." When the bill came before the Senate
Appropriations Committee, Vandenberg appeared to argue in
favor of restoring the cuts. Similar appeals came from GOP
candidates Stassen and Dewey. The Senate restored virtually
all the original request, and the Senate version prevailed
when the bill went to a conference committee. [20]
Vandenberg simultaneously feared that the Republican
platform would depart from the spirit of bipartisanship he
was promoting. He had been corresponding with Dewey's
foreign policy advisor John Foster Dulles, who recommended
inclusion of language in the platform "stressing the need to
roll back the Iron Curtain" and accused the administration
of following policies that made the U.S. "appear uncertain,
inefficient, vacillating and unr el iable . " Vandenberg
incorporated some of Dulles' language in a platform draft
and submitted it to Resolutions Committee Chairman Henry
Cabot Lodge, Jr. of Massachusetts. The final platform
approved by the convention reflected Vandenberg's attitude
toward bipartisanship. There were no attacks on "Democratic
appeasement at Yalta or Potsdam." Rather, in conclusion it
"invite[d] the Minority Party to join us under the next
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Republican administration in stopping partisan politics at
the water's edge." The convention itself was testimony to
bipartisanship. Only one speaker, Clare Booth Luce, a
convert to Catholicism and a close friend of Cardinal
Spellman, attacked Truman on foreign policy by bringing up
his "goof" in telling the country "I like old Joe." "Good
old Joe," Luce exclaimed, "Of course they liked him. Didn't
they give him all Eastern Europe, Manchuria, the Kuriles,
North China, coalitions in Poland, Yugoslavia and
Czechoslovakia?" Nevertheless, the party had removed foreign
policy from the campaign agenda. Polls continued to show,
however, "that the American people still gave foreign policy
issues a priority over domestic concerns" and that "a slight
majority felt that the Republicans were better equipped than
the Democrats to handle the delicate international
situation." In effect the Republicans were staking the
future on the belief that the disaffected urban ethnic, and
largely Catholic, voters that seemingly deserted the
Democrats in 1946 would continue to support the Republican
Party on domestic bread-and-butter issues if given no real
difference between the parties on foreign policy issues.
[211
On June 23 the Republicans nominated Governor Dewey
for the presidency. On the same day the Russians cut all
overland and water routes to Berlin, leaving only air
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traffic as the means of supplying the 2 million residents of
the western-occupied districts. The President was faced with
open hostilities breaking at any moment. Truman remained
silent, preferring to let others speak for the
administration. General Lucius Clay, American military
Governor of Germany, announced the Russians could not drive
the U.S. out of Berlin with any action "short of war." The
President apparently agreed with him. When Secretary of
Defense Forrestal began reviewing the advisability of
staying in Berlin at a briefing for the President on June
28, Truman interrupted him to say, "there was no discussion
on that point, we are going to stay period." Truman's
military advisor Admiral Leahy thought the situation
"hopeless," but the President authorized an increase in the
airlift that had already begun to bring supplies to the
city. On June 30 Secretary of State Marshall announced
publicly that the United States "would not be driven out of
Berlin" and that the airlift was already proving more
successful than had been expected. Marshall was obviously
speaking to reassure the public, for General Hoyt
Vandenberg, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, doubted the
effectiveness of the airlift and the additional exposure of
the Air Force to danger. Supplying the necessary number of
planes to support an effective airlift, he believed, would
cripple the Air Forces's strategic capabilities elsewhere.
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Nevertheless, planes were directed to Berlin from as far
away as Alaska and Hawaii. [22]
The President's political position was certainly
strengthened by his stand on Berlin. A strange combination
of conservative southerners and liberal Democrats were
appealing to Dwight Eisenhower to accept a draft from the
Democratic convention. The southerners appealed to Ike "to
lead the people of this nation in their fight against
communism, tyranny and slavery and to maintain peoples of
the world at peace." The liberals took a different approach,
claiming that Eisenhower was the only Democratic candidate
that could "keep Republican isolationists in line." In the
midst of the Berlin crisis, on July 5, Eisenhower issued a
statement in which he declared, "I will not, at this time,
identify myself with any political party, and could not
accept nomination for any public office or participate in a
partisan political contest." The liberals turned briefly to
Supreme Court Justice William 0. Douglas in the face of
Eisenhower's rebuff, but Douglas issued a statement of his
own in which he said, "I am not a candidate, have never been
a candidate, and don't plan to be a candidate." With the
opposition fragmented and no clearcut candidate willing to
step forward Truman for all intents had the nomination
locked up when the convention opened in mid-July. [23]
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The Democratic Platform Committee, however, took a
more belligerent attitude on foreign policy than its
Republican counterpart. In a departure from the spirit of
bipartisanship the committee approved language that took
credit "for resisting Communist aggression" through the
Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan and criticized the
Republicans for "reluctance to provide funds to support...
the greatest move for peace and recovery made since the end
of World War II." Candidate Dewey in turn criticized the
Democrats for this "extremely partisan and provocative
assertions concerning foreign affairs." Truman, however,
restored the essence, if not the spirit, of bipartisanship
in his acceptance speech to the convention. In a rather
backhanded manner the President claimed, "We have converted
the greatest and best of the Republicans to our viewpoint."
Giving the Republicans full credit for supporting the Truman
Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, he went on to say "foreign
policy should be the policy of the whole nation and not the
policy of one party or the other" and that "partisanship
should stop at the water's edge; and I shall continue to
preach that through this whole campaign." [24]
When Henry Wallace and his Progressive Party delegates
arrived in Philadelphia in late July, they made it clear
that they at least disagreed with the concept of
bipartisanship. Employing populist rhetoric typical of an
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earlier era, k.iynote speaker Charic:. V. llow..r(l (^n 1 ed the
bipartisan containment policy
-th..' brainchild oL b.,nkir>q
house dlplom.H .uKl l),,nking house brass." Writing in the New
Republic jn.-,l prior to the convention, Wallace claim.Mj,
"Vandc-nberq and l)n 1 1 .^re every bit as much responsible for
the Democratic Lorei-,n policy of cold w..r .,nd r rmnmen t ar,
the Democrats t^jemuel ves
.
" The W.ill.K.e c.nn|,,MMn h.id [)e,,k<«d
in June, registering anywlicr-' l r om lu to IJ pcrccnl in
public opinion polls. Itnl I h<' polls also Showed Anx' t i ( -.in:.
believing the Unito.i ,it w,i:, "too soft" on the Soviet
Union. The Fieri in crisis virt ii.illy elimiri.il .'d ,my chance
W.ill.jce hacJ of affecting th(- el.v l ion. The crir,ir. w.is the
inevitable r.e;,ult oL Trniii.in's "get toiKjh" i)oIicy Woll.tce
declared in his iKjmination speech, and rathec than
confrontin(3 the Soviets over the city lu: L.jvored i mmed i . 1 1, c
withdrawal from Berlin. W.Hl.ico was cle.icly ol step wil.li
public opinion on the Dor 1 in .•.itii.il ion, both al home .ind
abroad. I-'ven Ifie nril i:,fi Labour Government, whoso MP's often
agrcMMl witfi the <)o,ils it not the me.tnr. of rnony thinqs ffie
Soviets advoc.ilcd, received ForfMqn Secretary Uevin's report
in the House ol Commons with rousing cheers. Ueviri declared
that a "grav<? situation" could .ir isc ond tli.it t.he <jove r niiion t,
would ask th(; hou:-.(^ to "I, ice it" if it (J id. The .i It <-r native
2 3 0
was "surrender," concluded Bevin, "and none of us can accept
surrender." [25]
The Berlin crisis, following as it did on the heels of
the Czech Coup, helped to solidify the the perception within
the center/core groups that the Soviets were intent on an
aggressive course in Europe. While these events were
unfolding, the periphery was beginning to focus on
developments in Hungary which would solidify a developing
religious bipartisanship over the issue of religious
persecution. In April the Hungarian Minister of Religion and
Education proposed the nationalization of the country's
Catholic Schools. The Primate of Hungary, Jozsef Cardinal
Mindszenty, responded with a pastoral letter critical of the
minister for reversing his position of February in which he
declared that "the Catholic Church had played an enormous
role in the educational development of our country" and that
"the Hungarian democracy does not want to deprive the
denominations of their schools." Mindszenty had been openly
critical of the increasing influence of what he termed
"Marxist" elements within the government which carried far
greater weight than their numbers due to the presence of Red
Army occupation forces. [26]
In spite of the fact that a peace treaty had been
negotiated and signed with Hungary in January of 1947, the
Red Army maintained large forces in the country. Because no
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treaty had yet been agreed on with either Germany or Austri
the provisions of the treaty with Hungary permitted Soviet
occupation forces to remain in place "for the maintenance of
the lines of communication of the Soviet army with the zone
of Soviet occupation in Austria." Efforts first by Secretary
Byrnes and then Secretary Marshall to reduce Soviet
occupation forces in both Hungary and Rumania in early 1947
had been rejected by Molotov. The Soviet position toward the
Hungarian church was made clear by Georgi Pushkin, chairman
of the Allied Control Commission for Hungary. Newly
appointed Minister to the Italian Republic Stephen Kertesz
approached Pushkin about the possibility of renewing
official Hungarian relations with the Vatican. Kertesz
argued that "Hungary had a large Catholic population and it
would be advisable for the new regime to settle Church-State
problems by the intervention of an experienced papal
diplomat." Pushkin responded that "The Vatican is an agency
of American interests in Europe, financed by American
capitalists. The new Hungarian democracy does not need the
representative of such reactionary forces." This alleged
interplay between Vatican and American interests would play
an important role in subsequent events in Hungary. [27]
The crisis brewing in Hungary over the nationalization
of the parochial schools came to a head in early June just
as the House and Senate were taking up the Marshall Plan
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appropriation bill and the major parties were preparing for
their conventions. The Hungarian cabinet voted in favor of
the secularization bill and sent it to the parliament where
it was approved by a vote of 230 to 60 with 70 abstentions.
Under the new law a total of 4,885 schools were
nationalized, 3,148 belonging to the Catholic Church. In his
memoirs Mindszenty later accurately observed that the
"Bolshevist persecution of the churches," together "with
dismay over the coup in Czechoslovakia that had just taken
place, gave the ant icommunis t movement in the free world a
tremendous impetus." [28]
The post-convention atmosphere of international crisis
building over Berlin and Hungary took a dramatic turn in
early August. On August 4 the House UnAmerican Activities
Committee ( HUAC ) heard Whittaker Chambers, a repentant
Catholic, former Communist and editor at Time magazine^
testify that Alger Hiss, president of the Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace and a former State Department
official, had passed government secrets to the Soviet Union
during the 1930s. Hiss had served as FDR's interpreter at
the Yalta Conference, and the implication, soon widely
understood, was that he had deluded the president on the
importance of the Soviet position regarding Eastern Europe.
Once again the image of a deceitful Communist minority,
unable to gain its ends through legitimate democratic
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processes, but rather through cunning, manipulation, spying,
and treason was reinforced in the public's mind. This was
precisely the message the Catholic periphery had been
warning against throughout the 1930s when the Protestant
core "saw no threat at all." Catholic writers had then
argued "the millions of unwitting 'dupes' of the communists
-- mostly 'liberals' and most of these consisting of
teachers, writers, and assorted union activists," posed the
real threat to the republic by advancing the Communist cause
thereby allowing the relatively small number of real
Communists to maintain "low visibility" and to keep "their
activities largely undercover." The Communists' ability to
gain power through deception, manipulation of the electoral
process, and outside assistance from the Soviet Union was
now thoroughly documented by events in Eastern Europe. Yet
another lapsed Catholic and former Communist had contributed
to the growing belief that the Soviet Union was committed to
the overthrow of the United States by all means fair and
foul. Louis Budenz, former editor of the Daily Worker and a
member of the CPUSA national committee, had returned to the
church in 1945 under the guidance of Monsignor Fulton J.
Sheen. In 1947 Budenz published the account of his years
within the Communist Party which graphically detailed the
twists and turns of the party at the direction of Moscow.
Budenz' "confession" convinced many of the monolithic nature
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of Communism directed from the Kremlin. The accusations
against Hiss now demonstrated to many Americans that the
threat to America itself was real. [29]
Truman attempted to belittle the spy charges against
Hiss, declaring them "a red herring" at a news conference
the day after Chambers made his allegations. "The American
people," as historian Robert Divine notes, "already deeply
concerned over the Soviet threat as a result of Truman's
containment rhetoric, took the spy charges much more
seriously, viewing them as revealing a new front in the
already dangerous Cold War." While the charges against Hiss
contained "political dynamite" according to House minority
leader Sam Rayburn, the question for the public to answer
was whether or not the charges of a domestic Communist
conspiracy would negate the hard line being taken by Truman
in foreign policy. His advisors warned against associating
"the containment policy with the Communist problem at home."
But the president refused to follow their advice in this
instance. He denied there was a domestic Communist threat,
declaring "the greatest danger has been that communism might
blot out the light of freedom in so much of the rest of the
world that the strength of its onslaught against our
liberties would be greatly multiplied." [30]
In this instance the President's political antennae
appeared more sensitive than his advisors'. His appeal to
235
the Catholic ethnic voters on the strength of his resistance
to the spread of Communism abroad succeeded. The famous
whistlestop campaign featured repeated attacks on the
Republican 80th Congress on the bread-and-butter issues so
important to working class Catholics. At the same time the
President took full credit for the Truman Doctrine and
Marshall Plan, which to ethnic Catholic voters demonstrated
the President's commitment to resisting the Communist
takeover of their homelands. This combination succeeded
handsomely for the President. On October 27 as the campaign
neared its conclusion this fact was overtly demonstrated in
Boston. As the President was winding up his campaign swing
through the Northeast he paid an unscheduled visit to
Archbishop Gushing. Following a fifteen-minute private talk,
the two men appeared before reporters, and Cushing virtually
endorsed the President's reelection effort by telling him,
"I think you are making one of the greatest and most
courageous fights in history on behalf of the people."
Cooler heads within the archdiocese attempted to blunt the
Archbishop's statement by amending it later to read: "Both
[Truman and Dewey] are putting up a great fight." But the
Archbishop made no public comments the following day after
meeting with candidate Dewey. [31]
Clearly the President wanted to associate both himself
and his policies with support from the Catholic hierarchy.
236
as he did with his St. Patrick's day speech with Spellman in
attendance and this end-of
-campa ign appearance with Gushing.
In his Boston speech before meeting with Gushing the
President stressed "his administrations record in checking
Gommunist aggression." He concluded, "the whole world knows
of the success of this policy," and "now, the Communists
will never forgive me for that." Truman departed from the
spirit of bipartisanship in the closing days of the campaign
declaring in New York Gity, "We must never withdraw to the
Republican isolationism of the 1920s" and that if we did
"communism will become so powerful that the security of this
nation will be gravely endangered." Dewey responded in kind,
charging that "Millions upon millions of people have been
delivered into Soviet slavery while our own administration
has tried appeasement one day and bluster the next." In
Chicago Dewey resurrected the "I like old Joe" statement by
Truman and again charged the administration with vacillation
between appeasement and bluster. But it was too little and
too late to make administration foreign policy a critical
campaign issue for Dewey, [32]
The periphery, which was largely defining the issues
of the Cold War both at home and abroad, maintained its
loyalty to the Democratic Party one more time. Catholics had
voted for Truman in large numbers; according to David
McCullough, "in some predominantly Catholic wards of Boston
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and Pittsburgh the vote for Truman exceeded past tallies for
Al Smith and FDR." The President's hard line approach to the
Soviet Union, according to Robert Divine, "won back many of
the Catholic groups [which had seemingly deserted the party
in 1946] notably the Irish and Italians, who had been
antagonized by Roosevelt's intervent ionism. " Truman's strong
stand on Berlin brought Germans, a large percentage of whom
were Catholic, back to the party in large numbers. Only the
Poles, resentful of the treatment of Poland, defected in
large enough numbers to reduce traditionally large
Democratic majorities in cities like Buffalo, Chicago and
Detroit. Vandenberg's effort to attach Republicans to the
popularity of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan did
not succeed. The only foreign policy alternative to
containment offered to the votes was Henry Wallace's, and
that seemed to offer only more "appeasement" of the Soviets.
[ 33]
The election was barely concluded when events in
Hungary again focused Catholic attention on that country.
One day after the election Hungary's bishops issued a
statement acknowledging that they were "deeply disturbed and
grieved by the recent disgraceful attacks made against
Cardinal Mindszenty." The bishops, "speaking in the name of
religious freedom, protests against this campaign," On
November 18 the Voice of America broadcast to Hungarians a
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pastoral letter written by Mindszenty in Esztergom and
smuggled out of the country to be published. The letter
asserted that Mindszenty was being "blamed for counter
revolutionary plots and activities hostile to the people."
The Cardinal complained that Hungary "is condemned to
silence and public opinion is made a mere frivolous jest.
Democratic 'freedom of speech' in this country means that
any opinion that differs from the official one is silenced."
He claimed that Hungary stood alone "an orphan in the whole
world" and that he stood "for God, for the Church and for
Hungary." Mindszenty was saying things that the government
did not want said, he admitted, but, he continued, it was
only because "I am compelled to speak out from time to time
and to state the facts as they are, it is only the misery of
my people and the urge of truth which force me to do so."
[34 ]
The next day Mindszenty's personal secretary was
arrested returning from Mass. The Cardinal's own arrest
seemed imminent. While the situation remained strained and
further arrests of priests ensued, including the treasurer
and archivist of the archdiocese, the government took no
direct action against Mindszenty. Then, on December 26 some
eighty police surrounded the Cardinal's residence in
Esztergom, and he was placed under arrest. No public
announcement of the Cardinal's arrest was made until the
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following day. The New York Times of December 28 carried a
page-one story of the arrest along with a picture of
Mindszenty with a subhead declaring "Catholic Primate
Charged with Plotting Against the Government and Spying."
The announcement of the arrest carried no details, according
to The Times
,
but, quoting "a high Hungarian authority who
requested that his name not be used, it reported that "the
government would issue a "detailed statement" within
48-hours which would "contain some surprises." The Times
source said the government had "indisputable evidence"
against the Cardinal. The Times described Mindszenty as "an
outspoken champion of the Catholic Church" and "considered
probably the only remaining powerful enemy of the present
Hungarian Government." [35]
The leader of the Parliamentary Opposition to the
Communists in Hungary, Istvan Barankovice, was said to be
"not surprised" by the announcement of Mindszenty's arrest.
He alluded to recent speeches of Premier Istvan Dobi and
Deputy Premier Matyas Rakosi which, he stated, "showed the
Government had been determined to get rid of the Cardinal."
The Times reported there had been other "hints" of action
against Mindszenty in recent months, including a speech by
then Premier Lajos Dinnyes declaring Mindszenty a
"reactionary" and proclaiming the Hungarian people "are
determined to break reaction whether in the form of the
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purple of Bishops or the sabotage of kulaks [rich
peasants]." In addition, Rakosi's speech of the previous
January was cited in which he declared that it was "the task
of democracy this year to settle the relationship between
the Church and the Republic. It cannot continue that a
majority of the enemies of the people should hide behind the
cloak of the churches, especially the Catholic Church." The
year-long battle then was seemingly drawing to a close. [36]
Interestingly, The Times did not carry a reaction to
Mindszenty's arrest by New York's Cardinal Spellman. Rather,
it cited the reaction of Boston's Archbishop Cushing and
Boston Congressman John F. Kennedy. Cushing declared that
any conviction of Mindszenty would come on "manufactured
evidence." "No one will be surprised," he continued, "by the
latest outrage against religion perpetrated by the Red
fascists in Hungary. The only shock will be because of the
added cynicism with which the Soviet puppets chose the
Christmas season to strike their blow at religious
resistance to tyranny." Cushing asked for "the prayers of
all our people and all who love God for this heroic priest."
Kennedy, meanwhile, released the contents of a telegram sent
to Secretary of State Marshall in which he said, "The report
of the arrest of the distinguished Cardinal of Budapest has
alarmed and shocked all lovers of both religion and
freedom." The telegram went on to say "it is hoped that our
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state Department will urge the United Nations and religion
loving people of the United States that no crime we can
prevent will be permitted against this great patriot and
world figure." [37]
The periphery was once again at center stage in the
fight against Communism. Both the nation's Catholic press
and secular news media gave considerable coverage to the
Mindszenty arrest. Kennedy, ever the politician, and in this
instance a realist as well, left himself and the government
protected with his phrase "no crime we can prevent." In any
case Catholics were once again perceived as bearing the
brunt of Communist hostility in Eastern Europe. Mindszenty,
recounting the early days of his interrogation, recorded the
charges that he planned to overthrow the Republic and
reinstall the monarchy by crowning Otto von Hapsburg with
the Crown of St. Stephen, all with the assistance of the
United States to stir up a third world war. He told his
interrogators that he had indeed met with von Hapsburg in
1947 during a tour of America but only to secure help in
"obtaining and transporting charitable gifts from America."
He said he was heartened by the assurance that "Hungarian
Catholicism could count on support from Catholic Americans."
Indeed they could. And Mindszenty would become the leading
martyr of American Catholicism's fight against godless
Communism. A fight that, as FDR had foreseen, would continue
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to have repercussions on American foreign policy. There
could be no permanent peace as long as the Catholics of
Eastern Europe were denied the ability to practice their
faith. [38]
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CHAPTER 12
"REBELLION TO TYRANTS IS OBEDIENCE TO GOD"
The hail of protest resulting from the arrest of
Cardinal Mindszenty serves to highlight the impact of the
periphery in focusing American public opinion. The ability
of members of the Catholic hierarchy, such as Archbishop
Gushing, and Catholic Congressmen, such as Representative
John F. Kennedy, calling for some type of American response
to Mindszenty's arrest generated press coverage which no
other American religious denomination seemed capable of
achieving
.
And non-Cathol ics noticed it.
The Protestant journal The Christian Century took more
note of the disparity of attention given Mindszenty's arrest
by both the American press and, more importantly, by the
government. "Protestants may be struck by the difference
between the excitement created by the arrest of Cardinal
Mindszenty and the lack of it when Bishop Ordass, the
Lutheran primate of Hungary, and other Lutheran leaders were
arrested," the Centur y noted with some sarcasm. The Lutheran
press and "a few other church papers" protested the
"travesty of justice" which had taken place against Ordass.
"But there was no eagerness by the U.S. department of state
to come charging into the arena. . . .And the world's press let
Bishop Ordass go to his cell without making much fuss over a
blow to religious freedom." The editors were apparently
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upset by the double standard employed by Undersecretary of
State Robert Lovett. He described the charges against
Mindszenty as "patently false" at a news conference and
found that the legal process observed by the Hungarian
Government was a "sickening sham." The difference in the
treatment accorded Mindszenty's arrest could be ascribed to
the fact he was "a 'prince' of a church with a worldwide
organization and a publicity 'apparatus' (if we may venture
to use in this connection a term popularized by Whittaker
Chambers) that commands instant attention from press and
radio everywhere." [1]
The editorial went on to describe the Communists'
position on Papal activities; "In Communist thinking, the
Roman Catholic Church is now everywhere at war with
Communist governments," and from their viewpoint it was
understandable that such terms as "treason" and "spying"
should be invoked in the charges against Mindszenty. If the
church is at war with Communist governments' "any
communication ... between the Cardinal -- a Hungarian citizen
-- and Church authorities outside Hungary is communication
with the enemy. Hence, treason. Hence, spying. Hence,
plotting." The Christian Century argued that the Pope's
Christmas allocution of 1948 amounted to "war to the hilt
between the papal church and the Communist states" and
concluded that "with the Roman Church thus committed by its
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head to relentless warfare against Communist aggression, and
holding it the moral duty of nations to back that warfare if
necessary by force of arms, the part played in influencing
national policy by faithful members of that church — as
diplomats, as legislators, as government executives and
administrators, as soldiers, as journalists, as educators —
is something to be held under constant and careful
scrutiny." For the editors of The Christian Centnry. at
least, the issue of who presented the greater threat to the
nation -- Moscow or Rome — was still in doubt. [2]
The liberal Catholic periodical Commonweal on January
7, 1949 presented a rather measured response to the
Cardinal's arrest. "The position of Hungary is fluid and
complex," it editorialized, so "that it would seem an almost
desperate job to describe the frame and pattern of the
quarrel between the Hungarian Communist Government and the
Primate of the Church in Hungary." However, noting that
Mindszenty was an "ancient concentration camp dweller,"
having been jailed by Hitler, there could be no doubt that
"Communism is an enemy of religion, of the Church." In the
final analysis there could be no doubt that "the great issue
is the worship of God and the persuasion of souls .... There
is spiritual battle." [3]
Coincidental ly, the editors of Commonweal seemed to
take up the challenge of The Christian Century to keep
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"under constant and careful scrutiny" Catholics who were in
a position to influence national policy. In its January 14,
1949 edition Commonweal ran an article examining the voting
record of Catholics in Congress. The Cmnrnonweal. article,
however, was aimed at disproving the charge that Catholics
represented "a reactionary force in the United States."
Noting the charge of critics that "Catholics are puppets who
must follow the leadership of their Church" the editors
examined the voting record in the 80th Congress of 11
Catholic Senators and 45 Congressmen. They concluded that
while "the votes of Catholics in the House and Senate did
take a definite trend," it was not the conservative trend of
the 80th Congress but was decidedly liberal. In order to
prevent being charged with "chos(ing) our own issues and own
designations" of what constituted a "liberal" vote the
author employed the criteria of the New Republic . For the
purposes of this study the votes of Catholic members of
congress reflecting Catholic anti-communism will be
examined. In the Senate a vote against cutting funds for the
Marshall Plan was regarded as progressive. The Senate as a
whole voted 65 percent liberal while Catholics voted 81
percent. In a somewhat surprising combination the two
Catholic Senators voting in favor of cutting Marshall PLan
funds were Denis Chaves (D), New Mexico, and Joseph McCarthy
(R), Wisconsin. The vote in the House was narrower where a
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vote to restore Marshall Plan funds previously cut was
counted as progressive. Overall the House voted 83 percent
liberal, while Catholics voted 85 percent. [4]
A vote in the House against the Mundt-Nixon Bill was
considered progressive. Overall, the House voted only 15
percent liberal, while Catholics voted 61 percent.
Interestingly, Minority Leader John McCormack (D)
Massachusetts voted in favor of Mundt-Nixon while his
colleague John F. Kennedy (D) Massachusetts did not vote. On
a vote to provide new funding for the House Un-American
Activities Committee a vote against was considered
progressive. The House voted only 9 percent liberal, while
Catholics voted 40 percent. In this instance both McCormack
and Kennedy voted to provide new funding for HUAC. Thus,
Catholics seemed to present a much more united front in
terms of dealing with international Communism. Catholic
support for measures dealing with domestic anti-Communism
drops off considerably but may reflect more the partisan
nature of the attacks on Communists in government. After
all, the administration was Democratic. But even here 16
Democrats voted in favor of new funding for HUAC, while five
more abstained. This seems to suggest strong Catholic
congressional support for the fight against domestic
Communism even among Democrats. [5]
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The Catholic hierarchy moved to keep the Mindszenty
arrest at the forefront of public attention. Archbishop
Gushing sent a circular to all parishes calling for a day of
prayer for Mindszenty the week his trial was to open. The
Archbishop asked for prayers "during the counterfeit trial
of the Cardinal, whose crime has been the defense of freedom
of religion and of human rights." In addition prayer was
sought "...that the Cardinal may be delivered from the power
of his enemies, and that his people, delivered from the
bonds of Communistic slavery, may be free once more to
worship God." [6]
In New York as well Cardinal Spellman designated
February 6 as a day of prayer for Mindszenty, and 4,000
Catholic Boy Scouts marched down Fifth Avenue to St.
Patrick's Cathedral as part of the overall protest. Inside
the Cathedral the Cardinal took to the pulpit for the first
time since V-E Day and urged the American government to act.
Denouncing "the Satan inspired Communist crimes" against the
church in Eastern Europe, he called on the government "to
raise their voices as one." Jesuit historian Donald Crosby
in attempting to place American Catholic anti-Communism
within the spectrum of a broader American ant i -Communist
persuasion has focused on the strident rhetoric of
Spellman 's speech rather than the overall message which,
coming as it did in the midst of the emerging debate over
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U.S. participation in NATO, could only be construed as an
endorsement of American participation in keeping with the
Pope's Christmas message. As pointed out earlier (see
Chapter 6) Catholics were virtually alone in the mid-1930s
in calling for an ant i
-Communist awareness. The Christian
Century opposed and continued to oppose mainline Protestant
denominations falling in line behind Catholic leadership in
such an undertak i ng . [ 7
]
Spellman was hardly discouraged. Calling for vigorous
American leadership to halt the spread of "atheistic
Communism," he asked "when will the American Government, the
American public, the leaders in all phases of American life,
religious, educational, political, labor, industrial,
communications, yes, and entertainment, when will all free
men raise their voices as one and cry out against and work
against Satan inspired Communist crimes." This call from the
periphery to the core to take up the fight had immediate
results. The New York Times reported Protestant reaction in
the same page-one article on Spellman's speech. In
Washington the Rev, Dr. Frederick B. Harris, chaplain of the
Senate, told his Foundry Methodist Church congregation in
words seemingly lifted from The Christian Century that
Mindszenty's trial "was the signal for 'war to the hilt"
between Catholicism and Communism." In contrast to The
Century '
s
position, however, Harris said that "though he was
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a Protestant he felt he should 'speak out' against the
"so-called trial." m Boston the Rev. Dr. Daniel L. Poling,
President of the World Christian Endeavor Union,
"characterized the Mindszenty trial as 'a rape of justice'
and a 'super crime against freedom'." And, he continued
"this anti-God totalitarianism does not discriminate between
Catholic and Protestant." [8]
Mindszenty's gaunt figure at his public trial raised
the question of whether torture had been employed and his
"confession" coerced. The Hungarian Communist regime
produced letters Mindszenty wrote to American Ambassador
Arthur Schoenfeld in 1946. Mindszenty cited the
"responsibilities toward the nations of Europe" assumed by
the Allied Powers at the Yalta Conference. The Cardinal
declared that while "Hungary may appear to be a democratic
nation," in reality it "is not a true democracy." "There is
no room in the country for anything but a Marxist police
force, a Marxist press, and innumerable prisons and
concentration camps." The country was ruled by "Soviet
adherents" and would so remain "as long as the Soviet army
of occupation remains in Hungary." He appealed to "the
United States and England, the defenders of freedom and
justice the world over, to come to our aid. I ask them to
rescue us from the oppression and corruption overwhelming
our land." While Mindszenty's letters were probably aimed at
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securing a more active role by for Anglo-American
representatives on the Allied Control Commission for
Hungary, the language could be, and was, construed as
advocating war. The state prosecution so construed it,
declaring "Mindszenty and his cohorts led foreign nations to
believe that there was a widespread desire in Hungary to
abolish the Republic and restore the monarchy The
conspirators tried to incite the American imperialists to
declare war on our country. "[9]
Mindszenty's trial and subsequent life sentence
confirmed once again for the Catholic periphery the menace
of "atheistic Communism" and its attack on religion. It also
confirmed FDR's fear that religious persecution of Catholics
in Eastern Europe would prevent a permanent peace. Contrary
to most revisionist thinking on the development of the Cold
War, religious persecution rather than economics was the
paradigm driving confrontational public attitudes toward the
Soviet Union. And while the core -- mainstream American
Protestantism -- maintained a lingering ant i -Catol icism as
demonstrated by The Christian Century's reaction to the
arrest of Mindszenty, the Catholic periphery was limiting
its course of action. As if to underscore the nature of the
Catholic vs. Communist threat The Christian Century returned
to this theme on February 23 in an editorial condemning the
arrest of fifteen Protestant ministers in Bulgaria. Noting
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that the Protestant ministers in Bulgaria were charged with
the same crimes alleged against Bishop Ordass and Mindszenty
— treason, espionage and black market operations -- the
editorial declared, "When the Lutheran primate of Hungary
was sentenced to prison, the world's press showed little
interest. But now that a Roman Catholic cardinal has been
given a life sentence, anything that can be used to whip up
public indignation against Communist treatment of religion
becomes front page news." While admitting the charges
against the Protestant ministers were "incredible," the
editors went on to say: "We do not believe any such
supporting documentary evidence as was introduced in the
Mindszenty trial will be forthcoming." The Hungarian
prosecutors had made their case against Mindszenty as far as
The Century was concerned. "Some sort of official protest
from the United States government is now expected. What form
it will take, to whom it will be directed, or what it may be
hoped to accomplish no one seems to know." More importantly,
the editors noted, "No such protest against Bishop Ordass'
imprisonment is in prospect." [10]
More important, for our purposes, the trial and
conviction of Mindszenty, and the consequent publicity
surrounding these events, were thrust before the public
during the ongoing debate over United States participation
in NATO. Discussions involving U.S. participation in a
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collective security arrangement for Western Europe had begun
the previous September. Indeed, the Pope's Christmas
allocution can be seen as an endorsement of it's necessity.
In the very issue in which it once again criticized both the
press and government for their reaction to the Mindszenty
^""'^^ The Christian Century raised "new questions" regarding
the advisability of such a pact. The shifting emphasis in
Washington on whether or not the pact was in fact a
"military" agreement, criticism from the foreign minister of
Denmark that the United States was attempting "to force the
Scandinavian states into the alliance," and a call from
Trygve Lie not to let regional alliances undermine the
authority of the United Nations led The Century to conclude
that "a senate which ratified a military alliance under such
circumstances would convict itself of irresponsible levity
in its treatment of foreign affairs." [11]
Three weeks later The Century began to take a
different view of the religious show trials taking place in
Eastern Europe. The conviction and life sentences on the
leaders of the Bulgarian Methodist, Baptist, Congregational
and Pentecostal churches seemed to call for a reevaluation
of the trials in Hungary. The life sentences were "of
secondary importance," according to the editors, "The real
tragedy of the trials was laid bare to the world in the
sight of the succession of broken men mounting the stand to
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confess to misdeeds which few outside the iron curtain
believe they committed and to beg for punishment
commensurate to their self
-proclaimed wrongdoing." Catholic
claims that Mindszenty's confession had been extracted
through torture and drugs now seemed more credible given the
appearance of these "broken" Protestant pastors. [12]
While acknowledging the renewed attack on religion
behind the iron curtain. The Century continued to question
the need for a military alliance against Russia. Quoting
from a speech by John Foster Dulles opening the Cleveland
conference on churches and world order in which he said that
no responsible official "in this or any other government"
believed that Russia "now plans conquest by open military
aggression" and that the Soviet Union "does not contemplate
the use of war as an instrument of its national policy."
The Century concluded that only the administration's desire
to have the North Atlantic pact ratified prevented other
"such assurances" being made to the public. The security to
be achieved by the pact was being threatened by claims from
Communist Party leaders in western countries "that in case
of an 'imperialist* war, the Communists in those countries
would work for a Russian victory." With 1.1 million
Communist Party members in France, 2.3 million in Italy and
2.2 million in Germany the ability "to sabotage effectively
any military efforts by those countries" was enormous .[ 1 3
]
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The editors of The Century, however, were bucking the
trend, one which they seem to have perceived as being
largely led by the Catholic periphery as evidenced by their
earlier call to keep close watch on Catholics in positions
to influence policy decisions. Two polls conducted in 1948
demonstrated a dramatic shift in public opinion regarding
the idea of the U.S. defending Europe. When asked if the
"U.S. should promise to go to war to defend W. Europe if it
is attacked," 43 percent of Catholics and 40 percent of
Protestants responded yes. Interestingly, large numbers of
both, 46 percent of Catholics and 48 percent of Protestants,
answered no. By late November, when asked if the "U.S.
should join W. Europe in a permanent military alliance," 69
percent of Catholics and 70 percent of Protestants answered
yes. While the questions are not identical, it can be argued
that the second incorporates the first. It could also be
argued, and was, that a military alliance was a deterrent to
war. Nevertheless, the numbers of those willing to have the
U.S. actively involved in the defense of Western Europe
jumped dramatically. [14]
Secretary of State Acheson responded in early February
to criticism by some members of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee that the department "was leaving so much in the
dark about negotiations." Defending the treaty on March 19,
Acheson stressed the cultural connections and ties of the
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North Atlantic community as the product of "at least 350
years of history, maybe more." The United States was
"connected to western Europe by common institutions and
moral and ethical beliefs. Similarities of this kind are not
superficial, but fundamental. They are the strongest kind of
ties, because they are based on moral convictions, on
acceptance of the same values in life." The Secretary's
emphasis on "common institutions," "moral and ethical
beliefs," "moral convictions," and the "same values in life"
did not overtly state that these values were Christian. But
to a Senate inundated with resolutions, petitions,
proclamations and speeches condemning the arrest, trial and
conviction of Cardinal Mindszenty, and the continuing attack
on Christianity in general and Catholicism in particular in
Eastern Europe there could be little doubt that "atheistic
Communism" represented by the Soviet Union presented a
fundamental challenge to western civil ization .[ 15
]
In the midst of the debate over ratification of the
NATO treaty The Christian Century took up the plight of
Rumania's Greek Catholic or Uniat Church which had been
"wiped out by a decree of the Communist government." Noting
that the liquidation of the Greek Catholic Church affected a
population "appreciably greater than that of persons
belonging to the Congregational Christian Churches of the
United States," this was no small matter. The Century also
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noted that "the action was in conformity with the Kremlin's
policy toward the Uniat Church everywhere and was
undoubtedly adopted by the Rumanian government on orders
from Moscow." The forced inclusion of the Rumanian Uniat
Church into the Rumanian Eastern Orthodox Church was
accompanied by the arrest of some 430 Uniat priests, many of
whom were beaten in front of their families and "taken away
with blood-covered faces." The editors applauded their
courage in resisting the forced conversion. Although noting
and condemning the actions in Rumania, the editors of The
^^"^^^y were unaware of the "all-Slav" plan of Stalin to use
the Orthodox Churches of Eastern Europe as a bulwark against
Vatican influence. The pattern, however, had become clear
for all to see. The Kremlin had changed its early policy of
stamping out "all religions in the area under its control"
and had decided "to use the Orthodox Church as an instrument
of state power." [16]
While the Mindszenty case mobilized the Catholic
periphery in early 1949, another espionage trial closer to
home dominated public attention throughout the spring and
early summer. Once again Catholics would play an important,
perhaps a defining role. The trial involved Alger Hiss,
charged with perjury related to his activities as a State
Department official in the mid-1930s. As outlined earlier.
Hiss had come under investigation by the House UnAmerican
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Activities Coimnittee in 1948 when lapsed Catholic and former
Communist Whittaker Chambers accused him of being a member
of the Communist Party, in late 1948 Chambers expanded his
accusations against Hiss to include participation in a
Soviet spy ring. Chambers charged that Hiss passed
classified State Department documents through him on to
Russia. The charges against Hiss called into question once
again the entire nature of the postwar agreements which has
so dramatically broken down. Hiss served as Executive
Secretary at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference in 1944, served
as an advisor to FDR at the Yalta Conference and held an
important position at the conference establishing the United
Nations at San Francisco. Thus, the thread of Communist
intrigue could be seen woven throughout the entire postwar
policy which many saw as clearly a failure and clearly
designed to benefit the Soviet Union.
The HUAC investigation of Hiss was spearheaded by
Richard M. Nixon, a little known first-term congressman from
southern California. Nixon had come under the wing of
Congressman Charles Kersten of Wisconsin. According to
Nixon, Kersten "taught me most of what I know about
Communism." Kersten in turn introduced Nixon to Father John
Cronin, a labor priest in Baltimore who had been
instrumental in purging Communists from the dockside unions
in the early 1940s. Because of his activity with the
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Baltimore unions Cronin developed something of a reputation
as an expert on Communism, both within the church and with
the FBI. Archbishop Edward Mooney of Detroit asked Cronin to
prepare a secret report on Communism for distribution to
Catholic Bishops nationwide. The FBI also sought out
Cronin's advice on Communist activity in the labor movement,
and in turn FBI agents kept him informed of what they knew.
[17]
Nixon and Cronin were to develop a lasting friendship,
and Cronin provided the congressman a copy of his report to
the American Bishops entitled "The Problem of American
Communism." It included Alger Hiss among a list of "actual
and alleged Communists" who were implicated in atomic
espionage or working for the State Department. Thus, Nixon
was aware of allegations against Hiss over a year and a half
before the public naming of Hiss set off a national furor.
Later, Cronin revealed that FBI agent Ed Hummer was keeping
him informed of the bureau's investigation of Hiss. "Since
the Justice Department was sitting on the r esults . . . the car,
the typewriter, ect . . . . I told Dick, who then knew just where
to look for things and what he would find." [18]
Thus, as the NATO Treaty was making its way toward
ratification the attitude of the Catholic periphery was once
again dominating the public discussion of Communism.
Catholic reaction to persecution of the church in Eastern
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Europe could not help but be tied to the allegations of
espionage against Hiss. The church was not only defending
religious liberty in Europe but was intimately involved with
ferreting out the traitors at home who had left the European
church at the mercy of Communism. Whittaker Chambers, who
had seen the error of his ways and returned to the church,
believed he had a role to play in the divine plan. He was a
witness to the "struggle" which was taking place across the
world. And "the turn the struggle had taken made it clear
that what most of the world supposed it to be -- a struggle
between the force of two irreconcilable faiths — Communism
and Christianity..." was being played out in Europe for all
to see. The first perjury trial against Hiss ended in a
mistrial in early July when the jury deadlocked 8-4 for
conviction. Two weeks later, on July 21, the Senate voted to
ratify the NATO Treaty by a vote of 82 to 13. All nine
Catholic Senators present voted in favor of ratification,
including Senator McCarthy of Wisconsin. A tenth Catholic,
Senator Ellender of Louisiana, was not present for the vote
but was recorded as prepared to vote in favor. [19]
Against the background of the NATO debate still
another issue was emerging in which Catholic influence would
play a decisive role. As early as March of 1948 when the
House took up the first Economic Cooperation Act to
implement the Marshall Plan the question of what to do about
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Spain had been raised. Representative Alvin O'Konski,
Republican of Wisconsin and a Catholic, introduced an
amendment on the House floor making Spain one of the
participating nations. The House adopted the amendment by
almost a 3 to 1 vote, 149-52. The amendment was defeated in
a House-Senate conference on the bill, but the question of
what to do with overwhelmingly Catholic, but fascist. Franco
Spain would not go away. One historian has remarked:
"Undoubtedly, the sudden burst of support for Spain was due
in part to the pressures of an election year." Just as Spain
had been a political thorn for FDR during the civil war, it
would also be a political thorn for Truman. Virtually
simultaneous with the House vote Myron C. Taylor, first
FDR's and now Truman's personal representative to the
Vatican, met with Franco on March 30 to inform the
Generalissimo "by what means he could gain the acceptance of
the western governments." More importantly, at least from a
political perspective, "it was asserted by some that the
intention of the visit was to demonstrate to American
Catholics that the Truman Administration was in a
conciliatory mood toward Spain." [20]
In September of 1948 Senator Chan Gurney, Republican
of South Dakota and Chairman of the powerful Senate Armed
Services Committee, met privately for over an hour with
Franco in Madrid. After the meeting the Senator declared
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that he was in favor of "complete r eestabl ishment of all
relations between Spain and the United States." The official
administration policy toward Spain was articulated by
Secretary of State Acheson who pointed out that the U.S. had
never severed diplomatic relations with Spain but that we
honored the United Nations ban on ambassadors because it had
"become a symbol." Thus, U.S. policy toward Spain was more
symbolic than substantial. In spite of this, many Catholics
were doing their best to mitigate the image of Franco's
Spain. In March of 1949 the Jesuit weekly America argued
that any persecution occurring in Spain, particularly any
religious persecution, was not the result of Catholicism but
the internal dynamics of the Spanish State. "Spain is not
the Catholic Church" argued the editors of America
.
and
Spanish policy toward Protestants should be regarded as
specifically Spanish, not characteristically Catholic. Not
so said the editors of The Christian Century in rebuttal;
"This is the old excuse for the Inquisition: it was the
state that did it not the church." [21]
By May The Christian Century was asking the question
"What's Behind the Pro-Franco Agitation?" Citing a "new
outburst of agitation in Washington for some sort of
rapprochement with Franco Spain," The Century believed the
answer was to be found in the "consideration of the North
Atlantic Treaty." Fearing the possibility of Russian
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aggression in Europe, the Army did not want to repeat the
"invasion of 1944." In order to prevent this "Spain would
offer the one fairly secure base for the American forces,
beyond the reach of the Russians' first thrust, behind the
rampart of the Pyrenees." In spite of "all the disavowals
that will be made before the Senate votes, we expect that if
the North Atlantic alliance is ratified, it won't be long
before Franco's Spain will be in it." [22]
The answer to The Century's question of what (or who?)
was behind the pro-Franco agitation could perhaps be more
accurately found in the questioning of Secretary Acheson,
not before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings
on the NATO treaty, but before the Senate Appropriations
Committee. The Subcommittee on State Department
appropriations was chaired by Senator Pat McCarran, Democrat
of Nevada and a Catholic. McCarran opened the questioning of
Acheson with a specific threat to tie appropriations to
policy: "I should like to ask you why it is that this
country refuses to recognize Spain." Senator McKeller jumped
in to agree with McCarran "about our nonr ecognit ion of
Spain. Spain is a Christian nation and we have had friendly
relations with her.... I see no reason why we should not
have friendly relations with Spain." Acheson attempted to
evade the direct line of questioning by noting the U.S. was
"acting under this recommendation of the General Assembly"
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in not appointing an ambassador. McCarran jumped on the
response: "Are we to be enslaved to the U.N.? I never voted
with that in mind." Concluding his remarks, he declared,
"Let me say to you Mr. Secretary that so far as I am
personally concerned as chairman of this subcommittee I am
not in favor of your policy with reference to Spain and
until that policy is changed I am going to examine your
appropriations with a fine tooth comb." The Senator from
Nevada was not pulling any punches. [23]
Republican Senator Leverett Saltonstall, representing
heavily Catholic Massachusetts, attempted to come to
Acheson's aide by shifting the burden for our
"nonrecognition" policy to a question of security based on
the "attitude of other nations in Europe toward Spain and
our wanting to work along with them." Acheson denied that
there was a policy of nonrecognition and then admitted that
Spain was indeed important to U.S. security and "that is why
it is so important and why we have been doing our best to
bring about what I call a reintegration of Spain in the
west." This open admission that the Department of State was
working for the "reintegration" of Spain was apparently not
enough for McCarran who quickly brought up the issue of
whether or not NATO could be successful unless the Iberian
peninsula and Spain were included. Acheson in turn responded
267
that "the pact can be successful without it; it can be
stronger with it." [24]
Acheson was attempting a delicate balancing act. And
his efforts to reintegrate Spain into the western community
were beginning to achieve results. The Christian CPnt-nrv
noted in early June that "some curious things happened when
the U.N. voted on rescinding its 1946 anti-Franco
resolution. Explaining that "the United States does not want
to do anything that would be resented either by western
Europeans or by the Spaniards," the U.S. would abstain on
the vote. However, when the vote came, not only did the U.S.
abstain but also "the western Europe governments who were
said to be against Franco." In spite of the substantially
reduced majority needed as a result of the 16 abstentions,
the resolution failed. While criticizing the U.N. action.
Franco "hailed the 'realism' of his growing closeness with
the United States. The Christian Century did not quite know
what to make of "such a devious record." The Protestant
journal reported on rumors to the effect that only open
protests from Eleanor Roosevelt and John Foster Dulles had
prevented the U.S. from "casting an outright pro-Franco
vote," and that despite Acheson's public reservations,
"Franco believes he has good friends in Washington." The
fact that the major western European allies of the U.S.
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abstained on the vote clearly illustrates that Acheson's
policy of "reintegration" of Spain was making pr ogress
.[ 25
]
The Spanish in the meantime had retained the services
of Charles Patrick Clark to represent their interests in
Washington as a lobbyist and public relations specialist.
Clark was a Catholic and an honors graduate of Georgetown
University. He was well connected in Washington all the way
up to the oval office. Clark had served as an investigator
for the Truman Committee investigating the National Defense
Program during the war. In spite of Clark's close
relationship with his former boss, and increasing
congressional support to do something about Spain, Truman
remained adamant in his opposition to Franco. He personally
intervened to prevent inclusion of Spain under the Marshall
Plan in July, declaring that relations between the two
countries were "not friendly." [26]
By the Fall of 1949, however, the President was
willing to make informal gestures to Spain. Admiral Richard
Conolly, Commander of United States Naval Forces in the
Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, had repeatedly sought
permission to make courtesy calls on Spanish ports. Truman
finally authorized such an informal visit, and on September
3 U.S. warships entered the Spanish port of El Ferrol for a
five-day stay. This marked the first time since the Spanish
Civil War that American warships entered a Spanish port.
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Admiral Conolly, accompanied by four other admirals, an Army
Major General and an Air Force Brigadier General met with
Franco and "exchanged civilities and discussed problems of
mutual interest." When Conolly returned to Washington in
October, he reported to both the White House and the House
Armed Services Committee on his meeting with Franco. Before
the House Committee he made a strong argument for Spanish
naval bases, citing "the strategic importance of the Iberian
Peninsula." While Truman seemed pleased with the results of
the visit, his opposition to Franco did not wane. [27]
The American warships had hardly weighed anchor when a
virtual horde of congressional delegations, all headed by
Catholics, descended on Madrid. On September 14 Senator
McCarran departed for Spain, announcing that he intended to
discuss an American loan with Franco. Truman, whose
opposition to Franco may have stemmed in part from his
dislike for McCarran, immediately announced that McCarran
was traveling as a private citizen and "did not represent
anyone in the Administration." New York Democrat James J.
Murphy led a delegation of seven house members that met with
Franco shortly after McCarran. Murphy announced after the
meeting that he found Franco to be "a very, very, lovely and
lovable character." Another Catholic New York Democrat,
Eugene J. Keogh, was part of a five-member congressional
delegation arriving at the same time. On November 1 an
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important subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations
Committee headed by New Mexico's Catholic Senator Dennis
Chavez began a five-week tour of Europe which included
Spain. Chavez announced that Spain should receive both
economic and military assistance from the U.S. to "bulwark
Western Europe's security." On its return the committee
unanimously agreed that Spain should be given full
diplomatic recognition as well as economic aid. [28]
At the same time that Spain was being deluged by
congressional committees Charles Patrick Clark was also
visiting the country and conducting his own investigation
into the nature and status of religious persecution there.
Upon returning to the U.S., Clark prepared a report for
Truman "as requested" which relied heavily on the testimony
of Max H. Klein, President of the American Chamber of
Commerce in Spain. Klein, like Clark and so many others
involved in the attempt to reverse Spanish policy, was a
Catholic. Klein reported that "Protestantism is not a
problem in Spain." He confined himself to Barcelona where he
lived and stated, "I can be quite definite in saying that
the Protestant community is not persecuted and they are free
to worship according to their beliefs." He, and several of
his friends, had regularly attended Protestant services
"without the slightest difficulty." In conclusion, Klein
noted that Spaniards were great "individualists" and "apt to
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be very undisciplined." However, "there is just one issue
which they are practically all agreed and that is their
religion. Why should we attempt to destroy that unity?" [29]
Clark concluded his report to Truman by suggesting a
meeting at which he could convey "an expression of General
Franco's feeling regarding the religious situation, as well
as other matters," and "certain conclusions" of his own,
both of which he preferred to "give orally." While no such
meeting ever took place, Clark's report was circulated among
other influential sources, especially in Congress. In an
apparent attempt to stem the tide of public criticism
regarding Spanish policy several administration supporters
from the House Foreign Affairs Committee left for Spain in
early December. This group also included some prominent
Catholics, including Joseph L. Pfeifer, Democrat, N.Y.,
Thomas Gordon, Democrat, 111., and Clement Zablocki,
Democrat, Wisconsin. Pfeifer issued a statement to the
effect that the Spanish should not place too much weight on
statements of individual members of Congress as individuals
could not speak for the entire body. [30]
The issue of the "reintegration" of Spain would not be
completely resolved for several years. That story will be
taken up in later discussions of its impact on the
development of cold war ideology. Within the context of the
developing cold war atmosphere of 1949, however, it clearly
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demonstrates the ability of the Catholic periphery to
dominate the discussion of public policy, particularly
foreign affairs. The Mindszenty trial, the Hiss trial, the
unanimous Catholic support for ratification of NATO in the
Senate, and the increasing debate over the "reintegration"
of Spain all contributed to the underlying paradigm that
Christian civilization was at stake. Is it any wonder then,
that by mid-1950 the United States would be caught in the
grip of an hysterical anti-Communist crusade led by Catholic
Senator Joseph McCarthy and a hot war in Asia that would
refocus Catholic attention to the threat of "atheistic
Communism" in that quarter? The mindset first articulated by
Archbishop Cushing of Boston in 1947 that there was "a work
for Religion and Democracy" that could "be done only by
Catholics and by Catholics who are Americans" was becoming
dominant either publicly or behind the scene.
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CHAPTER 13
"THE ATTACK OF THE PRIMITIVES"
The final months of 1949 had seen the utter collapse
of Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist government in China. Chiang
fled to the island of Formosa leaving Mao Tse-tung and his
Communist armies in control of the mainland. The nation's
attention shifted instantly from the threat of Communist
expansion in Europe to actual Communist expansion in Asia.
On January 5, 1950, the British Government withdrew
its recognition of Chiang's government and on the 6th
officially extended recognition to Mao. The United States
refused to follow the British lead. On January 11, while Mao
was in Moscow negotiating the Sino-Soviet Treaty with
Stalin, Senator Taft charged on the Senate floor that the
State Department had "been guided by a left-wing group who
obviously have wanted to get rid of Chiang and were willing
at least to turn China over to the Communists for that
purpose." The administration was again under attack from a
variety of sources determined to find out "who lost China?"
It was in this atmosphere that Secretary of State Acheson on
January 12 delivered a speech to the National Press Club in
Washington entitled "Crisis in China -- an Examination of
United States Policy." The speech accurately reflected the
twin pillars of revolutionary nationalism sweeping Asia: the
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abject poverty of millions and the resentment of foreign
domination. [1]
However, the speech would soon become more important
for what it did not say than for what it did. In outlining
what Acheson described as the United States "defensive
perimeter" in the Pacific, he said that it "runs along the
Aleutians to Japan and then goes to the Ryukyus
. . .
.
[ and
]
from the Ryukyus to the Philippine Islands." The absence of
Korea from this defense perimeter passed unnoticed at the
time in the generally favorable response to the speech in
the nations 's press. In terms of "the military security of
other areas in the Pacific" Acheson declared "that no person
can guarantee these areas against military attack," but, in
event of such an attack, "the initial reliance must be on
the people attacked to resist it and then upon the
commitments of the entire civilized world under the Charter
of the United Nations...." The day after Acheson 's speech
Jacob A. Malik, the Soviet representative on the UN Security
Council, walked out in protest of the continued
representation on the Council by Chiang's Nationalist
government. [2]
At the time of his speech to the Press Club Acheson
was probably more concerned that Indochina, not Korea, could
be the site, if confrontation were to take place in an area
of the Pacific outside the "defensive perimeter" of the U.S.
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The Nationalist/Communist forces of Ho Chi Minh's Vietminh
had been engaged in open guerrilla warfare with the French
colonial forces since 1946. As Chiang's army collapsed in
1949 and Mao's forces moved to the south Acheson speculated
it "raised the ominous possibility of Chinese Communist
collaboration with the Vietminh." In addition "From late
1949 on, French officials issued increasingly urgent
warnings that without direct American military aid they
might be compelled to withdraw from Indochina." It must be
kept in mind that France, predominately Catholic France, was
the centerpiece of American postwar policy for Europe. The
need to restore France to its prewar position of power and
prestige was a central theme of State Department position
papers prepared for both the Yalta and Potsdam conferences.
The thrust of the argument was that the U.S. should "treat
France in all respects on the basis of her potential power
and influence rather than on the basis of her present
strength." By late 1945 this policy had crystallized even
further. John D. Hickerson, Deputy Director of the State
Department's Office of European Affairs, stated in a memo to
the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee "it is the policy
of the United States Government to assist in the
r eestabl ishment of a strong France in order that the country
may serve as a bulwark of democracy on the continent of
Europe . . . . " [ 3
]
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That American Catholics were concerned about events in
postwar France, just as they were in postwar Poland, Italy,
and Hungary, is demonstrated by a letter "sent to all French
pastors" on July 30, 1948 by Archbishop Gushing of Boston.
Gushing notified his French pastors that "the Bishop of
Lucon, France, has asked me to grant permission to his
representative, Ganon Louis Ratier, to seek alms among our
French speaking people in behalf of the church schools in
his diocese." France, as well as Hungary, was a focal point
for the preservation of Gatholic schools. Stressing the
international nature of the appeal. Gushing went on to state
that "Archbishop Roy of Quebec has granted a like permission
and I am anxious to cooperate to the fullest extent
possible." Gushing's letter was to serve as an introduction
of Father Ratier to the French pastors and "to express my
hope that you will allow him to speak to your people or to
solicit contributions from them or from organizations within
your jurisdiction." [4]
But Gatholic schools in France was not the only thing
on Gushing's agenda. If reviving the French economy and
gaining public support for such action was high on the
administration's agenda. Gushing was willing to do his part.
Hard on the heels of his appeal to the French pastors of the
Archdiocese Gushing led 600 American Catholics on a
pilgrimage to the shrines of Paris and Lourdes . The
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publicity surrounding the pilgrimage left no doubt in the
public's mind about the intimate connection between the
French and American church. But coming as it did amidst the
ongoing debate surrounding funding for the Marshall Plan,
the Berlin blockade and the beginning of the presidential
election campaign, it also reinforced the need for American
assistance to Europe. The political and economic nature of
the trip was highlighted in Paris on August 21 when both
Gushing and Auxiliary Bishop John J, Wright were made
officers in the French Legion of Honor by none other than
Foreign Minister Robert Schuman
. Cushing's smiling
countenance receiving the award from Schuman dominated the
front page of the Boston Globe on August 22. Upon receiving
his honor. Bishop Wright proclaimed "Vive la France!" [5]
In his remarks Schuman, whom the Globe described as
"...the greatest foe of Communism in France," and "credited
with the major role in defeating the Communists in the last
election here," described Gushing as "a man of great
character, a great leader in the spiritual field, and a
powerful foe of materialism." Gushing was no less laudatory
with his remarks, proclaiming he was particularly honored
that the award was presented to him by Schuman "whose
character and accomplishments we in America well know and
greatly admire." Gushing told the assembled guests: "You are
preoccupied with the staggering economic problems of
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France," and that while the principal purpose of the
pilgrimage was spiritual "...it involves transportation and
purchasing expenditures of every kind. And we were not
unmindful in planning this pilgrimage that a venture of this
kind brings economic aid to France and the other lands we
visit." Noting that "the political and economic problems of
the past war have not yet been solved on higher levels of
diplomacy and international relations," he continued, "I
submit the chief objective of all governmental action in our
day should be the facilitation of international friendship
and knowledge on the popular level." To that end of
friendship and knowledge both Schuman and Gushing reminded
the audience, and American readers, that the first Bishop of
Boston was Jean Louis Lefebre de Cheverus who was ordained
in Paris in 1790 and escaped the guillotine during the
French Revolution by fleeing to America as a missionary to
Indians and French Catholic pioneers in Maine (which was
then part of Massachusetts). Cheverus High School in Jamaica
Plain was named in his honor. So the French connection to
Boston and to the American church was underscored at
precisely the moment it was most needed for political
purposes
.
[ 5
]
As historian George C. Herring has noted, "In the
dramatically altered strategic context of 1950, support for
France in Indochina was considered essential for the
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security of Western Europe." State Department policy makers
were already concluding that to maintain France as "the
bulwark of democracy" in Europe it would be necessary to
relieve the drain on French resources represented by the
ongoing conflict in Indochina. In the midst of this ongoing
policy debate concerning the extension of the containment
policy to Southeast Asia two more events occurred in late
January that would tip the scales in favor of U.S. action.
On January 25 a New York jury convicted Alger Hiss of
perjury in connection with his testimony that he was not
involved with passing State Department documents to the
Soviet Union during the 1930s. We have already examined the
involvement of the Catholic periphery in the Hiss case. His
conviction now added further credence to the charges that
the "loss of China" was the result of Communist manipulation
within the State Department. On January 30 the Soviet Union
recognized the Vietminh Government of Ho Chi Minh as the
legitimate government of Vietnam. Acheson immediately
proclaimed the Soviet recognition cast Ho in his "true
colors as the mortal enemy of native independence in
Indochina." The Secretary of State, who only weeks before
had spoken so intelligently about the need to recognize
Asian nationalism and the hatred of foreign domination, now
interpreted events as a "significant and ominous" sign of
Stalin's intentions to "accelerate the revolutionary
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process." Why the Vietnamese would be willing to exchange a
French master for a Russian master he did not say. [7]
But perhaps the most significant event to occur in
January of 1950 amidst all the public furor was a quiet
private dinner at a Washington D.C. restaurant. Senator
Joseph R. McCarthy was a relatively inconspicuous but brash
first-term Senator from Wisconsin. He had been elected in
the 1946 Republican sweep after defeating long-time Senate
stalwart Robert LaFollette Jr. in the Republican primary.
McCarthy was looking toward the 1952 elections and seeking
an issue around which he could build a reelection campaign.
Joining McCarthy for dinner that evening were Charles Kraus,
William A. Roberts (attorney for syndicated columnist Drew
Pearson) and Father Edmund A. Walsh, founder and dean of
Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service. As we
have seen earlier Walsh was in Russia at the time of the
Bolshevik Revolution and headed the Vatican relief effort
there in conjunction with Herbert Hoover's relief efforts.
He also played an important role in the Catholic effort to
prevent U.S. recognition of the Soviet Union in 1933. His
anti-Communist credentials within the Church were
impeccable
.
After dinner the conversation turned to the search for
an issue. Roberts proposed the St. Lawrence Seaway, but
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McCarthy rejected that proposal as not having "enough sex."
He then proposed his own project, a Townsendesque pension
plan under which everyone over 65 would receive $100 a
month. All three of his companions rejected this plan as
fiscally unsound. Walsh then asked, "How about Communism as
an issue?" McCarthy jumped at the suggestion, declaring "the
government is full of Communists," and "the thing to do is
hammer at them." At least one of his dinner companions,
Roberts, warned McCarthy any such effort would have to be
soundly grounded in facts and not unfounded charges. Writing
about the incident later. Jack Anderson and Ronald May
concluded: "His three fellow Catholics went away with the
feeling that the sincere McCarthy would do his country a
service by speaking out against the Communist fifth column."
[8]
There has been considerable controversy surrounding
the dinner at the Colony. Scholars generally agree that the
meeting did in fact take place, although Father Walsh later
denied having suggested anything to McCarthy and charged
that Drew Pearson, who originally broke the story in his
column in March, had "manufactured" the incident. Walsh went
so far as to offer a $1,000 contribution to Pearson's
favorite charity if the columnist could satisfactorily prove
his contentions. Still, one of the participants was
Pearson's attorney and could have served as a source for the
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information. The real issue seems to have been whether or
not the story was embellished in subsequent telling. It
would certainly not be surprising for four Catholics
discussing politics in early 1950 to zero in on Communism.
But McCarthy's simplistic reaction, as if the idea of
Communists in government had never before crossed his mind,
is certainly not in keeping with the facts. The Senator had
in fact charged his Democratic opponent in the 1946
Senatorial race with being "Communist icly inclined." He
sponsored an amendment to the Taft-Hartley Act allowing
employers to dismiss employees who had previously been
members of the Communist Party or who had Communist
"sympathies." And he had taken an active interest in the
hearings of the House UnAmerican Activities Committee. In
fact McCarthy had been engaged in an ongoing battle with the
Madison Capital Times since November of 1949 on his charges
that the newspaper was "the Red mouthpiece for the Communist
party in Wisconsin." So the Communist issue was nothing new
to McCarthy, and his earlier activities may have been the
source of Roberts' concern that future charges McCarthy
might make be well grounded. [9]
The conviction of Alger Hiss in late January was
followed by the equally startling disclosure that the
British government on February 3 arrested physicist Klaus
Fuchs on charges of atomic espionage. Fuchs had worked on
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the Manhattan project at Los Alamos. His arrest and
subsequent confession resulted in the later arrest in the
United States of Harry Gold, David Greenglass, Martin Sobel
and Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, all later convicted of
conspiracy to commit espionage. It was within this virtual
firestorm of interest surrounding Communist activity at home
and abroad -- the "loss of China"; Acheson's attempt to
define the Pacific defense perimeter; the conviction of
Alger Hiss; Stalin's recognition of Ho Chi Minh's Communist
dominated Vietminh as the government of Vietnam; the arrest
and confession of Klaus Fuchs for atomic espionage — that
McCarthy delivered his speech to the Republican Women's Club
of Wheeling, West Virginia on February 9, 1950.
According to press reports, McCarthy declared he held
in his hand a "list of 205 — a list of names that were made
known to the Secretary of State as being members of the
Communist Party and who nevertheless are still working and
shaping policy in the State Department." Amidst all the
daily news reports of spies, espionage, and Communist
advances abroad American Catholics certainly needed no
further reminders of the consequences of Communist success.
Nevertheless they got one. The same week McCarthy delivered
his speech at Wheeling the film "Guilty of Treason" opened
in theaters around the country. The film, based on the trial
of Cardinal Mindszenty, was scheduled to open on the first
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anniversary of the trial. On February 2 a circular was sent
to all parishes in the diocese of Boston with instructions
that "the following announcement be read from all pulpits in
the Archdiocese at the Masses on Sunday, February 5." The
announcement stated that February 8 was the anniversary "of
the imprisonment by the puppet regime in Hungary of the
heroic Cardinal Mindszenty" and that "the film produced in
Hollywood to dramatize the story of the Cardinal will open
in several Boston theaters this coming week." It continued:
"Catholics and all interested in religious freedom are
called upon to ask their local theaters when and where the
picture will be shown," and it was "earnestly hoped that
large crowds of people will attend performances of this
important film." The Mindszenty trial was again being
thrust before public attention at the very moment McCarthy
was leveling his charges against the State Department. [10]
The Senator from Wisconsin was at the right place at
the right time. The initial press reports of his speech in
Wheeling were sparse; the New York Times did not even carry
the Associated Press wire service dispatch. However, when
McCarthy arrived in Salt Lake City, he was surrounded by
reporters wanting more information about his list. He now
changed his story to claim there were 205 "bad risks" in the
State Department, but of these there were fifty-seven "card
carrying communists." The Senator was now national news, but
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he had already begun to fudge on the accuracy and fact
demanded by his dinner companions a month earlier. McCarthy
in fact had no list at all in Wheeling. What he held in his
hand was a letter from former Secretary of State James
Byrnes written in July of 1946 detailing the results of an
investigation of some 3,000 federal employees transferred to
the State Department from other wartime agencies. The
investigation resulted in the recommendation against the
permanent employment of 285 of these employees as potential
"loyalty risks." Of these, 79 had already been terminated,
leaving 205 still employed. The entire matter became
increasingly muddled as the criteria for dismissal was
changed from loyalty risk to security risk and ultimately
choked off when President- Truman in March of 1948 issued an
executive order withholding all loyalty and security
information in all federal agencies from members of
Congress. [11]
As William F. Buckley and Brent Bozell correctly point
out in their defense of McCarthy this charge of fifty-seven
card-carrying Communists in the State Department was a
classic case of the Senator's penchant for overstatement. It
permitted his critics to constantly raise the question of
"Where are their cards?" when in fact by 1950 there were no
card-carrying communists in the United States at all. The
Party had recalled all membership cards years earlier. This
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was the type of overstatement and lack of factual
underpinning that would quickly lead to Father Walsh
breaking with McCarthy over his methods. Nevertheless a
Catholic Senator had suddenly been thrust to the forefront
of America's anti-communist crusade. Notwithstanding the
tremendous notoriety and popularity he would achieve over
the next several years, McCarthy was never a player in the
Senate. He had no real program other than the advancement of
Joseph Raymond McCarthy. William V. Shannon uses the
dictionary definition of a rogue elephant to describe
McCarthy: "A vicious elephant which separates from the herd
and roams alone; hence any large animal with habits like
those of a rogue elephant -- sometimes used attributively of
persons." [12]
Indeed Shannon's description of McCarthy seems
appropriate. He was a lightweight in the Senate, not well
regarded and given to breaking the rules and traditions of
decorum. Nevertheless, he became the lightning rod around
which the pent-up sense of frustration many Americans felt
toward dealing with the Soviet Union and the seemingly
endless series of Communist advances and affronts. McCarthy
himself seemed taken aback by the almost instantaneous
celebrity status attached to him by nature of his charges.
Confronted by reporters in his Washington office, McCarthy
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was asked for the names on his list by correspondent John
Dear .
"Look you guys," Joe said, "that was just a political
speech to a bunch of Republicans. Don't take it seriously."
"Don't you have any names?" Dear asked.
"Oh, one was a college professor," Joe replied,
"Where?" Dear asked.
"A professor of astronomy," Joe said. "Another was a
professor of anthropology, a woman. But it was just a
political talk."
The subsequent article failed to note McCarthy's attitude or
the reporters' questioning; "Newsmen at the time were
trained to report only what happened in public." [13]
McCarthy's attitude is critical to an understanding of
what followed. It was indeed political. The nature of what
was happening at home and abroad dictated a Republican
attack on the Democratic administration. That McCarthy was
an Irish Catholic with close ties to powerful Irish Catholic
Democrats such as Joseph Kennedy only made matters worse.
The political dynamics that FDR had foreseen and that Truman
had forestalled in 1948 seemed about to break. Truman had
barely been sworn in for his second term when Republican
critics began attacking administration policy toward China.
Much of this criticism centered around possible subversive
activity within the State Department. Once again the genesis
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of this criticism was Catholic. Patrick J. Hurley,
Ambassador to China appointed by FDR had given up his
efforts to reconcile the Nationalists of Chiang and the
Communists of Mao claiming subversive State Department
personnel were undermining his work. The Republican effort
at bipartisanship in foreign policy had proven disastrous
and was now abandoned. In fact bipartisanship now seemed to
be working against the administration. Pat McCarran of
Nevada introduced a bill in February of 1949 to increase
assistance to the Nationalists and twenty-four Democrats
joined him. The China Lobby was in full throat by the time
McCarthy gave his speech in Wheeling, and the lecture
circuit was crowded with Catholics: McCarran,, Henry Luce
[whose wife Claire Booth Luce converted to Catholicism and
played a key role in influencing him]. Hurley and the
Catholic Archbishop of Nanking, the Reverend Paul Yu-Pin.
[14]
McCarthy, and the "ism" attached to his name, have
been examined from a wide variety of perspectives by
historians and political scientists. Much of this analysis
disregards the political nature of McCarthyism or, when it
does attribute political themes to the movement,
misinterprets the underlying politics. Richard M. Freeland
argues that McCarthyism was spawned as the result of the
failed efforts of the Truman administration to implement
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what he terms "multilateral" economic policies for postwar
Europe. He argues that Truman deliberately introduced
anti-Communism, both domestic ad international, as the only
available wedge to secure passage of the European Recovery
Plan. The need for that in turn was dominated by the need to
keep American exports at a sufficiently high level to
prevent domestic recession. Domestic politics, for Freeland,
involved traditional Republican opposition to lowering
tariff barriers. Once again we see William Appleman
Williams' Open Door diplomacy at the heart of the cold war.
In this instance, however, Freeland argues that while the
administration was successful in pursuing "multilateral"
economic policies among the Western European nations, it
failed to achieve the same objectives at home due to a
coalition of Republican and Southern conservative
opposition. Freeland almost puts his finger on the real
political underpinning in analyzing the 1948 election when
he states that "an essential element in the President's
victory was the unusually solid support he received from
urban Catholic voters who admired his ant i -communism. " He
dismisses this impact, however, by stating that "Truman's
escape from political damage on this issue during 1948 did
not represent the main current of American politics, for it
resulted from circumstances that ceased to exist almost
immediately after the election." As we have seen, this is
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simply not so. Catholic anxieties increased dramatically
after 1948 with the Mindszenty trial and the whole spectrum
of events unfolding in 1949 and early 1950. If the Catholic
periphery did not constitute "the main current of American
politics," they were certainly dominating the public
discussion and beginning to limit the policy options as
demonstrated by the discussions on Spain. [15]
Seymour Martin Lipset takes a different approach to
the conservative trend in postwar American politics. He
argues that the period of "liberal supremacy" which marked
the decade of the thirties also marked a period of "great
growth in the influence of the Communist Party." This period
of influence was characterized by "penetrating and
manipulating liberal and moderate left groups, rather than
building an electoral party. The Communists, by concealing
their real objectives, by acting positively for liberal
causes, by being the best organizers of the left, were able
to penetrate deeply into various liberal organizations and
into the labor movement." Postwar prosperity once more
restored the "legitimacy" of the free enterprise system and
at the same time created status anxiety among many groups
that had been borne upward by the New Deal and a resurgent
economy, especially Catholics. According to Lipset: "As a
Catholic, McCarthy was able to embody the traditional
Anti-Communism and the growing conservatism of that
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population, without the disability of Father Coughlin's
collar." The implication seems clear: McCarthy could
represent the periphery to the traditional populist,
isolationist, and agrarian sentiment of the Midwest and
South without arousing the anti-Catholicism that an active
member of the Catholic clergy could not overcome
.[ 16
]
Lipset and other historians in the status
anxiety school of thought see an anti-elitist,
anti-intellectual and anti-eastern trend in support for
McCarthy. Lipset does look closely at the religious nature
of support for McCarthy citing polls which indicated that
"Irish and Italian Catholics were among the most
pro-McCarthy groups." A Roper poll indicated that Germans,
both Catholic and Protestant, "were disproportionately in
favor of McCarthy." He goes on to cite Michael Rogin's study
of McCarthy and his political impact. "It is a mistake to
see McCarthyite support as rooted in the status-stricken or
among the midwestern agrarian popul ists , "Rogin contends. He
finds "that it is to be seen more simply as a conservative
Republican movement feeding on these prevalent anxieties
about Communism and the Cold War." These anxieties, we have
already seen, were in large measure religiously motivated
and represented exactly the political threat to the
Democratic Party that FDR had foreseen as early as 1942 when
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he sent Myron Taylor to the Vatican to discuss the prospect
of Soviet domination of largely Catholic Eastern Europe. [17]
Lipset, however, finally errs in concluding that
McCarthy had no lasting political impact. "McCarthy ism, " he
states, "cannot be measured on an electoral basis. It was
never a political movement; it was a political tendency,
unorganized, activating certain impulses in a sympathetic
audience...." Of course McCarthyism was a political
movement, and movement is the operative word. The very thing
FDR feared most was the movement of traditionally Catholic
Democratic voters into the Republican ranks over the issue
of Communism. As we have seen, this is precisely what Truman
headed off with his strong ant i -Commmunist stand in 1948.
Now, in early 1950, with Catholics more upset than ever over
events in Hungary and in China and over seemingly clearcut
signs of espionage and subversion within the highest ranks
of government, the potential political impact was enormous.
[18]
McCarthyism was indeed rooted in the decade of the
1930s, not in a direct link from Father Coughlin and his
populist rhetoric but rather in the campaign conducted by
the Jesuits discussed earlier (see chapter four). Could
McCarthy have attended (Jesuit) Marquette University from
1930 through 1934 without having become at least familiar
with Catholic teaching on Communism? Possibly. His academic
295
record was not distinguished, although he was considered
bright and hard working. But his Senate career as an
anti-Communist seems clearly rooted in Catholic doctrine
that emerged during the 1930s. Thus when Joseph R. McCarthy
stood on the Senate floor and spoke of "a conspiracy on a
scale so immense as to dwarf any previous such venture in
the history of man," he was speaking in terms that virtually
every Catholic in the country was familiar with. [19]
As Robert Frank points out it was this emphasis on the
spiritual origins of Communism and its deceptive propaganda
techniques during the Thirties which "helps to explain why
Catholics perceived a threat of enormous magnitude while
their neighbors saw no threat at al 1
.
( emphas is added)" By
1950, however, the Catholic periphery's position had come to
dominate the discussion. There is no better example of this
than the 1947 publication of the Attorney General's list of
subversive organizations. There is little doubt that the
Truman administration "always referred to the ability of the
communists to appeal to broad segments of the population
through apparently patriotic appeals or organizations that
concealed their relationship to the communist movement." The
President himself had expressed concern about "reds, phonies
and parlor pinks." The leading spokesman within the
administration for exposing Communist front organizations,
however, was FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover. Hoover was a
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close friend of Cardinal Spellman of New York, and as early
as 1946 Spellman had agreed to cooperate with FBI agents to
help "ferret out and eliminate the Communists and fellow
travelers who are in positions of control in labor unions."
The FBI informed Spellman they planned to publish a monthly
magazine "to alert the business community to the dangers of
Communism." [20]
By late 1946 and early 1947 Hoover was speaking and
writing about these dangers with such impact that Attorney
General Clark reversed a long-standing policy of the Justice
Department against the FBI Director testifying publicly
before HUAC. According to Richard Freeland, "both Clark and
Hoover endorsed the principle of publicizing communist
activities as a potent means of combating them." Hoover, of
course, brought to the debate the Catholic belief that
exposing these groups as "dupes" and "fellow travelers" of
the Communists was the best way of eliminating their
effectiveness to disseminate "deceitful propaganda." [21]
Both McCarthy's rhetoric and tactics fall well within
the guidelines established by the Jesuit campaign of the
Thirties and expanded on by the Catholic hierarchy in the
postwar era. Speaking on the Senate floor shortly after his
Wheeling speech, McCarthy framed the struggle in rhetoric
reminiscent of Del Vayo ' s argument of 1947: "Today we are
engaged in a final, all-out battle between Communistic
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atheism and Christianity. The modern champions of Communism
have selected this as the time.... The war is on..." The
Senate wasted no time in establishing a subcommittee of the
Foreign Relations Committee to investigate McCarthy's
charges. The committee was intent on having McCarthy name
names, and he did. It is instructive to examine the cases of
the individuals named by McCarthy before the Tyding's
Committee, not from the perspective of guilt or innocence,
but rather from the perspective of how McCarthy's
allegations conformed to Catholic perceptions of threats to
America and whether or not that perception was coming to
dominate the Protestant core within the context of domestic
politics. [22]
McCarthy named three individuals who basically fell
within the category of "dupes" or "fellow travelers." These
persons had joined or been affiliated with a variety of
liberal organizations during the thirties which now appeared
on the Attorney General's list of subversive organizations.
Many of these organizations, as noted earlier, had been
infiltrated and taken over by Communists during the Popular
Front period. McCarthy named Dorothy Kenyon, Frederick
Schuman and Harlow Shapley before the Tydings Committee. He
cited Kenyon as belonging to 28 Communist front-
organizations, Schuman with 12 and Shapley with 21. None of
the three were formally employed by the State Department,
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but Kenyon, a lawyer and activist for women's issues, was an
American delegate to the United Nations Commission on the
Status of Women. Similiarly, Schuman and Shapley, both
academics, had both served as either lecturers or
consultants on State Department pro jects
.
[ 23
]
The Tydings Committee found that Kenyon's numerous
affiliations were only "sufficient to suggest a high degree
of naivete and perhaps gullibility." According to Catholic
doctrine, "naivete" and "gullibility" were exactly the
point. Liberals were susceptible to the deceptive propaganda
of the Communists and ultimately were duped into supporting
Communist objectives at the expense of legitimate social
reform. Schuman and Shapley fell into the category of
"fellow travelers" rather than "dupes." In fact, William F.
Buckley and Brent Bozell, writing in defense of McCarthy,
claimed that if the two professors were not "fellow
travelers," then "no one can legitimately be called a fellow
traveler." Both men had written approvingly of the Soviet
Union, with Schuman at one point declaring: "The Russian
adventure marks a long forward stride toward human mastery
of man's fate...." Human mastery of man's fate, of course,
was exactly the type of Anti-God sentiment which made
Communism anathema to Catholics. "In Catholic teaching,"
according to Frank, all human freedom, all individual rights
are grounded in a transcendent order that Communism would
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abolish... Human mastery of man.s fate made man responsible
for those rights and freedoms which came only from God. [24]
The second group of individuals named by McCarthy
before the Tydings Committee remain well within the
framework established by Catholic doctrine but take on a
more sinister character than those already mentioned.
Haldore Hanson, Philip Jessup, John Stewart Service, Gustavo
Duran and Owen Lattimore were all accused of being active
participants in a Communist plot to undermine American
foreign policy rather than simply being '.dupes', or "fellow
travelers... Hanson, Service, Jessup and Lattimore were
associated with the perceived failure of American policy in
China. Interestingly, it is through the use of deceptive
propaganda rather than espionage that the group was supposed
to have worked most effectively: Hanson through his book
Human Endeavor which according to McCarthy outlined his
"pro-Communist answer to the problems of Asia;" Jessup for
his role with the Institute of Pacific Relations and its
magazine Far Eas tern Survey - Service for passing classified
information to Ameras ia magazine, another publication of the
Institute of Pacific Relations and Owen Lattimore whom
McCarthy called "one of the principal architects of our Far
Eastern policy." [25]
The charge that this group was actively working to
undermine American policy in China went far beyond the
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accusations made against Kenyon, Schuman and Shapley which
basically consisted of their membership in various Communist
front groups. Adding to the drama was the testimony of
McCarthy's fellow Catholic, the former Communist and editor
of the Daily Worker
,
Louis Budenz. Budenz connected Hanson,
Jessup and Lattimore to Communist Party activities either as
party members or instruments through whom other party
members carried out their directives. Jessup, for instance
was described by Budenz as a pawn of party member Frederick
Vanderbilt Field and that a series of articles appearing in
Survey while Jessup was in charge were "planned and planted
by the American Communist hierarchy to keynote the switch in
the international party line on China." Budenz' testimony on
Lattimore was equally damaging. He claimed to have told
Communist Party chief Earl Browder in 1937 that Lattimore
should take over "the general direction of the move to
depict the Chinese Communists as 'agrarian reformers.'" In
addition, as late as 1943, he had heard Frederick Vanderbilt
Field report that "Lattimore had been instructed of a change
in the party-line on Chiang Kai-shek." [26]
Budenz further testified that he had been instructed
by Jack Stachel, who would replace Browder as head of the
American Communist Party, to "consider Lattimore a
Communist." His testimony did little to sway the Tydings
Committee but was given a far warmer reception by the
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McCarran Committee. Lattimore seems to have served as
something of a lightening rod for Catholic criticism. As
early as January of 1949, long before McCarthy decided to
make Lattimore "the top Russian espionage agent in this
country," Congressman John F. Kennedy of Massachusetts
attacked the policies of the "Lattimores and the [Harvard
University scholar and China expert John King] Fairbanks."
Later, in September 1949, Reverend James K. Kearney attacked
Lattimore in an article published in Columbia M;.q ;.-.in», the
official organ of the Knights of Columbus. [27]
In virtually every case outlined above McCarthy's
allegations followed Catholic doctrine established in the
1930s dealing with "liberals" being duped and manipulated to
advance the cause of Communism. Buckley and Bozell in
defending him argued from much the same position. In
essence, they argued that only the China group had stepped
beyond the role of dupes to being active and knowing
participants in a scheme to advance the interests of
Communism. They in turn used the techniques of deceptive
propaganda in magazine articles and other intellectual
pursuits to "dupe" liberals into following the latest party
line. As Robert Frank points out: "It is more than an
accident that the Senator from Wisconsin was a Catholic who
attended the Jesuit Marquette University during the 'Red
Decade I t is more than an accident that the priest in
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the Colony restaurant in early 1950 who suggested McCarthy
use communism as a reelection issue was Father Edmund
Walsh, the Jesuit who directed the opening Catholic campaign
against the 'red scourge' in America." [28]
Interestingly, the one major attempt to examine the
connection between McCarthy and Catholicism was also
conducted by a Jesuit scholar. Donald F. Crosby in God.
Church, and Flag: Senator J oseph R. McCarthy ;=>nri i-h»
catholic Church 1950-19^7 argues that the phenomenon known
as McCarthyism was little more than the Catholic version of
the broader American "ant i
-Communist impulse." This is
essentially the same argument as Robert Griffith who used
the term "ant i
-Communist persuasion" in describing the
impact of McCarthy during the second red scare. While Crosby
examines Catholic anti-Communist activity surrounding events
in Eastern Europe in the immediate postwar years, he does
not see it as a driving force in either domestic or
international policy development. More recent scholarship
such as Frank's, however, points to a direct connection
between the Jesuit led anti-Communist campaign of the
thirties, which Crosby does not mention, and the more
sweeping ant i -Communism of the late forties and early
fifties. Crosby concludes, "One has to question whether
Catholics were vastly more concerned over the threat of
Communism to their religion than the rest of the
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populace.... In sum, though the Catholic population felt a
deep concern over the problem of communism, so did the rest
of America, and if the Catholic anxiety was the greater, it
was not overwhelmingly so." That's exactly the point Frank
makes in his article, if there was no longer a gap between
Catholic anti-Communism and American ant i
-Communism overall,
then something dramatic had occurred since the decade of the
Thirties when "Catholics perceived a threat of enormous
magnitude while their neighbors saw no threat at all." [29]
The evidence seems clear that what had happened was
the ability of the Catholic periphery to dominate the public
discussion of events in Eastern Europe through a combination
of the Church hierarchy, influential Catholic laymen, and
Catholic politicians in forming what was essentially a
Catholic Lobby. These groups interacted on a regular basis
and shared the Catholic perception that Communism posed the
greatest threat to the church. Christian Civilization, and
to America. They in turn interacted and supported Catholic
leaders such as Schumann in France, di Gaspari in Italy,
Adenhauer in West Germany, and Franco in Spain to form an
effective international coalition against international
Communism. In terms of the American elements of this group
McCarthy was relatively insignificant, although he garnered
support from the more important figures such as Spellman,
Gushing, Joseph Kennedy and others at various times. His
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major contribution was extending and expanding the
atmosphere of anti-Communism within the context of Catholic
doctrine that "liberalism" either unwittingly or in some
instances knowingly advanced the cause of Communism.
However, it is by no means clear that this would not have
happened even if McCarthy had never been elected to the
Senate — and this Crosby does not address. As Pittman has
pointed out, the term "McCarranism" briefly vied with
"McCarthyism" for public attention. In the absence of Joe
McCarthy, Pat McCarran would have had center stage. And Pat
McCarran was a power to be reckoned with in the U.S. Senate
McCarran had not given up on his efforts to change
U.S. policy toward Spain. The Administration's Spanish
policy was again under attack in both the House and Senate.
In late April, in the midst of the Tydings Committee
hearings, McCarran introduced an amendment to the Economic
Cooperation Act which would authorize a $50 million loan to
Spain. He was able to get 35 fellow Senators to cosponsor
the amendment. For the first time real money was being
discussed. Perhaps not by coincidence the previous month
Rep. Owen Brewster led off the attack in the House against
the administration's Spanish policy by again citing Max
Klein on the religious issue. According to Lowe, "by this
time, Mr. Klein's name, as an authority on Protestantism in
Spain, had become almost a household word." Four days after
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Brewster's speech, on March 14, McCarthy named Gustavo Duran
as one of his public cases before the Tydings Committee.
Duran was employed by the State Department from 1943-1946.
His name had first come up before the Senate Appropriations
Committee in 1946 when Secretary Byrnes denied the Duran
being looked at by the committee was the same Duran employed
by the Department. When it finally became clear that it was
the same person, the Department did nothing. Duran
eventually resigned and moved on to a position with the
United Nations. The charges against Duran stemmed from U.S.
military intelligence reports that he was a member of the
Spanish Communist Party and possibly the Russian Secret
Police. He had fought on the Republican side during the
Spanish Civil War and headed their military intelligence
service for three weeks. [30]
The confluence between McCarran's ongoing attempt to
achieve a reversal of U.S. policy toward Spain and
McCarthy's effort to resurrect Duran as an example of the
State Department's failure to police itself against security
risks may have been purely coincidental. However, it is
unlikely. As David Oshinsky points out, U.S. military
intelligence reports on Duran were based largely on the
Franco-controlled Spanish press, and "since Franco had
powerful friends in Washington," he kept coming under
congressional attack. One of Duran's earlier critics was
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none other than Republican Representative Alvin O'Konski of
Wisconsin, friend of McCarthy's and a fellow Catholic.
O'Konski in fact, in language reminiscent of McCarthy, had
called Duran "one of the most notorious international
communists the world ever knew." While Duran was serving on
the staff of the Cuban Embassy, his work was defended by
Ambassador Spruille Braden in a memorandum to the Military
Attache in Havana in which he declared "From my personal
knowledge based on close association, Mr. Duran is not a
Communist, but a liberal of the highest type." As we have
seen, such a description of Duran as a "liberal of the
highest type" within the context of Catholic doctrine would
in no sense be seen as an exoneration but as more of an
indictment. [31]
The naming of Duran would only remind both Catholics
and the Core of the religious persecution suffered by the
Church in Loyalist Spain so similar to that currently
occurring in Eastern Europe. Once again, the threat of
godless, atheistic Communism was being emphasized. This tied
in with McCarran's efforts to rejuvenate Franco Spain and
bring it into the Atlantic community.
In the midst of this opening round of what Secretary
Acheson referred to as "The attack of the Primitives" the
administration was moving toward decisions in which the
Catholic Lobby, acknowledged or not, would play a leading
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role. In April the National Security Council presented to
Truman its policy document #68. NSC-68 has been described by
historian Walter LaFeber as "the American blueprint for
waging the Cold War during the next twenty years." The
character of international relations had been "fundamentally
altered" since the nineteenth century, leaving the United
States and Russia as the world's superpowers. It described
this realignment in terms of a confrontation between the
"slave society with the free." In addition, "the Soviet
Union, unlike previous aspirants to hegemony, is animated by
a new fanatic faith, antithetical to our own, and seeks to
impose its absolute authority." Casting the issue in terms
of "a new fanatic faith, antithetical to our own" was not
simply an exercise in rhetoric dealing with the contrast of
democratic versus totalitarian societies. No, the battle
that was raging was religious in nature, one in which no
compromise was possible. The call to protect Christian
civilization predicted by Del Vayo, and again by both the
Pope and Cardinal Spellman in the wake of the Mindszenty
trial, was becoming a reality. Acheson himself framed the
issue as he saw it in his memoirs: "The threat to Western
Europe seemed to me singularly like that which Islam had
posed centuries before, with its combination of ideological
zeal and fighting power. Then it had taken the same
combination to meet it: Germanic power in the east and
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Prankish in Spain, both energized by a great outburst of
military power and social organization in Europe. This time
it would need the added power and energy of America, for the
drama was now played on a world stage." The call for a
twentieth-century Crusade, this time to be led by America -
"The city on a hill" - comes through clearly as the
underlying theme of both NSC-68 and Acheson's think ing .[ 32
]
But what of bringing together the "Germanic power in
the east and Frankish in Spain?," both were excluded from
the NATO alliance. The first genuine opportunity to factor
Germany into the equation occurred in May. On a trip to
Paris prior to attending a meeting of the North Atlantic
Treaty Council in London Acheson was presented with a secret
initiative developed by Foreign Minister Schuman and Jean
Monnet which called for the entire German-French production
of coal and steel to be placed under a "joint high
authority" and an organization that would be open to other
European nations to join. The plan involved such great
political risk to Schumann that he had not yet proposed it
to the French cabinet. U.S Ambassador to France David Bruce
called the plan "the most imaginative and far-reaching
approach that has been made in generations to the settlement
of fundamental differences between France and Germany."
Coming as it did from French initiative, the proposal also
fit into the State Department's long held view to make
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France the "bulwark of democracy" in Europe. The fact that
catholic schuman in France and Catholic Adenhauer in Germany
could find common ground to combine the industrial might of
both countries in the face of the Communist threat should
not be surprising given the situation. [33]
Thus the Schuman Plan began to wind its way toward
becoming reality. The British were immediately hostile to
the proposal, regarding it as a Franco-American conspiracy.
Acheson later regretted what he termed his stupidity in not
recognizing the problems such a proposal created for the
socialist government of Britain. It could not manage
Britain's economy toward the development of a welfare state
if coal and steel were excluded, and if they did not join
the effort, they could expect to lose their continental
markets. When Schuman publicly invited six countries to join
the plan on May 25, the Benelux nations, Germany, and Italy
accepted. Britain declined. In between the secret
announcement of the plan and the public invitation the North
Atlantic Council meeting began to probe the more sensitive
issue of actually providing a common defense. The reliance
on an American atomic monopoly had been shattered the
previous September when the Soviets detonated their first
atomic device. While Acheson may have desired the inclusion
of "Germanic" power and "Prankish" Spain in the crusade
against Russia, he clearly thought the political realities
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precluded such an eventuality for the foreseeable future.
Only a year earlier, in April of 1949, he told the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee that "the disarmament and
demilitarization of Germany must be complete and absolute,"
and "a discussion of including West Germany in the pact is
not possible." in reality elements in both the Pentagon and
State Department viewed the inclusion of both Germany and
Spain as an eventual necessity. As early as December 1948
Secretary of the Army Kenneth Royall stressed the view at a
National Security Council meeting that the Joint Chiefs of
Staff regarded any "commitment to the defense of
Europe.
. .should leave open the possibility of a later
accession of Germany and Spain. "[34]
The Schuman Plan, however, seemed to breech the age-
old hostility between France and Germany. What had seemed
politically impossible only a year earlier now seemed to
take on new life. At the Big Three session of the Council
meeting Bevin raised the prospect of giving the Chinese
Communists recognition in the U.N., but Acheson argued to do
so would "increase greatly the capacity for Communist
trouble-making in Indochina, Malaya, the Philippine Islands,
and Indonesia." Bevin must have felt more Franco-American
pressure as Schuman agreed with Acheson's analysis as well
as with the proposition that France was not likely to change
its vote in the Security Council given Mao's recent
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recognition of Ho Chi Minh in Indochina. Acheson then raised
the question of just how long the continued occupation of
Germany could be expected to have "a useful and beneficial
effect in reshaping Germany." He answered his own question
by claiming a couple of years at best. He claimed Germany's
interests lay in Western Europe and the effort should begin
at once to "entangle and integrate" her there. "Here,"
Acheson claimed, "the implications of the French Coal and
Steel Plan were particularly relevant and important .... m
the ensuing discussion it soon became evident that even
Schuman had not fully appreciated that as the plan went into
effect it would have far-reaching effects on the status of
the occupation and the Rhur Authority." [35]
It is against this background that the real
significance of NSC-68 must be viewed. The analysis called
for in the document was the result of the ending of American
atomic monopoly only several months earlier. The prospect of
the newly-created NATO presenting an effective deterrent
against conventional Soviet military strength without both
German and Spanish participation had been questioned from
the beginning. Yet NSC-68 "did not give prominence to
possible German assistance," because undoubtedly French and
British resistance to rearming Germany could only be
considered as a possibility in the distant future. But the
Schuman Plan opened the door to the prospect that it could
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be accomplished sooner than expected. That events were
outrunning the planners was evidenced by two speeches
presented by General Omar Bradley, Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, in April and May, virtually as the Schuman
Plan was being presented to Acheson. in April Bradley
"warned that NATO plans were in danger of outrunning the
readiness of governments to provide the necessary forces"
and in May of "the need to establish adequate ground forces
before Russia succeeded in her efforts to achieve an atomic
deadlock." [39]
The decision by Acheson and the administration to
support the Schuman Plan and France against British
resistance is consistent with Acheson's expressed desire to
bring Germanic power to bear in the struggle against the
"new fanatic faith" of an aggressive Soviet Union. That the
Soviets were intent on an aggressive expansion of global
dimensions was confirmed in the eyes of the administration
in June when North Korean forces attacked South Korea. As
historian Richard Freeland observed: "Had a mischievous
deity determined to produce an event that would bring to
fever pitch the already heated political situation in the
United States, he could have succeeded no better than did
the North Koreans in their bold attack upon an Asian area
that only six months before the American Secretary of State
had indicated would not be defended by American arms." While
313
some revisionist historians have argued the administration's
Charges that the Korean War was a probing action initiated
by the Soviets and that South Korean activities provoked the
North or even that the South initiated hostilities, we now
know that both Stalin and Mao approved of the attack and
that the North Koreans even used a Soviet prepared
-bat t 1
e
plan. [37]
The fact remains that domestic political
considerations played a role in the administration's
decision to intervene in the Korean situation. Secretary of
Defense Louis Johnson admitted as much. Domestic opinion
also influenced the decision not to ask Congress for
authority to dispatch troops. Johnson recalled, " We were
scared of the Hill on this thing. If we tried to put ground
troops in at the beginning there would have been a great
deal of trouble." The related decision to send a military
mission and increased aid to the French in Indochina would
have far-reaching consequences for American foreign policy.
The decision to support France via the Schuman Plan as a
bulwark against Communism in Europe coincided now with the
need to support France as a bulwark against Communist
aggression in Asia. This is not to say the decision to
assist a Catholic country was based on religious grounds,
but rather that the influence of the Catholic periphery in
establishing the political atmosphere and the culture of
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ant i
-communism then prevailing in the country left virtually
no other option open but active intervention. Thus public
opinion was prepared to support actions based on the
analysis contained in NSC-68. [38]
The outbreak of war in Korea provided Pat McCarran
with the opportunity to reengage his pet project - Spain.
In July, less than a month after the outbreak of war,
McCarran convened a "somewhat secret" meeting of Senators
and Pentagon officials in his Washington office. He
announced his intention to introduce another bill calling
for a $100 million loan to Spain. Pentagon officials
restated the strategic importance of Spain to the senators.
The official administration position, in spite of Acheson's
personal desire to engage "Frankish" power along with
German, was not to encourage any such move, at least not
yet. McCarran was at the forefront of those convinced the
Soviet Union was behind the attack in Korea. "Korea is not
the real enemy in the conflict," he declared, "Korea is only
the buffer. We must be prepared to fight the real enemy
behind Korea -- sovietEsic] Russia." If the confrontation
should ultimately involve the Soviets, he claimed "it will
take the form of a crusade against the last bastion of evil
ideology, which has plagued the world since fascism and
nazism were conquered." The Senate was moving in McCarran's
direction on the Spanish question. Even the Democratic
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leadership deserted the administration in the crushing 65-15
vote. "I'm a realist," proclaimed Majority Leader Scott
Lucas of Illinois before the vote on the loan, "and when I'm
licked, I don't hesitate to admit it." [39]
Unlike Lucas, however, Truman was never one to admit
defeat. Administration backers in the Senate called for
reconsideration of the loan after Truman denounced its
inclusion in the omnibus appropriations bill. McCarran again
demonstrated his strength when the motion to reconsider was
tabled by the same 65-15 vote. A House-Senate conference
committee reduced the amount of the loan to $62.5 million
and the Senate went along with a House request to cut the
President's Point Four program request. When the President
sent a strong message to the House requesting the full
amount of the Point Four program be restored. Floor Leader
John McCormack did not even read Truman's message to the
House; he simply inserted it in the record. When he finally
signed the appropriations bill Truman, in language
reminiscent of a later President, declared he did not
consider the Spanish loan provision "mandatory" only an
"authorization." [40]
The initial bipartisan support of Truman's reaction to
the Korean invasion seemed a throwback to the Vandenberg
era. That, however, was not to last. The Republicans had
learned all too well in the 1948 election that all things
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being equal in terms of foreign policy they could not hope
to draw the big city Catholic voters away from the Democrats
on domestic issues alone. That the overall issue of
Communism, both domestic and international, was political,
and by political I mean electoral politics, was clearly
established by McCarthy backer Tom Coleman. "The issue is
fairly simple....," he declared, "it is now a political
issue, and somebody is going to gain or lose politically
before it's over. It all comes down to this: are we going to
try to win an election or aren't we?" [41]
The Republicans were indeed going to try and win an
election. While the major Republican spokesmen were praising
the President's actions in Korea, they were qualifying the
praise with criticism of the administration's past policies,
which they claimed led to the war. Senator George Malone of
Nevada declared "...it is fairly clear that what happened in
China and what is now happening in Korea were brought about
deliberately by the advisors of the President at Yalta and
by the advisors of the State Department since then." Senator
Albert Jenner of Indiana proclaimed: "The Korean debacle
also reminds us that the same sell-out-to-Stalin statesmen
who turned Russia loose are still in the saddle...."
According to Senator Taft, "the bungling and inconsistent
foreign policy of the administration" had led to the
atmosphere in which "it was not unreasonable for the North
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Koreans to suppose they could get away with it [the
invasion] and that we would do nothing about it." Senator
McCarthy, as usual, was perhaps the most extreme in his
denunciation of past policies that were developed by
"...that group of Communists, fellow travelers and dupes in
our State Department - a group who make Benedict Arnold
look like a piker . " [42]
By late summer the only spirit of bipartisanship
seemed to center around domestic ant i
-Communism. Senator
McCarran, fresh from his victory on the question of the
Spanish loan, was pushing for passage of the McCarran
Internal Security Act. As chairman of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, McCarran had kept alive the salient features of
the Mundt-Nixon bill which required the registration of
"Communist-action" and "Communist-front" organizations with
the Attorney General. Senate liberals, led by Paul Douglas
of Illinois and Hubert Humphrey of Minnesota, "as a
hypothet ically less drastic alternative" co-sponsored a bill
authorizing the Attorney General to round up and hold in
detention camps anyone he considered to be engaged in
subversive activities in the event the President declared an
"internal security emergency." The pressures of war, an
upcoming election and the fear of being proclaimed "soft on
Communism" generated overwhelming support for the McCarran
Act. Despite the fact that both McCarran and Mundt
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questioned the so-called "concentration camp" features of
the bill as being unconstitutional, the measure sailed
through both the House and Senate. Truman promptly vetoed
the bill, declaring it "a bill which would greatly weaken
our liberties, and give aid and comfort to those who would
destroy us." The President's veto was overridden in the
House 286 to 48 and in the Senate 57 to ten. Thus, while
McCarthy's shotgun approach and flamboyant rhetoric was
driving liberals to distraction, McCarran, the political
insider, was going about the business of getting legislation
passed in both the foreign and domestic fields. [43]
While the war in Korea was still going badly in late
August, General Douglas MacArthur entered the fray. Advance
copies of a speech prepared by MacArthur for delivery to the
Veterans of Foreign Wars appeared in U.S. News and World
Report
.
The speech attacked as "appeasement" and "defeatism"
those who criticized defense of Formosa in the belief it
would "alienate continental Asia." Such an attitude would
expose our "friends" in the Philippines, Australia, New
Zealand, Indochina, Japan and other areas to "the lustful
thrusts of those who stand for slavery as against liberty,
for atheism as against God." Truman asked Secretary of
Defense Johnson to order MacArthur to withdraw the speech,
which he did. This action only increased Republican
criticism of Truman's conduct of the war. Senate Minority
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Leader Kenneth Wherry attacked "the vagueness and complete
lack of direction to the administration's policies in the
Far East... at a time when our boys are fighting and dying in
Korea." It was at this time, according to historian Ronald
J. Caridi, that many Republicans "started to express their
dissatisfaction with the entire concept of containment ."[ 44
]
The dramatic mid-September landing at Inchon by
MacArthur, resulting in the encirclement and destruction of
much of the North Korean army and a rapid series of military
successes for the United Nations forces, probably kept the
mid-term election losses for the Democrats at a minimum.
With the war going well and MacArthur making predictions
that the boys would be home by Christmas, the Republicans
still managed to pick up 28 seats in the House and five new
Senators. In addition, the Republicans managed to capture a
majority of the governorships being contested that year. It
was not the overall gains, however, but rather the
individual Republicans who won, and, perhaps more important,
the individual Democrats who lost, that made the results
significant. Both the Senate Majority Leader, Scott Lucas of
Illinois, and Majority Whip, Francis J. Myers of
Pennsylvania, were defeated. Millard Tydings, Chairman of
the powerful Senate Armed Services Committee and of the
investigation that had castigated McCarthy's charges against
the State Department, and Elbert Thomas of Utah, Chairman of
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the Senate Labor Committee, were also defeated. As William
A. Glaser has pointed out "The simultaneous defeat of four
such important leaders weakened the power and prestige of
the Democrats," while at the same time "no comparable
defeats of incumbents were experienced by the Republican
Party in 1950." Among Republican incumbents Senator Taft's
reelection in Ohio with some 57 percent of the vote
"convinced him and his supporters that he possessed
heretofore-unsuspected popularity at the grass roots and led
to his bid for the 1952 presidential nomination." [45]
Equally important was the emergence of new Republican
leadership and the issues they used to get elected. Richard
M. Nixon, capitalizing on the national publicity generated
by his involvement in the Alger Hiss case, won election to
the Senate by over 680,000 votes in California. Everett M.
Dirkson defeated Scott Lucas in Illinois by over 290,000
votes. In Maryland John Marshall Butler described his 43,000
vote victory over Tydings as "the largest majority that has
ever been given a Republican senatorial candidate in the
history of my state." Glaser has pointed out that along with
the emergence of new leaders came new issues which "were
tested for their vote getting effectiveness." The three big
issues that would provide the cornerstone of the 1952
Republican campaign -- Korea, Communism and corruption --
"were first used widely by Republican campaigners in 1950."
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Indeed, Nixon's campaign in California would become the
bellwether for future Republican efforts linking both Korea
and Communism. In late October, when the first evidence of
Chinese Communist "Volunteers" became public, Nixon demanded
to know Helen Gahagan Douglas' position on admitting Red
China to the United Nations. When she declined to answer
Nixon declared: "This is the last straw. I know that my
opponent was committed to the State Department policy of
appeasement in the Far East, but I never dreamed she would
stick to it even after we were attacked." Thus Nixon neatly
tied his opponent both to support for the enemy in the midst
of a shooting war and to the policy of appeasement generated
by the Hiss gang at the State Department. [46]
Post-election commentators tended to focus on the
effect Senator McCarthy played in shifting Catholic voters
to the Republican Party. This was particularly true in the
case of Tydings' defeat in Maryland, where McCarthy took an
active role in helping to defeat his Senate nemesis. But
McCarthy had campaigned across the country, and according to
columnist Marquis Childs, "In every contest where it was a
major factor McCarthyism won." Later historians have
attempted to minimize McCarthy's effectiveness, citing local
issues and the personal popularity of some candidates rather
than McCarthy's influence. Donald Crosby has made a
particularly valiant effort to downplay the role Catholics
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played in Tydings
•
defeat and to minimize the shift of
Catholic votes to Eisenhower in 1952. Both these
interpretations, it seems to me, miss the larger impact of
Catholic influence not just on other Catholics but on the
center-core groups as well. Most of the time these center-
core groups may not even have been aware that Catholic
influence was playing a role in shaping their attitudes.
Californians may have been well aware that McCarthy was
campaigning for his fellow Communist hunter Nixon and may
not have been influenced by McCarthy's support for him. But
they were certainly not aware at the time that Nixon's
overall national prestige as a result of the Hiss case had
been largely the result of efforts by Father John Cronin
acting on information from Catholic FBI director J. Edgar
Hoover and in turn passed on to Nixon. Thus the influence of
Catholics such as McCarthy on Catholic voters is only one
dimension of the politics involved. Equally important was
the influence of the periphery on the center-core. [47]
Truman and the Democratic Party were now faced
squarely with the prospect that FDR had foreseen in early
1945. The domestic political consequences of the failure to
achieve a lasting peace in the face of Soviet domination of
Catholic Eastern Europe had seemingly driven large numbers
of traditionally Catholic voters into the Republican column
in the 1950 mid-term elections. Historian Stephen Ambrose in
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writing on the 1950 election states, "This was an America ir
which paranoia ran so deep that it was politically
profitable to charge that Truman and Acheson, those coldest
of cold warriors, were soft on Communism." The irony of the
situation was clear. Truman had managed to retain the
Democratic loyalty of Catholic voters in 1948 by keeping
foreign policy out of the political debate. His tough stand
against Communism through such measures as the Truman
Doctrine and the Marshall Plan and, as we have seen, his
ability to link Catholic support for those measures through
the Catholic hierarchy was no longer enough. Appeals during
the campaign by liberal Catholic Democrats such as Secretary
of Labor Maurice Tobin, former Governor of Massachusetts,
and Democratic National Chairman Stephen Mitchell were not
as effective against the rhetoric of McCarthy, McCarran, and
others on charges that the administration was influenced by
Communism, as FDR's campaign against similar charges hurled
by Father Coughlin in 1936 had been. Many Catholics who
rejected Coughlin's charges now seemed receptive to the same
arguments and were willing to vote accordingly. McCarran
himself had become convinced of the validity of the charges.
An early supporter of the New Deal, he considered not
seeking a third term in 1944 on the Democratic ticket
because "he cannot support those who call themselves
Democrats, but who in reality are nothing but communists to
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the very core." Similarly, Joseph Kennedy, who supported FDR
in 1936, supported Richard Nixon's Senate bid in 1950 and
even channeled a $1000 contribution to Nixon through his son
Jack. [48]
The 1950 election results seemed to foreshadow the
fact that the periphery was moving to the right politically,
and in the process dominating the political culture of
anti-Communism. In fact. Catholic anti-Communism governed
not only the domestic political culture, but it drove U.S.
foreign policy in directions the administration did not
necessarily want to go, such as in Spain. Crosby framed the
issue succinctly: "In the fearful ten months that followed
the 1950 elections, the Democratic strategists in the White
House found themselves haunted by a nagging question --
would the Republicans be able to use the Communist issue to
capture the Catholic vote in 1952?" Stephen Springarn,
administrative assistant to Truman, wrote a series of
memoranda encouraging the President to appoint liberal
Catholics to various security commissions the administration
was trying to create as a counterpoint to McCarthy. The
electoral politics of the Catholic vote, which FDR
sidestepped in 1944 over the Polish question, and which
Truman managed to maintain in 1948 through his hardline
approach to Communist expansion in Europe, seemed about to
break against the Democrats. The issues were in place, the
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rhetoric was capturing votes and the prospect of a political
realignment was in the air. [49]
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CHAPTER 14
"WE HAVE HEARD GOD SPEAK TODAY"
The Korean war was going badly in January 1951. in
fact Seoul fell to the Communists on January 4. The conduct
of the war, we have seen, had been identified by the
Republican Party as a potential domestic political issue in
the off-year election. According to Ronald Caridi the four-
month period beginning with Chinese intervention in the war
in late November 1950 and the dismissal of MacArthur in
April 1951 resulted in Republican "resolve to oppose the
Administration's handling of all phases of foreign policy,"
and "to use the Korean War for its own political advantage,"
tl]
Walter LaFeber, respected diplomatic historian,
identifies Korea as "the war for both Asia and Europe." He
emphasizes yet again the importance of France in State
Department calculations for both areas. State Department
planners had to support the French effort in Indochina in
order to maintain access to vital raw materials and to
provide markets in Southeast Asia for a recovering Japan,
which was the "...key to the entire American position in the
Pacific." Such support, both economically and militarily,
would extract a quid pro quo, namely, French compliance with
the rearming of Germany. Such strategic and economic
arguments have validity, but the cultural aspects, in this
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instance religion, have not been thoroughly explored.
Religious views take on added significance in the context of
approval of these policies by American public opinion. [2]
In Europe the dominant personalities, Schuman in
France, Adenauer in Germany, DiGaspari in Italy and Franco
in Spain were all Catholic. In the Pacific a similar pattern
emerges. The Catholic Philippines and Indochina, controlled
for the moment by Catholic France with the support of an
indigenous Catholic bureaucratic infrastructure [which we
will look at in more depth later], form the bookends of
American strategic policy in Southeast Asia. In addition,
both Syngman Rhee in Korea and Chiang Kai-shek on Formosa,
while not Catholic, were converts to Christianity and thus
represented Asian nationalist alternatives to "atheistic"
Communism. To neglect this aspect of the emerging Republican
policy of "liberation" versus the Truman policy of
"containment" in terms of domestic politics has resulted, I
believe, in a skewed interpretation of the origins and
subsequent maturation of the Cold War.
The National Security Council was presented with a
policy paper on Spain in mid-January at the time the
military situation in Korea was deteriorating. Acheson, whom
we have seen recognized the need to include "Prankish power"
in the fight against an aggressive Russia, accepted the
long-range goals enunciated in this paper. One of these was
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"to search out the situation for a possible military
arrangement." m naming Stanton Griff is Ambassador to Spain
Truman again raised the religious situation, "i don't know
what your religion is," the President told Griffis, "I do
not even know if you have any, but I am a Baptist and I
believe that in any country man should be permitted to
worship God in his own way. The situation in Spain is
intolerable. Do you know that a Baptist who dies in Spain
must even be buried in the middle of the night?" The
strategic significance of Spain, however, and the impact of
the Catholic Lobby in building public support for enlisting
Catholic Spain in the fight against "atheistic" Communism
were overriding the President's libertarian objections. [3]
While Truman expressed his displeasure at religious
persecution in Spain, American Catholics again confronted
continued efforts to undermine church authority in Eastern
Europe. Michael Busalka, Roman Catholic Suffragan Bishop of
Bratislava, Czechoslovakia was brought to trial. Busalka and
Bishops Jan Vojtassak and Pavel Gojdic were charged with
treason and espionage for wartime activities. "Sent Spies to
Russia, Bishop on Trial Says," read the headline in the New
York Times of January 12. It reported that Busalka "told the
court he sent spies into Soviet Ukraine shortly before the
German attack on Russia." How this constituted "treason and
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espionage" against the Czech government at the time was left
unstated. [4]
Another story of the same day came closer to the mark
for policy makers and those interested in changing public
attitudes toward Spain. Archbishop Gushing of Boston, who
led a pilgrimage to the Catholic shrines of France in the
midst of the Marshall Plan funding debate, now announced
plans to lead a pilgrimage to the shrines of Spain in the
midst of growing public debate on Spain's role in European
defense. Cushing, the Times reported, "was planning to
accept the invitation of church and government leaders to
lead an international pilgrimage to Christian shrines in
that country(Spain) next summer ."[ emphas is added] The
article went on to state that Cushing received a letter from
Jose F. Leguerica, Spanish Ambassador designate to the
United States "who noted that Archbishop Cushing recently
had praised Spain for its fidelity to Christendom and its
resistance to anti-religious violence." If Truman believed
Baptists in Spain had to be buried in the middle of the
night, the American public was being presented with a far
different picture. The pilgrimage was scheduled to sail from
Boston on July 14. [5]
As the question of what to do about Spain slowly took
shape, the controversy surrounding military policy in Korea
exploded. MacArthur advocated taking the war directly to the
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Chinese, including the bombing of Chinese cities and the use
of Chiang's forces either in Korea or in an invasion of the
Mainland. Truman, who had earlier supported MacArthur's
drive to the Yalu with the expressed intent of reuniting the
Korean peninsula as a political unit, now reverted to the
limited concept of maintaining the independence and
integrity of the Republic of Korea. Republican policy during
this period was reminiscent of the Civil War era's Committee
on the Conduct of the War. No criticism of the
administration's conduct of the war was too extreme. Much of
it centered around the "no win" concept of limited war, the
failure of the United Nations to support branding the
Chinese Communists as aggressors, and the failure of our
allies to provide adequate forces to the conflict and to
discontinue trading with the Chinese.
By the time Truman dismissed MacArthur on April 11 the
military situation had stabilized about the original 38th
parallel border. The reaction to MacArthur's dismissal was
instantaneous, furious and political. The White House
received 125,000 telegrams within forty-eight hours and
admitted they "were running 20 to 1 against the President."
The Michigan legislature passed a resolution declaring that
"at 1:00 A.M. of this day. World Communism achieved its
greatest victory of a decade in the dismissal of General
MacArthur." By April 17 MacArthur was back in the country
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and a crowd estimated at over a half-million people lined
the route from San Francisco's airport to the general's
hotel. On April 19 "a record 30 million people tuned in
their radios to hear General MacArthur address Congress."
The general provided his political supporters with all the
ammunition they needed. "In war, indeed, there is no
substitute for victory," he declared, and went on to say
that the policy of not attempting to drive China from Korea
was nothing less than "appeasement." He claimed his plan to
carry the war to the Chinese had the support "of our own
joint Chiefs of Staff," implying that the military judgment
of professional soldiers was being overridden by "a mere,
meddlesome civilian, the President of the United States. "[6]
Republican reaction to the speech took on a messianic
flavor. Representative Dewey Short of Missouri proclaimed:
"We have heard God speak today. God in the flesh, the voice
of God." Former President Herbert Hoover declared MacArthur
was the "reincarnation of St. Paul." The General's arrival
in New York, "hard-bitten, cynical New York, stronghold of
the Democratic party," seemed to foreshadow political doom
for the administration. Six million people lined the parade
route in a welcome that exceeded the return of General
Eisenhower and the reception given Charles Lindbergh.
Observers noted people crossing their breasts as the General
passed. The motorcade took almost seven hours to cover the
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19.2 mile route through Manhattan. The general got out of
his convertible only twice, "once to pump the hand of
Francis Cardinal Spellman, who was standing in his red robes
outside St. Patrick's Cathedral." [7]
The politics of the situation was not lost on Senator
Pat McCarran. On April 28 the Nevada Democrat burst into
print on his favorite subject — Spain. McCarran published a
lengthy analysis of America's military situation vis.-a-vis.
the real enemy -- Russia — in the Saturday Evening Post
entitled "Why Shouldn't the Spanish Fight for Us?" A short
preface by the Post declared "A million fiery fighting men
are ready to help us battle communists if we give them the
nod and some guns. They are the subjects of a police state,
but, says this distinguished senator, they can still kill
reds." The senator briefly outlined his earlier efforts to
secure a loan for Spain. In language that could only be
construed as drawing on public discontent over the
President's seeming "meddling" in military affairs, he
launched into his primary objective — to "bring Spain into
the Atlantic Alliance." McCarran told his readers: "The
shirt sleeve boys in the Pentagon wanted it. Army men of
Cabinet level kept out of the argument, but one notch below
were the professionals, the men who have already fought
Russia on a hundred blueprints." These "professionals" knew
the value of Spain to the defense of Europe. "But the
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military does not make decisions if political questions
intrude." In late April 1951 McCarran's readers did not have
to be reminded what that meant. "Political decisions belong
to the State Department and the White House," he continued,
"and the President had made it clear he wanted no relations
with Spain." [8]
This left the "professionals" in a bind. They could
"not openly advocate a policy which frightened their
superiors, let alone contradict the President," without
jeopardizing their careers, as MacArthur's dismissal made
all too clear. This blundering President could not, or would
not, see what was clear to all, but "by the time we have
waved good-by to a few more boatloads of nineteen-year-olds,
the logic of Spain will be obvious." The still-ravaged
European economies, and the reluctance of the Europeans to
raise the necessary divisions for their own defense left
Americans with only one choice; "as retaliation to Russian
invasion, our trump card is air power directed at Russia
itself -- atomic war carried right to the source." [9]
McCarran went on to describe the opposition to Spain's
inclusion in the Western community as "a festering anger
with critics in many countries of the West who have been too
careless with the word 'Fascist.'" These critics failed to
understand that the Spanish Civil War "was simply Stalin's
first European inning in a game whose subsequent innings
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were played and won in Poland, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia,
Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and China, and whose latest
inning is Korea." For most Spanish, then, "their civil war
was simply one Russian failure in a campaign that
subsequently was a success in eleven other countries now
bossed by the Kremlin." For McCarran it was almost
impossible to discuss the Spanish Civil War rationally with
our European allies; "in France's Chamber of Deputies there
are some twenty men who fought in the Loyalist brigades. In
the Italian Government -- at the cabinet level, in
Parliament and in the civil service -- are some 200 veterans
of the Loyalist army," and while England did not send as
many men as other countries, "there was a unit in the
Loyalist forces commonly known as the Attlee Company." Even
Marshall Tito of Yugoslavia had commanded a Loyalist
brigade. While McCarran's comments would certainly appear to
be those of a rigid ideologue French political scientist
Alfred Grosser describes a postwar European political
situation much like that McCarran saw. "Everywhere," Grosser
writes, "in France, Denmark, Italy, Germany and Belgium, a
push to the Left was taking place." The war had been fought
in the name of anti-Fascism according to Grosser and "the
disappearance of the parties of the Right caused many
conservatives to vote for the least Leftist party." The
resultant triumph of socialist governments in Western Europe
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committed to the "denunciation of monopolies, the refusal to
equate political freedom and economic laissez-faire, the
demand for a planned economy and participation of workers in
the management of enterpr ises
. . . were found almost
everywhere...." The fact that virtually all these
Governments were headed by Catholics, and that the United
States was supporting them both financially and militarily,
lends further support to the thesis that religion rather
than economics was the underlying paradigm of cold war
confrontation with "atheistic" Communism. [ 10
]
This is further born out by the fact that McCarran had
to address his religion. He asked readers for "leave to
intrude with an explanation which is personal and, I hope,
unnecessary." He acknowledged his leading role in the plan
to "mobilize Spain," and added, "I am also of the Roman
Catholic faith." However, "I am certain my religious views
do not enter, consciously or subconsciously, into my
advocacy of Spain's military role." But the mere fact he
raised the issue, even as a disclaimer, indicates that it
was significant and that by extension it involved the
Catholic periphery and Spain in the public's perception.
Furthermore, the disclaimer has something of a hollow ring
to it, given his connections with Cardinal Spellman and his
discussions of the Communist menace with Pius XII. In any
case, the article, coming as it did at the very height of
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the MacArthur controversy, further tied the Truman
administration to what the public perceived as failed
military policies in Korea, and perhaps disastrous military
policies in Europe. Coming from a powerful Catholic
Democrat, in a party largely dependent on urban Catholic
voters, McCarran's arguments had to be taken into account.
[11]
The MacArthur hearings before the joint Senate Foreign
Relations and Armed Services Committees began in early May
and ran through June 25th. Again controversy swirled about
the conduct of the hearings, which the Democrats demanded be
held in executive session while the Republicans sought
public hearings. Senator Dirksen, newly elected Republican
from Illinois, reminded his Senate colleagues of the result
of secrecy at Yalta. In a Senate vote to place the bill of
Senator Homer Ferguson, dealing with open hearings at the
top of the agenda the Democrats won on a vote of 41 to 37,
with Senator McCarran the only Democrat to cross party
lines. MacArthur, as expected, attacked the administration's
policies as "appeasement" and used the Truman Doctrine
against Truman, declaring the enemy was not Russia but
"Communism all over the world." MacArthur was confident the
professional soldiers among the Joint Chiefs of Staff would
endorse his proposals for victory rather than the concept of
"limited war" espoused by the administration. Instead, the
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Joint Chiefs attacked virtually every aspect of MacArthur's
plan and even the general himself. The culmination of the
attack came when General Omar Bradley declared that
MacArthur's plan would involve the United States "in the
wrong war at the wrong time with the wrong enemy." [12]
The MacArthur hearings had barely concluded when
Truman announced his willingness to negotiate a settlement
in Korea based on the 38th parallel. According to Walter
Karp, "This was the appeasement peace' against which
MacArthur had hurled his thunderbolts ... and, so it seemed
back in April, [to] the entire body of the American people."
The general's political star was declining, but that of
another general was rising. The Republican party throughout
this period seemed to embody the contradictions inherent in
the Korean controversy. The concept of a "limited war" for
limited objectives ran against the grain of American public
opinion. To a nation that had so recently emerged victorious
from the greatest war the world had ever known with its
clearcut objective of "unconditional surrender," the idea of
limited war seemed preposterous. This was the appealing card
Republicans were playing: either bring the full force of
American military might to bear against the enemy or get
out. This seeming contradiction emerged early in the
MacArthur controversy when on April 24 Republican Senator
Harry P. Cain introduced two resolutions on the same day.
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The first called for a declaration of war against both North
Korea and China. The second called for the immediate
withdrawal of U.S. troops from Korea. [13]
The controversy surrounding MacArthur seemed to have
been spent by July 10 when American and Chinese negotiators
met in the Korean town of Kaesong to begin discussions for a
truce. At the same time events were moving toward a new U.S.
policy toward Spain. On July 12 the Boston GlohR. in a
front-page story, described the purposes of the forthcoming
pilgrimage to Spain being led by Archbishop Gushing. The
pilgrims would receive a historic welcome in Spain,
according to the Globe, and "be given an opportunity to
learn first hand the religious character of the country" and
"the sincere affection of the Spanish people toward the
United States." Cushing's remarks barely concealed the
political nature of the trip. "Despite the political
misgivings on every side," he remarked, "I believe the times
are propitious for such a strictly spiritual gesture of
friendship for Spain. It is also a declaration of confidence
in God. Little by little the Western world is beginning to
acknowledge its debt to Spain and to understand in the light
of its own experience with Red treachery, the militant
resistance of the Spanish people to any compromise with
atheistic Communism." The Archbishop of Boston clearly was
thinking on the same lines as the Senator from Nevada. [14]
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On July 16 readers of the Globe were greeted by a
front-page picture of a smiling Archbishop doffing a straw
hat to the 4,000 well wishers crowding the pier to wave 'bon
voyage- to the Spanish pilgrims. "Summing up the motives for
this historic making trip of American Catholics to Catholic
Spain," the Globe reported, "Archbishop Gushing told this
reporter tonite (sic) that American Catholics are conscious
of the need of Divine Aid in the present world crisis."
Gushing was restating his earlier theme that only American
Catholics could perform the tasks necessary to save the
world from atheistic Communism. This time it was being
stated through the public media along with the belief that
God was on our side. The Archbishop concluded by saying "one
could consider this journey in the nature of a good will
visit to Spain, not on a high or so called diplomatic level,
but one of people to people." While Cushing's trip was
obviously for public consumption and not "on a high or so
called diplomatic level," it did not have to be. That was
taking place separately, on the very same day. Admiral
Forrest P. Sherman arrived in Madrid on July 16 to begin
serious discussions with Franco on securing military bases
in Spain. Secretary of State Acheson confirmed on July 18
the nature of Sherman's discussions with Franco. Noting that
"military authorities are in general agreement that Spain is
of strategic importance to the general defense of Western
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Europe," Acheson went on to say "tentative and exploratory
conversations have been undertaken with the Spanish
Government with the sole purpose of ascertaining what Spain
might be willing and able to do which would contribute to
the strengthening of the common defense against possible
aggression." McCarran's question of "Why shouldn't the
Spanish fight for us?" was now being answered affirmatively.
They should. The President confirmed the shift in
administration policy toward Spain at a press conference the
fol lowing day. [ 15
]
Certainly geopolitical, economic, and strategic
reasons entered into the decision to reverse American policy
toward Spain. But perhaps in no other case do we have so
dramatic a picture of the influence of the Catholic
periphery in influencing the culture of Cold War
ant i -Communism in terms of public opinion on a foreign
policy issue. Interestingly, we do have available
statistical evidence of the change taking place in American
attitudes toward Spain over the course of the postwar years.
In May 1946 only 14 percent of American Catholics had "a
favorable impression of the present government in Spain,
headed by General Franco." Still, this represented more than
double the 6 percent of American Protestants and seven times
the 2 percent of American Jews holding a favorable
impression. Much of the overall unfavorable impression was
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traced to Franco's sympathies with America's enemies during
the war years. The numbers begin to edge upward for all
groups following the Czech Coup in 1948, and the beginning
of what I have termed the Catholic Lobby's efforts to
rehabilitate the image of Spain, not as a fascist state, but
as a staunchly Catholic opponent of "atheistic Communism."
In November of 1948, while still in the minority, 32 percent
of Catholics, 24 percent of Protestants and 22 percent of
Jews approved inclusion of Spain in the Marshall Plan. The
gap between Catholics and other religious denominations had
not only narrowed considerably, but had also jumped
dramatically. By the spring of 1949 Catholic opinion was
nearing a majority when 47 percent of Catholics favored
Spain being invited to join the UN. Catholic opinion was
more out front on this issue as only 30 percent of
Protestants and 23 percent of Jews approved of Spain's
inclusion. The Korean War pushed the numbers up even faster,
and by the time of Stalin's death, but before the Korean
armistice, 57 percent of Catholics, 53 percent of
Protestants and 50 percent of Jews approved sending military
and economic assistance to Spain. The efforts by McCarran,
Kennedy, Cushing and the numerous other Catholics actively
working for inclusion of Spain within the Atlantic alliance
had paid off in the form of a supportive public opinion.
These efforts culminated in late 1953 when 81 percent of
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catholics, 77 percent of Protestants and 75 percent of Jews
approved the sending of military and economic aid to Spain
in return for air and naval bases. [16]
With truce negotiations underway in Korea and the
administration publicly admitting its reversal of policy on
Spain, McCarran turned his attention once again to internal
security. The Internal Security subcommittee of the Senate
Judiciary Committee, chaired by McCarran, opened hearings in
July 1951 on "the activities of the Institute of Pacific
Relations and the actions of Owen Lattimore in particular."
It should be kept in mind that it was these hearings which
formed the basis of Buckley and Bozell's defense of Senator
McCarthy's charges before the Tydings' Committee. Historian
Von Pittman describes McCarran's attitude during the
hearings by noting he "discussed the war [in Korea] mainly
in terms of traitors within the United States." The fall of
China was brought about by these traitors and now American
boys were dying at Chinese hands as a result. In language
reminiscent of MacArthur, McCarran charged the traitors were
still at work within the administration, spreading defeatist
propaganda [read "limited war"], and attempting "to inject
fear into the hearts of Americans so they will accept peace
at any price." With American negotiators sitting down with
Chinese negotiators in Korea "peace at any price" could only
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refer to the "peace without victory" theme being sounded by
Republican critics of the administration. [17]
The resumption of charges of traitors in government,
this time being led by a powerful Catholic Democrat rather
than a Catholic Republican, could only embarrass the
administration, its foreign policy and its conduct of the
war in Korea. Once again the charges were lent credibility
when on March 30 Julius and Ethel Rosenberg were convicted
of wartime espionage in passing information to the Soviet
Union dealing with the construction of the atomic bomb.
Judge Irving R. Kaufman, declaring the couple's crime "worse
than murder," imposed the death penalty on the pair on April
5, less than a week before MacArthur's dismissal. Just as
occurred earlier in the Hiss case, a Catholic played a
prominent role in the Rosenberg case. Elizabeth Bentley, a
former member of the Communist Party converted to
Catholicism through the efforts of New York's Bishop Fulton
J. Sheen, testified about her knowledge of Julius
Rosenberg's participation in a Communist cell passing
information to the Soviet Union through Harry Gold. Both
Bentley and Budenz were now key witnesses before McCarran's
subcommittee. The hearings before the McCarran Committee
drew massive press coverage. Pittman notes that "this
inquiry would develop into the largest, most thorough, and
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most controversial of the efforts to uncover communist
infiltration into the government." The following year, in
July of 1952, The Washington Post, no friend of McCarran's,
concluded: "It sums up the character of this congress to
state an unquestionable fact: that its most important member
was Patrick A. McCarran." [18]
But the political implications of the stalemate in
Korea was beginning to take its toll within the Republican
party itself. The prospect of victory in 1952 was already
beginning to drive presidential politics within the party.
Efforts within both parties had long been underway to secure
the services of General Dwight D. Eisenhower. Truman
himself, in 1948, briefly entertained the prospect of
stepping aside as a presidential candidate in favor of the
general if that could have been arranged. For many the
problem was that noone seemed to know if Eisenhower was a
Democrat or a Republican. Much light has been shed on this
subject which points to Eisenhower's earlier decision that
he was in fact a Republican and that he wanted the Party's
presidential nomination. Raymond J. Saulnier, former
Chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisors,
claims Eisenhower told him he "must be a Republican" as
early as January, 1948. Saulnier, at that time on the
faculty of Columbia University where Eisenhower had recently
been named President, was discussing monetary policy with
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the general and in the process concluded "it was evident
we talked that his views on public policy fitted him
indisputably into the Republican scheme of things."
Eisenhower talked "with great force and earnestness about
the qualities of self-reliance, i ndustr i ousness and
frugality that individuals had to have if an enterprise
system was to work," according to Saulnier, and "I began
early to surmise that what I was hearing (and here and there
contributing to) was oral drafting of a speech." Indeed,
Saulnier claims the essence of the discussion that day was
later given in a major address by Eisenhower to the American
Bar Association and published under the title "The Middle of
the Road: A Statement of Faith in America." [19]
We have clear evidence that by October 14, 1951
Eisenhower indicated in a letter to Senator James Duff of
Pennsylvania that he would agree "to accept the Republican
Party's nomination as its 1952 presidential candidate,
should the Party designate him as its choice." Duff was part
of a group of moderate eastern Republicans headed by former
presidential candidate Thomas E. Dewey that looked to an
Eisenhower nomination to head off that of neo-isolat ionist
Robert Taft of Ohio. The group also included Harry Darby, a
Republican national committeeman from Eisenhower's home
state of Kansas, General Lucious D. Clay, New Hampshire
Governor Sherman Adams and Massachusetts Senator Henry Cabot
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Lodge, Jr., appointed to head the Eisenhower campaign. Along
with Dewey came his principal advisor on foreign affairs
John Foster Dulles. Dulles, a leading spokesman for
Republican foreign policy positions from the
internationalist perspective, had recently been the chief
negotiator for the Japanese peace treaty which was signed in
San Francisco on September 8, 1951. He would now take on the
assignment from President Truman of securing ratification of
the treaty in the Senate. [20]
Dulles was quite familiar with the political
infighting of the Senate where the President was now asking
him to secure confirmation of a peace treaty in the middle
of a shooting war. He was also aware of the importance in
many states of securing the Catholic vote in order to get to
the Senate. He had served briefly in the Senate when Dewey,
still Governor of New York [after his defeat for the
Presidency in 1948], appointed him to fill the unexpired
term of Robert F. Wagner, who resigned in the summer of 1949
because of ill health. In the critical 1950 off-year
election Dulles faced a particularly tough Democratic Party
candidate out to recapture Wagner's old seat. Former
Governor Herbert H. Lehman with his connections to "the
tight state and city machine" he formerly headed would be
difficult to beat. The Republicans put together a team
headed by Herbert Brownell [later Attorney General under
351
Eisenhower] and James H. Hagerty [later Eisenhower's press
secretary] and "a young lawyer ... named Roderick L. O'Connor,
who was drafted to get out the Roman Catholic vote." [21]
The campaign in New York was as hard hitting as
elsewhere in the country that year. In an effort to attract
the big city ethnic Catholic voter the Republicans charged
Lehman "was 'soft on Communism' and approved what the
Soviets were doing to the Czechs and other satellite peoples
in eastern Europe." Democrats in turn suggested that Dulles
"was against popery and had disinherited his son... for
becoming a Roman Catholic priest." The son of a Presbyterian
minister and theology professor, Dulles had been taken aback
by the decision of his youngest son, Avery, to convert to
Catholicism in 1941. Avery then took matters further by
entering a Jesuit seminary and taking the initial vows of
the Catholic priesthood. The charges seemed to be sticking,
and O'Connor, with Dulles' approval' sought to bring father
and son together to discredit the claims. Avery, however,
under the strict rules of the Jesuit Order, was confined to
his seminary in Woodstock, New Jersey. O'Connor sought the
help of Father Robert Gannon, former head of Fordham
University, to see if "there [was] any way Avery could be
brought to New York?" to which Gannon responded "Tell the
senator I'm sure we can work something out." Indeed,
something was worked out and Avery appeared at the family's
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New York home for a photo session with his father. Hagerty
later claimed the photos were intended only for use in the
metropolitan areas with "the idea being to appeal to the
Italian and other Catholic voters in the city." But the
pictures were distributed upstate as well and, according to
Hagerty, "probably didn't gain us anything. Because I think
there was a certain feeling upstate about the Catholic
connection." [22]
Dulles, then, was clearly aware of the importance of
both the Catholic periphery's electoral importance and its
central role in the development of the culture of
anti-Communism. The Dulles/Eisenhower team would lay out a
strategy of "liberation" rather than "containment" which was
"motivated in fact more by determination to lure East
European voting blocs away from the Democrats than from any
realistic expectations of 'rolling back' Moscow's sphere of
influence." Dulles elaborated on this theme of liberation in
an article entitled "A Policy of Boldness" which appeared in
the May 19, 1952 issue of Life magazine. "Our policies have
largely involved emergency action to try to 'contain' Soviet
communism by checking it here or blocking it there," he
wrote, but "we are not working, sacrificing and spending in
order to be able to live without this peril -- but to live
with it, presumably forever." Such a policy was clearly
unacceptable to the people of the United States, according
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to Dulles, and just as unacceptable to the people in the
enslaved nations. The task of liberation would not be quick
and easy, but the people in the captive nations must be made
aware that America was on their side. "Liberation from the
yoke of Moscow will not occur for a very long time, and
courage in neighboring lands will not be sustained, unless
the United States makes it publicly known that it wants and
expects liberation to occur." The transition to liberation
from Moscow's domination should be on the model of Tito's
Yugoslavia and a "peaceful separation" because, Dulles
wrote, "We do not want a series of bloody uprisings and
reprisals." [23]
Dulles 's thinking dominated the Republican platform
hammered out in Chicago in July of 1952. The platform
attacked the Democrats because "they profess to be following
a defensive policy of 'containment' of Russian communism
which has not contained it," but rather "abandons countless
human beings to a despotism and godless terrorism which in
turn enables the rulers to forge the captives into a weapon
for our des tr uct i on . " [ emphas is added] The phrase "godless
terrorism" would of course remind all Americans of the
activity in the satellite states against organized religion,
particularly Catholicism. The platform went on to state:
"The Government of the United States, under Republican
leadership, will repudiate all commitments contained in
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secret understandings such as those at Yalta which aid
Communist enslavements." Further, "it will be made clear, on
the highest authority of the President and the Congress,
that United States policy, as one of its peaceful purposes,
looks happily forward to the genuine independence of those
captive peoples." [24]
Eisenhower in particular was not thinking of
liberation in the sense that the United States was going to
confront the Soviet Union over the control of its sphere of
influence in Eastern Europe and liberate the satellite
countries. Rather, both he and Dulles would lend America's
moral support to indigenous democratic forces that by
peaceful means were attempting to throw off Soviet
domination. In reality they were speaking of liberation by
containment. The public, however, heard much more strident
rhetoric. The Eisenhower/Dulles doctrine mirrored that put
forward by Senator Brien McMahon, Democrat of Connecticut
and a Catholic, as early as 1951 during the debates over the
MacArthur proposals for widening the war in Korea. McMahon
argued that Korea was in reality only a holding action while
the United States built up the economic and military power
of the free world. He regarded internal revolution in the
communist countries as inevitable and that America could
facilitate this with a well planned propaganda effort "a
kind of intellectual invasion which will do more to weaken
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the Kremlin than any other thing we could possibly do in the
military field." Containment was to be a pro-active policy
according to McMahon. This argument came under attack in the
Senate from both Robert Taft and Richard Nixon but is
strongly reflected in Dulles' Li_fe. article. [25]
The era of a bipartisan foreign policy was over. Not
only did the Republican platform reflect this change, the
convention itself was a virtual nonstop attack on
Roosevelt/Truman policies from start to finish. The keynote
speaker was none other than General Douglas MacArthur
. He
was followed by House Minority Leader Joseph Martin, Senator
Joseph McCarthy with his charge that the Democrats had
presided over "twenty years of treason" and former
Ambassador to China Patrick Hurley. Not only was
bipartisanship a thing of the past, now there was open talk
of "treason." The lineup of speakers -- Martin, McCarthy,
Hurley -- and their message, was an obvious tipoff of an
all-out Republican effort to capture the ethnic. Catholic,
big city voters that formed the core of the Roosevelt
coalition. The realities of domestic politics, which
prompted FDR to send Edward J. Flynn on his mission to
Moscow and Rome following the Yalta conference hoping to
forestall a confrontation between the Vatican and the
Kremlin in Eastern Europe was being played out in the
campaign speeches of the 1952 presidential election.
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Perhaps the most dramatic incident of the 1952
presidential campaign occurred not between the presidential
candidates, but between Eisenhower and Senator Joseph R.
McCarthy of Wisconsin. It is generally conceded among
historians that Eisenhower detested McCarthy and all that he
stood for, especially following McCarthy's attack on General
George Marshall, Ike's mentor and colleague. It was an
article of political faith at the time that McCarthy carried
great weight with Catholic voters in big cities, the very
voters the Republicans wanted to peel away from the
Democratic Party. There had been criticism from the right
wing of the party following the convention when Eisenhower
made a decision not to campaign in either Wisconsin for
McCarthy or Indiana for Senator William Jenner. But
following McCarthy's overwhelming showing in the Wisconsin
primary in September, Eisenhower aides insisted the campaign
train visit Wisconsin. Ike was prepared to use the
opportunity of a speech in Milwaukee, where he would share
the same stage with McCarthy, to defend Marshall and his
career. Eisenhower was prepared to say he had known Marshall
for 35-years "as a man and as a soldier." Marshall was
"dedicated with a singular selflessness and the profoundest
patriotism to the service of America." The recent "charges
of disloyalty" were "a sobering lesson in the way freedom
must not defend itself." [26]
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But as the campaign train moved into Wisconsin both
Eisenhower's aides and prominent Republicans began to doubt'
the wisdom of attacking McCarthy on his home turf.
Republican Governor of Wisconsin Walter Kohler and national
committeeman Henry Ringling urged the candidate to delete
the reference to Marshall. McCarthy himself boarded the
train and warned Eisenhower that if he disagreed with him
publicly in Wisconsin he would be booed. Eisenhower replied
that he had been booed before and didn't mind. Kohler then
approached Eisenhower aide Sherman Adams, arguing that to
attack McCarthy could jeopardize both local and national
Republican candidates. Adams again approached Eisenhower
over the critical passage, noting that he agreed with
Kohler's position. Ike, described as "purple with rage,"
finally succumbed to the political realities and ordered the
passage on Marshall taken out of the Milwaukee speech. In as
much as the speech had already been released to the press
the fact that Eisenhower did not mention Marshall when he
delivered the speech caused an even greater embarrassment to
the candidate who was now portrayed as being intimidated by
McCarthy. The speech itself was a ringing endorsement of
McCarthy's themes. "Two whole decades our national life" had
been "poisoned" by a national tolerance for Communism,
Eisenhower said. Just as McCarthy and Catholic doctrine had
been saying, this evil doctrine had worked its way into
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schools, labor unions, news organizations "and — most
terrifyingly-- into our government." This resulted in
"contamination in some degree of virtually every department,
every agency, every bureau, every section of our
government," Eisenhower declared, and "it meant a government
by men whose very brains were confused by the opiate of this
deceit." The fall of China, he asserted, and the "surrender
of whole nations" in Eastern Europe could be laid at the
feet of Communists working in Washington. Eisenhower seemed
to be quoting from McCarthy himself when he proclaimed both
domestic and foreign policy of the previous administrations
"meant -- in its most ugly triumph -- treason itself." [27]
Whatever the reaction of the press and the Democrats
the political strategy appears to have paid off. The
domestic political reaction that FDR attempted to forestall
by sending Flynn to Moscow and Rome in 1945 and that Truman
managed to overcome with his efforts to promote a bipartisan
foreign policy and a hard line approach to the Soviet Union
in 1948 materialized in 1952. Ethnic Catholic voters in
large numbers deserted the Democratic Party and joined
Protestants in putting a Republican in the White House for
the first time since 1932. Pollster Louis Harris identified
the issue succinctly when he wrote, "There is no doubt that
a foreign policy issue -- the war in Korea -- dominated all
other issues in the election." The stalemated war in Korea
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"grated and gnawed" declared Harris and fused the public's
frustration with the administrations apparent failure to
deal with the Soviet Union since the end of the war.
"Somehow, it summed up all the impatience and protest the
people felt," he claimed, "It was easily the Achilles heel
of the Democratic campaign. It was the. issue on which an^
Democratic answer had little chance from the start." [28]
Korea managed to focus the attention of the electorate
while at the same time highlighting the issue of Communists
in government. The perception of a failed Far Eastern
policy, perhaps undermined by Communist agents working
within the State Department, resulted in a majority of
Americans "believing the issue a major one, and by an
overwhelming four to one count, that only the Republicans
could clean the Reds out of Washington." More importantly,
the Eisenhower/Dulles rhetoric of liberation rather than
containment, while not appreciably different from what some
Democrats such as Brien McMahon were saying, conveyed to
large numbers of Catholic ethnic voters the belief the
Republicans were prepared to liberate their homelands. The
trend was across the board among Catholic voters and
reversed "an identification of their economic self-interest
with the New Deal." FDR's pro-British foreign policy had
resulted in a drop off of German, Irish and Italian voting
strength in both the 1940 and 1944 elections. Truman had
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managed to bring these voters back in 1948. German voters
present an interesting example because they were not
overwhelmingly Catholic as were the Irish, Polish and
Italians. Both Catholic and Protestant German-Americans had
a long tradition of voting Democratic. In 1952 both groups
came over to the Republicans in large numbers. However, 55
per cent of German Catholics "bolted from their past
political affiliation and voted Republican" as opposed to
roughly one-third of German Protestants. That 22 percent
more German American Catholics switched voting patterns is a
statistically significant margin and suggests something
other than etnicity was at work. Catholic anti-Communism, it
would seem, provides the answer to the difference. [29]
The movement among Irish voters was just as dramatic.
Early indications seemed to indicate Irish voters would
maintain their loyalty to the Democratic candidate, but
there were reservations. A September poll taken at the
traditional kickoff of the campaign season showed 43 per
cent of Irish voters favoring Stevenson, 24 per cent
favoring Eisenhower but a large 33 per cent in conflict or
undecided. By October the shift had taken place with a
majority, 51 per cent favoring Eisenhower. Most of this
shift came from the previously undecided as Stevenson's
total dipped to only 42 per cent, but the undecided dropped
to seven per cent from 33 per cent. The Irish had made up
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their minds and decided on Eisenhower. This movement of the
Irish away from the Democratic Party held particular
significance in terms of the impact of McCarthy on the
election and the decision of Eisenhower not to confront
McCarthy over the Marshall issue. This is not meant to
convey the idea that the Irish, or any other ethnic group or
Catholics as a whole, moved in lockstep with McCarthy or
followed his political advice. But enough of them did to be
considered decisive in any given election. The real issue
for these groups was ant i
-Communism, not McCarthy or the
tactics he employed. [30]
This Catholic ant i
-Commun ism was perhaps best
illustrated in Massachusetts where young Congressman John F.
Kennedy was seeking the Senate seat held by Henry Cabot
Lodge, Jr. Here was a virtual direct confrontation between
the core and the periphery. An Irish Catholic politician
whose grandfather had been a ward boss in Boston against a
Boston brahmin whose grandfather had been the architect of
defeat for the Treaty of Versailles. Kennedy's father
represented new Irish wealth and power. Lodge's father
represented old Yankee wealth and power. Lodge himself was
one of the movers behind the Eisenhower candidacy. But with
some 750,000 Irish voters in the state, and a majority of
the state's voters being Catholic, Lodge felt the need to
have fellow Senator Joe McCarthy endorse his candidacy for
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reelection. But McCarthy had developed a close relationship
with the Kennedy family, particularly with Joseph Kennedy,
who frequently invited the Wisconsin Senator to the family
compound at Cape Cod for Kennedy style weekends. The elder
Kennedy also sought to keep the Wisconsin Senator out of
Massachusetts by contributing $10,000 to his reelection
campaign. Jesuit historian Donald Crosby asserts that Lodge
avoided calling on McCarthy for help in Massachusetts
"probably because he disliked McCarthy." Thomas C. Reeves,
however, writing at a later date and with more information
available, asserts that "Lodge strongly desired McCarthy's
assistance, he telephoned the McCarthy office almost daily
appealing for the senator's aid." McCarthy's asking price
for his assistance, that Lodge "introduce him personally
wherever he appeared and wholly endorse his fight against
the Reds," was too high for Lodge, as McCarthy knew it would
be. [31]
Measuring McCarthy's impact on the overall Irish move
to the Republicans in 1952 is of course impossible. Crosby
tends to downplay McCarthy's influence among the Irish and
particularly among Catholics. Instead he focuses on the fact
that a narrow majority of Catholics remained Democratic
voters. Harris, more accurately, emphasizes the dramatic
shift from the historically high Catholic vote of up to 80
per cent for FDR in 1936 and the traditional two-to-one
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margin among Catholic voters for the Democratic Party as the
basis for a potentially permanent new Republican majority.
The Irish and Germans were essentially part of the old
stock immigrant groups. The new groups, the Poles, Italians,
Hungarians, Lithuanians, Czechs and Russians had come into
their own politically as part of the New Deal. Al Smith had
been the first Democratic candidate to benefit from these
groups, and FDR had seemingly solidified their alligence to
the Democratic party. A quick look at the above list
indicates that with the exception of Italy, the homelands of
all these groups were under the domination of the Soviet
Union. These were the groups FDR feared might bolt the party
and in the process bring along their co-religionists. He
even raised the political implications of the Polish and
Lithuanian vote with Stalin at Teheran. His great fear at
the moment, of course, was for the "six or seven million
Polish voters" in the United States.
During the war years the Poles had remained solidly
Democratic, while the Italians had shown signs of moving
away as had the Germans and Irish. The postwar years brought
the Italians back as they began to make progress within the
party, even challenging the Irish for leadership of Tammany
Hall in New York. Italian-Americans were also less concerned
with the outcome of the Roosevelt/Truman foreign policy
since their homeland, while having a large Communist party.
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was not under the direct influence of Moscow. "The Polish
groups," according to Harris, "were torn between the avowed
anti-Communist foreign policy program of Truman and Acheson,
and the stories they were to hear with increasing anger that
the Democrats had sold their homeland down the river at
Yalta and in the years that followed." They expressed this
anger in the polling booth. The Polish vote that FDR had
struggled so mightily to keep in the Democratic column by
avoiding the issue of Poland as much as possible in 1944
"broke heavily over to Eisenhower as the campaign moved into
high gear early in October." The final vote in November 1952
showed voters of Polish descent splitting evenly between the
candidates. This, of course, was a disaster for the
Democrats. Eisenhower had neutralized a huge ethnic voting
block that traditionally voted over 70 per cent Democratic.
More importantly they were concentrated in big industrial
cities: Chicago, Milwaukee, Buffalo, Detroit; and in states
with large electoral vote counts: Illinois, Michigan, New
York, Pennsylvania. In the final analysis "three out of
every ten voters of Polish descent who had always voted
Democratic in the past broke ranks and voted Republican for
the first time in 19 52 . " f emphas is added] And the issue that
separated the Poles from the Democratic Party was Communism.
At the outset, in early September, polls indicated that
while Korea and the issue of Communists in government were
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important to Polish voters economic issues such as high
prices were their primary concern. By mid-October this had
changed dramatically with two out of three Polish voters
citing "Reds in government" as the key issue. [32]
The results of the 1952 election seem to confirm the
fears of FDR expressed as early as 1942 through Myron Taylor
to Pius XII. The fate of Eastern Europe, largely Catholic
Eastern Europe, would have political repercussions within
the United States. This fear, expressed again to Archbishop
Spellman in 1943 prior to the Teheran Conference, that this
Russian domination would not be "too harsh" had indeed
proven to be, as FDR phrased it, "wishful thinking." The
religious conflict FDR had foreseen developing between the
Vatican and the Kremlin had burst forth in a series of show
trials in virtually every country of Eastern Europe. While
this conflict was not exclusively directed at Catholics they
were the most prominent targets, and attracted the most
publicity. FDR's fear that the fate of Poland would develop
beyond simply a Polish issue into a broader Catholic issue
had taken place. Catholics had deserted the Democratic party
in large enough numbers to swing the 1952 election
decisively to Eisenhower. The key issue was foreign policy
as conducted by the Roosevelt/Truman administrations in the
face of an increasingly assertive Soviet Union. The Catholic
periphery was dominating this discussion through the church
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hierarchy's call for concerted American reaction against the
threat of Soviet expansion, the efforts of Catholic
politicians to alter the course of policy decisions such as
in Spain, and Catholic involvement in the increasingly
divisive campaign to identify a seemingly failed foreign
policy with traitors in government.
The ability of the Republican Party to cast the
stridently ant i
-Commun is t foreign policy of the Truman
administration as being "soft on communism" becomes clearer
when viewed from the perspective of the Catholic periphery
and its domestic political implications rather than from the
theories of postwar American economic imperialism. The
ability of the Republican Party to maintain the new majority
achieved in the 1952 election would now rest with the
success or failure of the Eisenhower/Dulles conception of
"liberation" versus the Truman/Acheson concept of
"containment .
"
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EPILOGUE
"I'D LOVE TO RUN WITH A CATHOLIC"
The partisan divergence of opinion on foreign policy
questions that emerged during the 1952 election campaign
continued to dominate any discussion of foreign affairs. The
era of bipartisanship had ended. Henceforth questions
dealing with foreign policy had to be answered with the
potential reaction of a shifting electorate in mind. And as
indicated above, the most important shift had come among
Catholic Democrats. Would they remain in the Republican
column? The importance of the Catholic vote to the
Democratic Party which we have seen so dramatically
illustrated during the Roosevelt/Truman presidencies was now
the concern of the Republican Party. That is a story which
remains to be told in detail. A brief recounting of
international events affecting Catholic political loyalties
during the Eisenhower administration coupled with the
emergence of a national Catholic candidate for the
presidency suggests that the overall theme of religion as a
paradigm of the Cold War continued unabated.
Eisenhower's relationship with the Catholic hierarchy
was no less intimate than his Democratic predecessors.
Cardinal Spellman, presidential aide Sherman Adams later
recalled, was frequently a guest at the famous stag dinners
Eisenhower gave at the White House and indeed might be seen
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leading the guests into dinner on the President's arm. The
President was well aware of the influence Spellman carried
not only in New York, but within the Catholic hierarchy
across the country. In his diary the President related an
incident which occurred during the annual meeting of the
Catholic Bishops in Washington in November 1954. A group of
bishops approached Spellman with a resolution they intended
to bring before the assembly dealing with a controversy on
the Supreme Court. According to Eisenhower's account,
"Spellman 'emphatically objected' to the matter and that 'he
thought the matter was sufficiently serious that he should
bring it to my attention." Spellman reportedly assured the
bishops "their concerns were unjustified." Eisenhower went
on to say the incident "does show the acute sensitiveness of
particular groups in the U.S. in this matter of what they
consider to be proper and equitable representation on all
important governmental bodies, especially the Supreme
Court." While the language of Eisenhower's entry clearly
suggests the resolution dealt with an appointment to the
Court, Robert Ferrell, who edited the diary for publication,
noted the copy of the resolution referred to by Eisenhower
was not found among the President's papers. Nevertheless,
the incident clearly demonstrates the relationship between
Eisenhower and Spellman and the fact that Spellman would go
out of his way to prevent embarrassment to his friend. [1]
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on
A dazzling array of problems faced the new
administration. While efforts to bring the Korean situati
to a resolution took priority, negotiations dealing with the
European Defense Community [EDC] were again in trouble.
Italy and Yugoslavia were still contending over Trieste and
in the midst of all the turmoil the Italians were again
holding elections. Once aga^in the fear of an outright
Communist Party victory in Italy, and what that might mean
for NATO or the prospect of EDC, produced a desire to
influence the election outcome just as in 1947. The new
administration barely had time to settle into office when
Italian-American Catholics were called upon to write to
their relatives "back home" and urge "them to vote with the
best interests of Italy in mind." Walter Faraday, Chancellor
of the Archdiocese of Boston, wrote to pastors in late May
that "an Air Mail letter sent promptly would doubtless help
to influence many to exercise their franchise with
conscientious purpose." The elections, held on June 7,
resulted in a narrow victory for the Christian Democrats and
their smaller coalition party members. Catholic
ant i -Communism, so clearly influencing the culture of
American ant i -Communism, was again playing a decisive role
in Italian politics with American help. In addition to the
efforts of Italian-Americans to influence votes the American
Ambassador Claire Booth Luce [a convert to Catholicism] and
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the AFL-CIO under George Meany worked "massively" against
the Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro [CGIL] a
union federation run by the Italian Communist Party to
undermine their effect on the election. Ten days later
Soviet tanks rolled through East Berlin in the first
demonstration that Soviet military power would be used to
control discontent among dissatisfied workers. [2]
In the Far East the situation in French Indochina was
on the verge of total collapse. With French forces under
siege at Dien Bien Phu an international conference opened at
Geneva to settle the issue. In something of a reversal of
positions congressional Democrats were now calling for
assurances from the administration that its policy of
"united action" in Indochina would generate adequate Allied
support. The Democrats seemed to have quickly learned the
lessons of being in the opposition. On April 7 the New York
Times carried a two-column front-page story dealing with
what it termed "a grave foreign policy debate" in the
Senate. Senator John F. Kennedy, Democrat of Massachusetts,
according to the Times
.
"precipitated the debate" and
"called on the Administration to tell the people of the
United States 'The blunt truth about Indo-China' " while at
the same time declaring he backed the policy of united
action "in principle." Yet, paradoxically, he also claimed
that "so long as the French withheld the promise of
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independence from the Indo-Chinese, no amount of military
intervention by the United States could win the war against
the Communist-led rebels." [3]
Kennedy asserted that a guarantee of independence
would result in a "reliable and crusading native army" that
would "deserve and get the military support of this and
other free countries" and might "lead to United States
involvement in the war." He drew immediate responses from
Everett Dirksen of Illinois and William Knowland of
California. Dirksen declared he could "give reassurance that
the President had no intention of cutting across the power
held by Congress alone to declare war." Already the
Republicans saw the constitutional argument they raised
against Truman's introduction of U.S. troops into Korea
without prior congressional approval being used against
Eisenhower in Indochina. Knowland was preparing a defense
against unreliable allies, another major issue raised by the
Republicans in Korea. Knowland demanded to know "how far
they would go in a common effort in the Indo-China theatre"
and that if United States forces ever had to go to Indochina
"others must march with them." It was Kennedy, however, in a
speech "saluted by several of his colleagues," who was
defining the Democrats' position. Kennedy charged,
ironically given later similar charges against his
administration, that the Administration "had persistently
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been over-optimistic and less than candid" on both the
military situation and the political question of the French
granting independence. Without this grant of independence
"the hard truth" was that the people of Indochina would not
"give adequate support to the fight against the
Communist-led rebels." And without their support "no
military victory could be won. United States intervention or
no United States intervention." Kennedy concluded by
declaring: "The battle against communism should be a battle
not for economic or political gain but . . . f or those values
and institutions which are held dear in France and
throughout the non-communist world." While not spelling out
what those values and institutions were, it does not require
a great leap to conclude Kennedy was referring to both
democratic and Christian values that atheistic Communism was
attacking in Eastern Europe and threatening to overrun in
As i a . [ 4 ]
Kennedy was quick to capitalize on the attention his
Senate speech produced. On August 8, 1954, only two weeks
after the conclusion of the Geneva Conference, Kennedy
authored an article entitled "Foreign Policy Is the People's
Business" which appeared in the New York Times Magazine . The
Senator was concerned with the impact of "myths" which
distorted the hard realities of foreign policy decisions.
The French, for example, were more concerned with "the
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ancient fear of a rearmed Germany" than with the "menace of
Soviet aggression." The Senator's mail convinced him that
similar attitudes were influential in America and "are
frequently more influenced by ethnic and cultural ties with
the problem areas involved, or with ancient hostilities than
by the necessities of world security." The Senator had his
finger on the periphery's pulse and was seeking to use that
in a partisan manner without seeming to do so. "The present
crisis," according to Kennedy, "requires greater
participation of American public opinion in the foreign
policy-making process." This public opinion, however, "needs
enlightenment on the United States new role as leader of the
free world... the sheer fact of our physical and economic
strength, and our position as the only real counter to the
forces of communism in the world today." Kennedy needed no
convincing that NSC-68 should be the policy of the United
States. [5]
Hinting at where his true future aspirations lay,
Kennedy told his readers this new enlightened and
participatory public opinion "requires firm, candid and
responsible leadership." That leadership had to come from
the President because "in the last analysis" it was "to the
President, with his constitutional role of foreign policy
spokesman that we look for our initial information and
guidance." Kennedy's views on presidential leadership were
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evolving with his own aspirations. On election eve 1960 he
would remark that the presidency had become "the center of
action." Public opinion would "flounder and drift" if the
Pres ident ' s statements on foreign pol icy lacked "f irmness
and consistency." Kennedy suggested such leadership was now
lacking in dealing with the Far East. "If the public is
unable to determine what our policy is in Indochina, that
is, the policy of the United States, not the policy of the
Vice-President or the Majority Leader or the Chiefs of
Staff, then whatever our policy may be, it cannot succeed .
"
The Amer ican "foreign pol icy mythology" was the "subject of
gross oversimplification" in terms of "how we ' lost ' China
or why we are in Korea." The same tendency was evident in
our dealings with Indochina. "It is apparent to all,"
Kennedy wrote, "that the very foundation of American
assistance in Indochina rested upon a miscalculation of the
military program of the French Union forces," and that the
State Department "under both Democratic and Republican
leadership failed to recognize the nature and significance
of the independence movement in Indochina . " [ 6
)
The Junior Senator from Massachusetts was of course
playing partisan politics to a large degree. With the
Republicans in control of the White House it was easier to
urge that public opinion influence foreign policy decisions
and to decry the lack of presidential leadership. Such was
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the case with "the use of beguiling slogans, including most
recently 'the new look' and 'massive retaliation.'" While
acknowledging that "the science of opinion research has made
gigantic strides in recent years," Kennedy admitted "even
some of the more reputable polling agencies fall far short
of necessary standards of validity and reliability." in
calling for public opinion to carry greater weight with
policy makers Kennedy proposed "new and better techniques
for gauging that opinion." He could not help but be aware
that public opinion "influenced by ethnic and cultural ties
to the problem area involved," in this case the cultural
ties of American Catholics with Vietnamese Catholics, was
about to take on added significance. In fact these cultural
ties were already being noted in the press. On August 6,
only two days before Kennedy's article appeared, the Times
carried a story announcing the Archdiocese of New York was
already sending aid to Vietnam's refugees. The article noted
that "Cardinal Spellman had received information from his
•brother bishops' in Vietnam of the massed flight of
civilians from North to South Vietnam to escape from the
Communist-led Vietminh." The announcement of the aid came in
the form of a pastoral letter to be read at all masses that
Sunday, the same day Kennedy's article appeared in the
Sunday Times . According to the Times
,
Spellman's letter went
on to declare: "Happily, our Government which has so
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generously come to the aid of other afflicted peoples has
taken swift steps to assist in the evacuation and
resettlement of the Vietnamese by providing them with
transportation, clothing and food." The Cardinal then
thanked all those who had made such a "generous response" to
the recent Bishops Appeal which enabled the Archdiocese "to
supplement American governmental subsidies by shipments of
food and clothing which are already on the high seas." On
the same page with the article on Spellman the Times carried
a picture of refugees sleeping on mats in the streets of
Hanoi awaiting transportation south. [7]
The next week, on August 16, the Archdiocese utilized
the celebration of the Feast of the Assumption to again warn
that "the death sentence" of the United States had "been
pronounced in Moscow" and that Americans and "other free
men... cannot live in peace with atheistic communism." This
declaration was made by Bishop Joseph F. Flannelly,
administrator of St. Patrick's Cathedral, at the mass of the
assumption welcoming Mile. Genevieve de Galard-Terraube , a
young French Army nurse known as the "angel of D i enb i enphu .
"
In a politically-charged sermon Flannelly said it was
"unfortunate" that "many of our blind leaders are leading
the blind to the conclusion that atheistic communism and
Christian civilization can exist together." The Bishop
acknowledged Mile, de Galard from the pulpit, telling her
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that "Catholics were proud of her as a fellow communicant
because her care of the wounded during the Indochina siege
was a practical demonstration of the Christian religion." In
addition, he hoped her visit "would awaken Americans to to
power of the 'destructive force of communism.'" Flannelly
then said, "We must turn from indifference and indecision
and convince ourselves that we cannot live in peace with
atheistic communism. It is simply and solely a force of
destruction. It is the enemy of liberty, of peace and of
God." Following mass. Cardinal Spellman presided at a lunch
at his residence for Mile, de Galard at which he presented
her with a medal "imprinted with his motto and coat of
arms." To complete the circle of Catholic attention, vespers
in the cathedral that day saw "Hungarians and Americans of
Hungarian descent honored St. Stephen, the first
constitutional monarch of Hungary." A picture of Spellman
presenting the medal to Mile, de Galard accompanied the
story . [ 8
1
By mid-December 1955 Eisenhower was considering the
possibility of seeking a second term and in the process was
reflecting on the large numbers of Democrats that had
deserted their traditional party to vote for him. As we have
seen, a great proportion of these Democrats were Catholic.
Eisenhower was concerned with keeping these voters in the
Republican camp. He first raised the issue with Press
381
Secretary Jim Hagerty in discussing the prospect of turning
the country back "into the hands of people like Stevenson,
Harriman, and Kefauver." Ike noted that two of the potential
Democratic candidates had been divorced and "up until
recently there has been a political axiom that no divorced
man could ever be elected President of the United States."
If it were possible for a divorced man to be elected, was it
not also possible for a Catholic to be nominated and
elected? Ike queried Hagerty on the prospects of Ohio
Governor Frank Lausche, and Hagerty responded that he "did
not know whether a Catholic could be nominated or not, let
alone elected." While Eisenhower was often characterized as
politically inept, in this case he demonstrated a wide
understanding of both the electorate and the internal
politics of Washington. Declaring that "Sam Rayburn and
Lyndon Johnson are going to be politically important," he
told Hagerty "they don't care much for Stevenson or Harriman
and, of course, despise Kefauver." Eisenhower believed "it
might be possible that they might get behind someone like
Lausche." [9]
Hagerty, warming to the topic, told the President
that he thought Lausche "as a Catholic" would be hurt in the
South as Al Smith was. He told Ike that Jim Farley was the
only Catholic he knew in politics who believed he could get
the Democratic nomination and not be hurt in the South due
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to his close relationship with the party district leaders.
Ike still believed Lausche the natural candidate for Rayburn
and Johnson to support. Moreover, he added that "in 1952
many Democrats voted for me because they didn't like
Stevenson and the Truman Fair Deal-New Deal boys [And]
I'm the only Republican that the young folks will support."
The politics of the situation was clear to Ike, "Lausche
would appeal to the youth and hundreds of thousands of
Democrats who left their party to vote for me...." [10]
By February 1956 Eisenhower had firmly decided to
seek a second term, but the question of his running mate was
still open. Now Ike put the question of Lausche running not
as the nominee of the Democratic Party but as his own
running mate. This time Ike and Len Hall, Republican
National Chairman, "found themselves speculating on running
Ike with Lausche, Democrat and Catholic, of Ohio." Hall
seemed so enthusiastic about an Eisenhower/Lausche ticket
that Ike had to remind him "that labor hated Lausche." That
did not matter to Hall, who reminded the President: "Labor
leaders don't like you, but the laboring people vote for
him and vote for you." In addition, putting Lausche on the
ticket would help relieve the Republican image of a stand
still party. "The Republicans seldom do something
different," Hall told Eisenhower: "here you would break the
bugaboo of a Catholic." The potential existed for a new
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alignment of parties, the very thing Eisenhower sought, just
as FDR had in the mid-thirties, "it would just knock the
props out of the opposition," Ike said, and Hall agreed it
would be a "shocker." The fact that millions of Catholics
had left the Democratic Party to vote for Eisenhower and now
could be permanently locked into the Republican Party by
such a move was critical to the underlying dynamics of
presidential politics, as Harris suggested. "I'd love to run
with a Catholic, if only to test it out," the President
remarked. Hall thought it was, perhaps, more crucial, noting
that "if the Republicans didn't run a Catholic this time the
Democrats would next time." At this point Hall mentioned the
future prospects of the young Catholic Senator from
Massachusetts John F. Kennedy, whom he described as an
"attractive guy." [11]
Eisenhower directed Hall to approach Vice-President
Nixon about the possibility of stepping aside and being
named to a cabinet post and at the same time to poll the
Republican County Chairmen about the prospect of having
Lausche on the ticket. He later mentioned several Catholics
whom he considered to be good vice-presidential material
besides Lausche. These included Connecticut Judge John A.
Danaher, whom he appointed to the U.S. Court of Appeals;
Secretary of Labor Jim Mitchell; and NATO Commander Al
Gruenther. He also asked Fred Seaton to prepare a list of
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Republican Catholics but without mentioning what the purpose
of such a list would be. The politics and the importance of
the Catholic vote continued to occupy the attention of
presidents and presidential advisors. [12]
Events in the summer and fall of 1956 brought the
attention of America's Catholics, and most of the rest of
the world, back on the fate of Eastern Europe. In late June
workers in Poznan, Poland rioted following demonstrations
against "bad rations, low pay and unsympathetic management."
Polish Communist troops had "faded away" rather than
confront and disperse their fellow countrymen. According to
Adolf A. Berle, Jr., former Assistant Secretary of State,
the Poznan riots showed three things about the Communist
regimes of Eastern Europe; "First, that demonstrations were
possible and widely known; second, that satellite troops
were more likely to side with their own people than with
Russian policy; third, that the capt ive countries had not
lost their national identity during the ten years of
Russ i an-Commun ist occupation..." The riots indeed resulted
in dramatic change in Poland . Wladyslaw Gomulka, a Pol ish
Tito ist
,
emerged as Chief of State and named a Tito- type
Central Committee. Gomulka even opened negotiations for the
possible withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland. [13]
In October the demonstrations moved to Hungary, where
students in the name of "ant i -Stal ini sm" demanded "liberty
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of criticism, instruction beyond the Marxist dogma, land]
communication with the West." According to Berle, "this was
not a call for autonomy: it was a call for freedom." Soon
appeals for a free economy and freedom of religion were
sweeping the country. As in Poland the Communist Party of
Hungary turned to a Titoist, Imre Nagy, in an attempt to
restore order and confidence in the regime. Also as in
Poland Hungarian Communist troops called on to restore order
refused to shoot at their own countrymen. Dramatically, as
Hungarians battled Russian troops, Joseph Cardinal
Mindszenty "was rescued by a band of freedom fighters and
brought to Budapest." Leo Cherne, Chairman of the
International Rescue Committee, met with Mindszenty as he
prepared to broadcast a message to France and Germany.
According to Cherne, the Cardinal was surrounded not only by
young priests and aides, but "with Hungarian leaders from
many political parties," seeking the Cardinal's advice "as
to whether to associate themselves with the Nagy Government,
which on this day was forming along anti-Communist lines."
Thus, after eight years imprisonment, Joseph Cardinal
Mindszenty, however briefly, was back at the center of
Hungarian affairs. "Obviously," Cherne said, "the Primate
had assumed his role of leadership almost in the hour of his
liberation." 114]
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Mindszenty was also back as the focus of American
Catholic perceptions of Communist persecution. His freedom,
"however short lived, put a seal of accomplishment on the
Hungarian revolt." The Russian crackdown, when it came, was
all the more shocking in light of statements that generated
hope of a peaceful settlement. Marshall Georgi Zhukov, who
had developed a close wartime friendship with Eisenhower,
told a Moscow press conference the Russians were willing to
discuss "revision of the Warsaw Pact." An official Soviet
statement followed Zhukov's: "The Soviet Union is ready to
examine with the other Socialist states which are
participants in the Warsaw treaty the question of Soviet
troops stationed in the ... Hungarian and Rumanian Republics
[ and ] in the Polish Rep ub lie." Eisenhower expressed the
be lief that if the Soviets meant what they said the world
might be on the brink of "the greatest forward stride toward
justice, trust and understanding among nations in our
generation." Indeed, the concept of "liberation" generated
from within as outlined by the Eisenhower/Dulles foreign
policy seemed on the threshold of realization. [15]
When reinforced Red Army units reversed themselves and
headed back into Budapest, Nagy called on the United Nations
Secretary General to "put on the agenda of the General
Assembly the question of Hungary's neutrality and defense of
this neutrality by the four great powers." The Soviet
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representative denied reports that tanks were moving back
into Hungary. Nagy broadcast from Budapest that Soviet
troops had indeed attacked "with the clear intention to
overthrow the lawful, democratic Government of the Hungarian
people." With Russian tanks crushing the revolt Nagy and his
Cabinet were arrested. Cardinal Mindszenty sought asylum in
the U.S. ligation. A final message delivered over a
Hungarian radio station appealed to the "People of Europe,
civilized people of the world, in the name of liberty and
solidarity, we are asking you to help Listen to our cry.
Start Moving. Extend to us brotherly hands." Clearly, at
least some within the Hungar ian movement were hopeful that
their efforts at "liberation" would bring assistance from
outside Hungary. Even the editors of the Jesuit weekly,
Amer ica
^
recognized the dangers inherent in such a move
:
"To have answered the Hungar ian appeal with armed legions of
free men would have precipitated World War III." They also
recognized that the announcement of the formation of a new
Hungarian government of "peasants and workers" came
"fittingly" from "Radio Moscow." [16]
All of this, of course, was taking place in the midst
of a presidential election in the United States and was
compounded and confused by the s imultaneous conflict between
the United States and its principal allies Britain and
France over the Suez Crisis. The crushing of the Hungarian
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revolution left a hallow ring to the policy of "liberation"
in the minds of the very Catholic ethnic voters to whom it
was first designed to appeal. However, the denouement came
after the votes were cast and the Catholic voters that had
switched to Eisenhower in 1952 (whom he considered so
important he discussed the possibility of placing a Catholic
on the ticket with him in 1956), remained solidly
Republ ican
.
However, doubts about "1 iberat ion" and just
exactly what it meant surfaced almost immediately in both
the secular and religious press. The editors of Amer ica
questioned the "U.S. Policy of Liberation" in the December
1, 1956 issue. At a November press conference "a deadly
ser ious Pr es ident " was asked about "charges that the
Government, after having encouraged the captive satellite
nations to revolt, had failed the Hungarian people in their
tragic hour of heroism and agony." Eisenhower, after
expressing sympathy for the Hungarians and their cause
declared: "I must make one thing clear: the United States
doesn ' t now, and never has, advocated open rebellion by an
undefended populace against force over which they could not
possibly prevail." Rather, the policy of the administration
"always urged that the spirit of freedom be kept al i ve; that
people do not lose hope." [17]
The President was then asked to explain comments by
Vice President Nixon in which he claimed events in Poland
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and Hungary proved the liberation policy correct and "in
view of the latest developments, could you explain, sir,
what the liberation position of the Administration is?"
Again Eisenhower stated we "never asked for a people to rise
up against a ruthless military force," and "we simply insist
upon the right of all people to be free to live under
governments of their own choosing." Conceding that the
"President's words might sound singularly uninspiring," the
editorial in America went on to cite a column by Arthur
Krock in the New York Times calling on the public to be
realistic: "unless this Government and this people go to war
with Russia," there was no possibility of "quick rescue...
for the oppressed inhabitants of the satellites." The
editors of Amer ica were forced to agree with Krock in spite
of "the almost guilty knowledge that the only foreigners who
struck a blow for the savagely oppressed Hungarians were
deserters from the Soviet army." Still, the editors claimed
"There must be something more -- something more that the
most powerful nation on earth can do." They then quoted from
a Life magazine editorial that stated "future fights for
freedom on the part of enslaved peoples will find us somehow
prepared to come to their aid," and called on the President
"with his tremendous new mandate," to "develop a
'liberation' policy which is more than words." They then
concluded: "We make that demand our own." [18]
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As usual it was not just the Catholic press that was
reminding Catholics of the terrors of Communism. On the same
day America was editorializing on the inadequacies of the
"liberation" policy. Archbishop Cushing of Boston sent a
letter to all his pastors with instructions that it be read
"at all the Masses in your Church on Sunday, December 9 and
recall it again on December 16 when the collection for the
people of Hungary will be taken up." The letter stated that
the Bishops of the United States had organized a relief
effort for the people of Hungary "who have been the victims
of the most savage and inhuman massacre of modern times."
The nature of events in Hungary meant that "at the moment
our help must be extended to the refugees who have escaped
to our country from the scene of Communist brutality and
terror in their own homeland." According to Cushing, it was
not necessary "for me to describe the tragic plight of the
oppressed and persecuted Hungarian people." The annual
appeals for funds to help relief efforts in Poland was
temporarily replaced by this broad appeal on behalf of
Hungary. Both Poland and Hungary, however, served to keep
the fate of Eastern Europe before American Catholics. These
efforts of the hierarchy in turn spilled over into the
secular press to compliment the already heavy press coverage
being given events in Eastern Europe. [19]
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Within two weeks Gushing was again writing to his
pastors, this time with an appeal from the Bishops
designating December 30 as "A Day of Prayer for the
Persecuted." Gushing left it to each pastor "to make
suitable arrangements in his own parish," but the faithful
"should be exhorted to receive Holy Gommunion
. . . f or this
intention," and some special service "such as a Holy Hour,
or Benediction with Rosary and Sermon" was encouraged.
Enclosed with the letter was a statement issued by the Most
Reverend Francis P. Keough, Ghairman of the Administrative
Board of the National Gatholic Welfare Gonference. If there
was any doubt about just who the "persecuted" were, about
who were being prayed for. Rev. Keough clarified matters in
the first sentence of his statement. "With the sound of the
Hungarian tragedy still ringing in our ears, there is little
likelihood that we of the free world will forget the
sufferings of our fellow Ghristians of that nation as they
end the year in the darkness of renewed slavery." Again the
formula - Ghristianity equals freedom and Gommunism equals
slavery, was at the forefront. The Hungarian revolt was
simply the most recent example. "Their truly noble
uprising," Keough continued, "and the f r ight fulness of their
repression serve as a vivid reminder of all those who for so
long have borne the yoke of atheistic communism." [20]
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According to Keough, Communism was the most
unrelenting foe Christianity ever faced. "Never in history
has any body of Christians borne such widespread and
unrelenting persecution," he wrote: "Even in the pagan days
of the Caesars there were intervals of quiet and places
where the poor and obscure were left unmolested." Not so in
1956 when "throughout the whole vast territory under Red
domination, in Eastern Europe and in Asia, a constant,
grinding terror has everywhere and at all times made itself
felt." The modern totalitarian state was thus far more
efficient than its ancient predecessors, and "modern tyrants
have learned the lesson that, as long as even a few of the
faithful are left, they are certain to raise up from the
seed of their martyred brothers a Christian Church which in
the end will prevail." The story of Poland and Hungary,
therefore, "bespeaks a still large body of Christians whose
faith has been but deepened by their trials." The tyrants,
for all their modern methods and constant attempts to crush
any and all opposition, were faced by the "Church of
Silence" which in the end "will prevail." [21]
As Eisenhower prepared to take office for a second
term Communism continued to seem on the march against
freedom, particularly religious freedom, in both Europe and
Asia. The focus of this religious crackdown continued to be
Roman Catholicism, both in terms of those whom the
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Communists appeared to be cracking down on, and those most
visible and vocal in the struggle against Communism. Yet as
Eisenhower prepared to take the oath of office the editors
of America were just as concerned about the prospects for
religious freedom in the United States. "It is on the
occasion of a Presidential Inauguration," the magazine
editorialized, "that Catholics in America feel most vividly
the heritage of bigotry that has so long hung over them."
The editors pointed, almost despairingly, at "the old
prejudices come to life again" that past summer when Senator
Kennedy had made a brief run at the Vice-Presidential spot
on the Democratic Party ticket. At that point, "fairly
representative Protestants protested that a Catholic, as a
Catholic, did not have the right to be chosen for the high
office of President." That Catholics could still be denied
the highest office in the land seemed incongruous in the
face of the evidence. Thousands of Catholic officers had
faithfully fulfilled their oath in the war and Catholic
legislators on both the State and Federal level had proven
their loyalty. Catholics had even sat on the highest court
in the land and interpreted the very Constitution many
Protestants claimed a Catholic President could only
undermine. "That only the Presidency should be barred to a
Catholic is a striking inconsistency, attributable only to
ill-considered ant i -Cathol icism. " So, as Dwight D.
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Eisenhower took the oath of office on Inauguration Day,
"despite the shadow over them. Catholic Americans have some
reason for hoping that a better time may come. At some
future date a Catholic President-elect may appear on that
same spot before the Capital, take the same oath and win the
same confidence of all America." The editors of America, of
course, were unaware that Eisenhower had actively considered
the possibility of running with a Catholic. The larger
question, given Kennedy's failed attempt to get the
Vice-Presidential nomination, was Len Hall's prediction that
the Democrats would turn to a Catholic, perhaps even that
"attractive" Senator Kennedy, to lure the Catholic Democrats
back to the party they saw as selling out their native lands
to Communism. [22]
The politics of religion and the culture of
ant i -Commun i sm continued to converge during the second
Eisenhower administration. The Eisenhower/Dulles rhetoric of
liberation was badly damaged by Hungary. Senator Kennedy
apparently benefited by losing the Vice-Presidential
nomination. The Eisenhower landslide could not be blamed on
the presence of a Catholic on the ticket. Kennedy was free
to pursue the nomination without a national party defeat
being attributed to his religion.
Meanwhile, would-be presidential candidate Kennedy was
in the process of establishing his credentials in the
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foreign policy field. On August 21, 1957, as negotiations
the test ban were breaking down, Kennedy made a major
foreign policy speech in the Senate calling for a new
approach to Poland and Eastern Europe. Kennedy said he was
"strongly persuaded" of "the inadequacies of current
American foreign policies and programs concerning Poland and
Eastern Europe." It was "baffling beyond words," he declared
to look at "that so-called 'liberation' policy" upon which
the administration had "taken patent rights." In a style
that was to become increasingly familiar he spoke of the
need to "take the hard decisions" and the "real risks"
necessary to a resolution of the problems of Eastern Europe.
Kennedy was particularly critical of the administrations
"liberation" policy as restated earlier in the year by
Secretary Dulles. Labeling it a status quo policy, he noted
that it provided for an American response "only" when the
satellite states "gain more freedom" and not "before." [23]
Notwithstanding its own rhetoric, the administration
had been singularly slow in responding to a Polish loan
request. There was ample evidence that gains had been
registered in Poland; the very type of "steps ...made toward
independence" from Moscow which, according to Secretary
Dulles, would result in American "readiness to respond with
friendly acts." Not the least of this evidence, especially
from Kennedy's perspective concerning the potential
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political reaction of his fellow American Catholics, was the
fact that "at least a precarious working accommodation has
been reached with the Catholic Church in Poland under
Cardinal Wyszynski." Kennedy here was relying on logic
similar to FDR's at the end of the war. If the Polish Church
could make an arrangement to work with the Communist
government, then American Poles, Catholics in general, and
the hierarchy in particular, might be willing to accept a
less hard-line approach to the question of the United States
dealing with the satellite governments. The loan agreement
was "too little and too late," according to Kennedy, and had
come only after "months of haggling, indecision and delay."
All this in spite of the fact that "Mr. Khrushchev has
indicated that he is not happy about it." If Khrushchev was
troubled over this meager loan, what might his reaction be
to "a bolder, more imaginative American foreign policy" that
more closely related to the actual needs and realities of
the Polish situation? Such vacillation on the part of the
administration only strengthened "the Polish Stalinists" in
their conflict with the more moderate Wladyslav Gomulka. If,
on the other hand," Kennedy continued, "we take these risks,
through a more adequate program of loans and other
ass i stance ... we can obtain an invaluable reservoir of good
will among the Polish people, strengthen their will to
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resist, and drive still a further wedge between the Polish
Government and the Kremlin." [24]
Kennedy was particularly critical of Secretary Dulles'
"extreme position" at the time of the Hungarian crisis when
he "wrote off completely any possibility of the use of
American military means in Eastern Europe, thus inviting
Soviet intervention." Dulles and the Republican Party
condemned Dean Acheson for his defense perimeter speech
regarding Korea, Kennedy noted, and "might usefully ponder
Mr. Dulles' much more sweeping remarks of last October in
regard to East Europe." Thus, the threat of possible U.S.
military intervention should not be withdrawn. Kennedy's
speech certainly reinforced what the editors of America had
pronounced the previous December, namely that the people of
the United States and of the satellite countries had not
heard the last word on the policy of liberation in the wake
of Hungary. Kennedy, along with Senator George Aiken,
Republican, Vermont, proposed an amendment to the Battle Act
designed to provide "a more flexible set of economic tools
to promote peaceful change behind the Iron Curtain." The
amendment was defeated by one vote in the Senate, but would
be revived and passed two years later. [25]
In his efforts to marshal bipartisan congressional
support for the administrations pending Mutual Security
bill, Eisenhower again demonstrated his political acumen.
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He now sponsored a conference at the White House with former
President Truman and Archbishop Fulton J. Sheen of
Rochester, New York among the more prominent supporters.
Sheen, of course, had been the most popular television
personalities in the nation, having driven "Mr. Television,"
comedian Milton Berle, off the air.
If Eisenhower was taken aback by officials of State
not fully comprehending his views, he must have been equally
surprised by reactions to the announcement of Khrushchev's
visit made at an August 5th press conference. It would be an
exchange ot visits; Khrushchev coming to the United States
and the President visiting Russia later in the year. The
announcement came at the cone 1 us ion ot Vice-President
Nixon's trip to the Soviet Union and his famed k i tchen
debate with Khrushchev. Even be fore Nixon's trip and during
it Khrushchev repeatedly criticized a Joint Resolution of
Congress declaring .\ "Captive Nations Week 1959" issued by
Eisenhower just before Nixon's went abroad. The resolution
called for a "week of prayer dedicated to the peoples held
captive under Communist dominat ion . " Khrushchev, in Warsaw,
criticized Eisenhower for signing such a resolution and
questioned the advisability of the Nixon visit. [26]
The negative react ion to Khrushchev 's visit came
largely from the Catholic periphery. Both the hierarchy and
many lay leaders opposed the visit by the "Butcher of
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Budapest," as William Buckley's National Revipw Hnhh^H him.
More importantly, those opposing the visit saw the conflict
in terms of a "spiritual struggle." Buckley, addressing an
anti-Khrushchev audience in New York City's Carnegie Hall
also placed the contest in religious terms: "Khrushchev
cannot take permanent advantage of our temporary
disadvantage, for it is the West he is fighting. And in the
West there lie, however encysted, the ultimate resources,
which are moral in nature. Khrushchev is not aware that the
gates of Hell shall not prevail against us." Archbishop
Joseph Hurley of St. Augustine, Florida, recalling events in
Hungary, denounced the visit and declared he would not
welcome "one whose hands are crimson with the blood of our
fellow Christians." Brent Bozell, Buckley's colleague and
fellow Catholic, placed the apparent willingness to appease
Khrushchev in the context of the horrors of modern warfare,
concluding the West had the advantage over "atheist
materialism" by providing the comfort of an afterlife not
available to the Communists. Garry Wills, a former Jesuit
seminarian, "joined the chorus against Khrushchev in
National Review ." The invitation to Khrushchev by Eisenhower
and his advisors was indicative of the "cowardice" that
allowed "the cry of Hungary" to go "unanswered" and could
not "see in Chiang Kai-shek's little garrison a desperate
romance of courage." "The morbidity of the modern soul,"
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according to Wills, "reflects a paralysis in the face of
evil" among those advocating "coexistence" [27]
Eisenhower seemed taken aback by the ferocity of the
attack on Khrushchev's visit. "Many Americans nursed serious
misgivings about the forthcoming Khrushchev visit," he noted
in his memoirs, and "some of the more vociferous (possibly
thinking of the editors and writers of the National Review )
were those who opposed any kind of contact with the
Soviets..," There were others, however, "persons of
standing" from among the nations business, labor and
religious leaders that also opposed the visit. "One
outs t and ing leader who expressed some misgivings , " the
President wrote, "was Francis Cardinal Spellman." Eisenhower
was so concerned about Spellman ' s opposition that he
"telephoned to assure him we would stand firm on Berlin" and
that "the exchange of visits implied no hint of a
surrender." The President was reassured when "the cardinal,
always my great friend, promised he would continue to pray
for the successful outcome of my endeavors." There is no way
to measure the impact of Spellman's decision not to
embarrass his friend. The crowds protesting Khrushchev's
visit to New York were substantial, but the active and
enthusiastic support of the Cardinal, who had repeatedly
demonstrated the ability to produce thousands in the war
against "atheistic Communism, " most certainly would have led
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to greater protest. He had, however, received private
assurances directly from the President that governmental
actions were not going to be detrimental to the interests of
the Cardinal or his church. [28]
The off-year congressional elections in 1958 which
produced a Democratic landslide also produced a Catholic
landslide. In all 102 Catholics were elected to Congress, 90
in the House and 12 in the Senate. For the first time
Catholic representation in Congress was roughly equivalent
to their numbers in the country. Catholics were the largest
single religious body in the Congress; and with a potential
Catholic President emerging as well "interest and concern on
the part of the public, the press, and the academic world"
was focusing on "whether Catholic Congressmen would vote as
a bloc." Democratic party leaders such as Bill Green and Jim
Finnegan in Philadelphia, Richard Daley in Chicago, Robert
Wagner in New Yor]< and Dan O'Connell in Albany represented
crucial urban areas. More important were the Governors of
key states; Pat Brown of California, David Lawrence of
Pennsylvania, Mike DiSalle of Ohio and Steve McNichols of
Colorado. In Massachusetts Senator Kennedy boosted his
presidential hopes with a landslide reelection victory. The
work of Kennedy's pastor, the Archbishop of Boston, was also
recognized as Cushing was raised to the Card inalate . [ 29
]
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The political situation seemed ripe for a return of
the presidency to the Democrats in 1960. The emergence of
Kennedy as a national candidate and the seemingly increased
acceptance of Catholic candidates by the electorate
suggested to many that a Catholic could indeed be elected
President. Catholic politicians, however, mostly Democrats,
feared a Catholic at the top of the Democratic ticket would
only revive the underlying American ant i -Cathol ic ism so
evident in the 1928 campaign. They worried that he might
drag other Catholic candidates down to defeat eliminating
the hard fought gains of a generation. Generally, the church
hierarchy was also anxious about the potential for resurgent
anti-Catholicism that a Catholic presidential nominee might
generate. On a practical level, they had come to expect a
sympathet ic hearing on issues important to the church from
Protestant politicians sensitive to the Cathol ic vote, as
the Eisenhower example illustrates. Specifically, many
members of the hierarchy viewed Kennedy as too liberal and
would have preferred a more conservative Catholic candidate
if there had to be one at all. Even the presence of the
candidate's conservative father in the background and the
longstand ing relat ions hip between Joseph Kennedy and
Cardinal Spellman could not sway the Cardinal to support the
his son . [ 30
]
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While prominent members of the Catholic hierarchy may
have believed Kennedy was too liberal their flock, the
"Catholic vote," would have been hard pressed to identify
just what it was they objected to. The differences were a
question of degree, and on foreign policy issues both
Kennedy and prelates such as Cushing were calling for a more
active anti-Communism. Candidate Kennedy, after all, was
criticizing the Eisenhower/Nixon team for permitting the
extension of the Communist menace into the Western
hemisphere in Cuba, the continuing Soviet challenge to
Berlin, the failure to take a sufficiently tough position on
the defense of the Chinese Nationalist islands of Quemoy and
Matzu and, perhaps most tellingly, allowing the Soviet Union
to take the lead in missile technology thus producing the
"missi le gap ." In terms of campaign rhetor ic, this last was
allegedly the most serious threat to American security.
It is interesting to note the similarities between
candidate Kennedy's campaign rhetoric and that of his pastor
Card inal Cushing, in attempt ing to sort out religion and the
Cold War. Cushing later recalled "Whenever he was home he
never failed to contact me by a telephone call or a personal
visit. Our conversations covered many subjects: for example,
the trends of the times, legislation in which the Catholic
Church and other churches were interested." The
Kennedy/Cushing relationship has been "the subject of much
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speculation," according to historian James M. O'Toole. Much
of that speculation, however, has centered around the depth
of Kennedy's commitment to Catholicism. Many writers have
emphasized his secular Harvard education, others his
divergent views on parochial education and the conflicts
with the Catholic hierarchy that position engendered, still
others his lack of moral commitment to the teachings of the
church due to his sexual promiscuity and frequent
adulteries. Even Cushing has been quoted as saying: "He wore
his religion lightly." Perhaps a more accurate description
is presented by Francis Russell who writes that while
"Catholicism was of course a Boston Irish trademark," the
Jansenist strain which dominated Irish and American Irish
Catholicism was muted, and "Kennedy's Catholicism was Latin
rather than Celtic - to accede to the church, accept it, but
not to let it interfere too much with one's private habits
or one's daily life." While this may explain much about
Kennedy's personal life, more research needs to be done on
the question of Kennedy ' s Catholicism as it relates to his
ant i -Commun ism, both as a candidate and as a President. [31]
The evidence seems to suggest that the ant i -Communist
position of the Catholic periphery which had been defined in
the decade of the 1930s, led to FDR's initiative to reach an
accommodation between the Vatican and the Kremlin, defined
the postwar confrontation over Eastern Europe and the call
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for internal security at home and, re invigorated in the
streets of Budapest, would reach its logical conclusion in
October 1962 when John and Robert Kennedy realized their
options in the Cuban Missile Crisis were limited by the
domestic political realities. The inability to achieve a
permanent peace, foreseen by FDR in his conversation with Ed
Flynn prior to Yalta, is echoed in a conversation between
the Kennedy brothers. "I just don't think there was any
choice," Robert Kennedy told JFK, "and not only that, if you
hadn't acted, you would have been impeached." The President
reflected for a moment and replied, "That's what I think - I
would have been impeached." [32]
The 1960 election marks the culmination of thirty
years of effort on the part of the Catholic periphery to
dominate the Protestant center/core by means of the culture
of ant i -Communism. This trend was particularly prominent in
the postwar era when Catholic anti-Communism governed the
discussion of both domestic and international affairs.
Thomas Garvin of University College, Dublin, Ireland,
building on the earlier work of Seymour Martin Lipsit, has
demonstrated the case for a periphery-dominated center.
According to him, the political party organization of the
early Irish Republic saw Fianna Fail, the political arm of
Eamon De Valera's revolutionary republican movement
"inheriting a core of west coast ultra-nationalist rural
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Republican support." Political developments in Ireland
hinged on "the polarization within Ireland on the question
of relations with Britain," and the political culture of
radical republicanism espoused by De Valera came to dominate
the discussion. This polarization continued into the 1930s
and 1940s as "the stormy character of Anglo-Irish
governmental relations" was kept alive by De Valera's
efforts to establish a truly independent Irish Republic-
This ultra-nationalist republicanism is perhaps best
illustrated by the fact that Ireland, alone among the
English speaking nations of the world, did not declare war
on Germany during WWII. [33]
The parallels between the Irish situation, driven by
the ideology of radical republicanism, and the American
situation, driven by the ideology of ant i -Communism which in
turn was largely driven by Catholic ant i -Commun ism are
striking. Foreign policy as an issue in the 1960 election
was dominated by the no compromise att i tude toward the
Soviet Union being expressed so candidly in the speeches of
both candidates. As historian and Kennedy biographer Herbert
S . Par met has noted , "The issue was not whether the cold war
could be mitigated, not which man was best equipped to
search for peace, but who would face the ' Communist threat *
with greater resolve . " Nixon attacked Kennedy ' s seeming
willingness to give up the Nationalist Chinese held islands
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of Quemoy and Matsu off the China coast, which Kennedy
denied. Kennedy in turn attacked Nixon's part in the loss of
Cuba into the Soviet orbit, charges which Nixon denied. With
both candidates struggling to outdo the other in
demonstrating their ant i
-Communism, members of the Catholic
hierarchy did not need to fear that their no compromise
attitude toward Communism was in jeapordy. "Cold war issues
raised the most passion" in the campaign, according to
Parmet. There simply was no center politically when it came
to anti-Communism. The Vital Center, as described by Arthur
Schlesinger Jr., was just as dominated by anti-Communism as
the extreme right. It is small wonder then that as President
JFK could fear the prospect of impeachment should he be
perceived as giving in to the Soviets on so vital an issue
as missiles in Cuba. [34]
The focus of this work has been the driving force of
religion, more specifically American Catholicism, as a
motivator of the Cold War. The emergence of American
Catholics as a potentially decisive factor in American
politics during the 1930s coincided with the emergence of
the United States and the Soviet Union as the world's
superpowers. Scholars have argued that American Catholic
ant i -Communism was an expression of Catholic nationalism -
an effort to be accepted as true and faithful Americans.
That view places American anti-Communism at the very center
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of American nationalism. This work takes the opposite
position. The importance of Catholicism to politics and in
turn the importance of Catholic ant i
-Communism to American
Catholicism influenced and shaped foreign policy filtered
through domestic politics, beginning with FDR and continuing
until the end of the Cold War. The significance of FDR's
attempted reconciliation between Joseph Stalin and Pius XII
in 1945 and is fully realized in the dramatic meeting
between Mikhail Gorbachev and John Paul II which symbolized
for Catholics everywhere the end of the Cold War. If FDR had
succeeded, would the Cold War have been fought? The evidence
seems clear that he at least thought so, and attempted to
forestall it.
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